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Accession to the Economic and Monetary Union is one of the most important steps
in Hungary's European integration, which will entail abandoning the national currency
and adopting the euro as domestic legal tender. For Hungary as a new member state
in the EU, introduction of the euro will not be an option but an obligation.
Nevertheless, new EU members will have some leeway to set the date of adopting
the euro
1.  Therefore, it is useful to analyse the likely costs and benefits of joining the
euro area for Hungary and to define the choice of medium-term economic policy
strategy in the light of the results of this analysis. The National Bank of Hungary
would like to contribute to the formulation of an economic policy strategy by issuing
this volume, which contains a cost-benefit analysis of the likely effects of the country's
joining the euro area. This analysis is confined strictly to the economic benefits and
costs of introducing the euro and is not intended to examine its other possible
impacts, including, for example, the implications for politics and national security.
Adopting the euro will likely have a permanent impact on Hungarian economic
growth. This impact will become evident through numerous channels. Bank staff
have attempted to quantify and sum up the extent of this impact transmitted
through the various channels. The findings of this analysis suggest that the intro-
duction of the euro will bring about significant net gains in growth. However, wel-
fare is influenced not only by the level and rate of GDP growth, but their stability as
well. A widely fluctuating national income will produce lower welfare than a more
stable one, even if on average the two income levels are identical. For this reason, it
is important to examine whether joining the euro area will increase or mitigate the
volatility of business cycles. In other words, the key question is whether Hungary
and the euro area form an optimum currency area, that is whether the monetary
policy of the euro area is capable of adequately substituting independent
Hungarian monetary policy in smoothing out cyclical fluctuations. In the findings
of this analysis, the euro area seems to be in most respects at least as optimal
a currency area for Hungary as for less developed euro area member countries.
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1 One example of the current EU member states is Sweden, which even though committed to joining
the euro, has been postponing it by staying outside the ERM II. By contrast, Great Britain and
Denmark have an official opt-out. The new EU members did not request an opt-out, and probably
they would not have received one. Quantifying costs and benefits
In estimating the likely costs and benefits of monetary union, it is very important
to clarify to which alternative path those costs and benefits are related. The alter-
native path used in our study reflects possible economic developments if Hungary
enters the EU at a relatively early stage, but refrains from adopting the common
currency for some reason, pursuing independent monetary and exchange rate
policy strategies. This study assumes successful disinflation and continued income
convergence towards the euro area even in the staying-out scenario. However, if
Hungary stays out from currency union, disinflation will entail higher real economic
sacrifices, due to the costs of accumulating and preserving central bank credibility.
Disinflation undertaken with a well-defined purpose and time-horizon of joining
the euro area would probably enjoy higher credibility and thus would be less costly.
As this credibility gain arising from the presence of an early EMU-entry date cannot
be quantified, it has not been accounted for in our cost-benefit analysis, but its
significance will be stressed when determining the optimal timing of joining the
euro area. 
The methodology of estimating the costs and benefits is necessarily eclectic, but
Bank staff have attempted to confirm the calculations from several aspects, taking
account of recent theoretical and empirical findings in the international academic
literature. 
The analysis quantifies three key benefits arising from euro area membership, in
the form of gains from reduced transaction costs, expansion of foreign trade and
a drop in real interest rates (and the simultaneous easing of the current account
constraint). 
Maintaining a country’s own currency can be viewed as an administrative restriction
causing welfare losses to society, since part of the physical and human resources are
tied up due to this very restriction. These losses appear in the form of transaction
costs incurred by firms and households. One group of transaction costs is conversion
costs, comprising fees and commissions charged by banks and other financial
intermediaries for converting euros into forints (and vice versa) and of bid-ask
spreads. The other group contains in-house costs incurred by firms engaged in
foreign currency transactions, due to extra administration and risk management
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these transaction costs and the reallocation of resources released in this way may
raise the level of GDP. Estimates of the magnitude of transaction costs are partly
derived from data for Hungarian foreign exchange market turnover and from the
size of commissions, and partly from international estimates. Thus, Bank staff
estimate that the gains from reduced transaction costs will cause a one-off rise
in the level of GDP of 0.18-0.30 of a percentage point.
The bulk of international empirical research suggests that maintaining an inde-
pendent currency will also have an adverse effect on external trade. In contrast,
currency union with major trading partners will boost a country’s external trade,
leading to higher growth via various externalities (such as technology and
know-how transfer). In this analysis, we have used a methodology that has
recently gained popularity to gauge such effects on external trade and growth.
The approach is based on gravity models and large panel data to estimate the
effect of a currency union. Accordingly, the adoption of the euro may raise
GDP growth by 0.55-0.76 of a percentage point over the long run, via the
expansion of external trade.
Domestic interest rates currently contain a risk premium component to compensate
non-resident investors for the uncertainty about movements in the exchange rate.
The switch to the euro will remove this premium from domestic nominal rates,
causing real rates to be lower. A lower level of real interest rates will in turn encourage
domestic investment. Furthermore, once in the euro area, investment can grow
unhindered by current account deficits, as depreciation will cease to be a threat to
non-resident investors. Thus, the adoption of a common currency will help the
country maintain macroeconomic equilibrium even in the face of a higher current
account deficit, thanks to the removal of a major restraint on investment growth.
More buoyant investment will, over the longer term, boost economic growth and
accelerate convergence towards the average income level within the EU. To
quantify this additional growth, Bank staff have first estimated the size of the
expected reduction in the risk premium following the euro changeover, using
information inherent in the forint yield curve. Using as input the reduction in real
rates obtained in this way, two different models were employed to estimate the
effect on growth in numerical terms. The findings suggest that the common
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over the longer term via lower real rates of interest.
A quantifiable cost of abandoning autonomous monetary policy arises from giving
up part of the government’s revenue from seigniorage. Once inside the monetary
union, Hungary will also share the seigniorage revenues arising from the use of
euro notes and coins. However, due to accounting rules, this share will likely be
lower than if the National Bank had retained its right of issue. Estimates suggest
that lower seigniorage revenues will cause an annual loss in the range of
0.17–0.23 of a percentage point in the level of GDP.
When summarising the benefits and costs, it creates some difficulty that the euro-
induced increases/decreases in GDP are distributed across time in a way that is not
identical or not known for each individual mechanism. Savings arising on lower
transaction costs will presumably appear over the very short term, pushing up the
level of GDP. The same applies to the losses caused by the lower seigniorage.
Therefore, it seems plausible to treat the benefits and costs of entering monetary
union associated with these two items as changes in the level of GDP.
The situation is different with regard to the benefits arising from the reduction in
real rates, the subsequent pick-up in investment and the expansion of external
trade. Here, GDP growth will unfold fully only over the longer term, justifying the
expression of these benefits as changes in the growth rate of GDP. When quantifying
these two effects, the assumption is that GDP will reach the higher level estimated
for the long term (20 years) by growing at an even pace. The benefit obtained
from joining the euro area is expressed in the form of average annual gain in
growth calculated in this way. 
It is important to distinguish between the short-term benefits and costs affecting the
level of GDP and those affecting its rate of growth only in the longer run. Being
approximately equal in size, the quantifiable short-term benefits and costs (i.e.
the gains from reduced transaction costs and the loss due to lower seigniorage)
effectively cancel each other out. The sum of the estimated long-term benefits
reflects significant net gains, as euro area membership may raise the growth rate
of Hungarian GDP by 0.6 to 0.9 of a percentage point in terms of a long-term
(20-year) average. 
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Effect of short-term factors on (the level of) 
GDP as a percentage of GDP
Reduction in transaction costs (+) 0.18–0.30
Change in seigniorage revenue (–) –0.17––0.23
Net effect 0.01–0.07
Table I-2
Effect of long-term factors on GDP growth
(percentage points)
Reduction in real rates (+) 0.08–0.13
Expansion of external trade (+) 0.55–0.76
Net effect 0.63–0.89
Abandoning monetary autonomy and the effect on business cycles
The welfare cost of abandoning the national currency and autonomous monetary
policy is determined by the extent to which business cycle volatility increases in
the wake of joining the euro. This in turn greatly depends on the exposure of the
Hungarian economy to asymmetric shocks, that is unexpected disturbances in the
economic environment affecting Hungary and the euro area to differing degrees.
This study claims that the incidence of asymmetric shocks is no more likely in
Hungary than in current less-developed members of the euro area.
The first reason for this is that integration of Hungarian economy and trade towards
the euro area appears to be on a par with that achieved by current members, in
terms of both quantitative indicators (such as the size of trade with the euro area)
and qualitative indicators (such as export/import structure, weight of intra-industry
trade and penetration of high value added markets). 
Secondly, the structure of the Hungarian economy, in terms of the contribution of
individual sectors to GDP and employment, does not significantly differ from the
euro area average. Thus, sector-specific shocks tend to have a similar effect in
the euro area as in Hungary. Hence, common monetary policy responses to such
9
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Hungary. There exists a certain degree of asymmetry regarding a few specific
industries within manufacturing, but this does not exceed the asymmetry
experienced by the current smaller euro-area members.
The third reason is that since the middle of the past decade, the Hungarian business
cycle has been increasingly in line with that in western Europe, at least as much as
the business cycles of peripheral euro area members in respect of some indicators.
Provided that this trend is permanent, the anti-cyclical monetary policy of the
European Central Bank will be suitably timed, with a cyclical smoothing effect on
the Hungarian economy.
Abandoning independent monetary policy will entail a smaller loss in welfare
provided there exist effective market mechanisms and economic policy instruments
capable of taking monetary policy’s place in the management of the asymmetric
shocks that may arise. 
Comparative studies suggest that Hungary does not lag behind the west European
average in respect of the flexibility of goods markets and probably outperforms the
former in terms of labour market flexibility. Hence, price and wage adjustments by
the market can be counted on in the management of asymmetric shocks at least
as much as in the case of the current euro-area members.
Fiscal policy may be suitable for dampening asymmetric shocks at the aggregate
level in a country. However, to be able to respond with the necessary speed it has
to be sufficiently flexible and unplagued by high deficits or debts. This is to be
ensured by the Maastricht criteria on the size of the budget deficit and public debt
which countries wishing to join monetary union have to meet and, after accession
to the EU, by the requirements laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact.
Adjustment to the shocks can be implemented in two different ways, namely the
operation of automatic stabilisers and active discretionary fiscal measures. As
fiscal revenues and expenditures in today’s Hungary are predominantly linked to
wages and consumption, and as the expenditures are less variable relative to the
cycle, automatic stabilisers do not have a very large effect. However, this should
not be seen as exceptional, as automatic stabilisers play a similarly minor role in
some (typically south European) EU countries. Consequently, discretionary
measures, with special regard to those aimed at smoothing investment activity,
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pronounced role. It should be noted that the EU prefers aggregate demand
management via the automatic stabilisers to that via discretionary measures.
Even though monetary independence is a useful instrument in smoothing cyclical
fluctuations, it may actually magnify the cycles under certain circumstances. For
a small open economy, still classified within the ‘emerging’ market investment
category, maintaining the national currency may by itself induce undesirable
shocks, such as financial contagion and speculative attacks on the currency. A
country sticking to its currency may have to face larger volatility in capital flows
than that experienced by more developed countries and/or countries in a currency
union with their major trading partners. This may also make a mark on the business
cycle, triggering more erratic movements than in the more advanced economies or
in countries that gave up their national currencies. It should be stressed that
although surpassing the emerging market status may by itself mitigate higher capital
flow volatility, it cannot completely eliminate it, as that can only be achieved by
giving up the national currency. Thus, Hungary’s entry into the EU and its
prospective move away from the emerging market status in itself offers no
complete remedy to this problem.
Adopting the euro is also expected to be conducive to financial integration. The
end of exchange rate uncertainty will likely prompt Hungarian households to
reallocate investment portfolios and transfer a large portion of their savings into
euro area instruments. The ensuing higher diversification of portfolios will lead
to a wider distribution of risk across Hungarian and euro-area households, a
welcome development for both parties. Wider diversification of risks will in turn
reduce exposure to asymmetric shocks, since income changes triggered by the
shocks tend to be smaller if portfolios are more diversified. However, it is rather
difficult to quantify the rise in utility through this channel, as that would require
knowledge of both the size of the expected diversification and the risk aversion
of Hungarian households.
Our cost-benefit analysis could be summarised as follows. The quantifiable benefits
arising from joining the euro area considerably exceed the costs entailed, resulting
in higher economic growth and faster real convergence towards western Europe.
It is impossible to quantify the impact of the introduction of the euro area on
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currency will entail the loss of a device for keeping some of the asymmetric
shocks at bay, while, at the same time, it eliminates one potential source of
asymmetric shocks (i.e. emerging market financial contagion). The likelihood of
other asymmetric shocks is not higher than in the less developed euro-area
countries, thanks to the similarity of production structures, the advanced state of
trade integration with the euro area and cyclical synchronicity. Furthermore,
flexible price and wage adjustment mechanisms and discretionary fiscal policy
instruments can tackle any disturbances that may still occur at least as effectively
as in the euro-area member nations at a similar stage of development. 
Timing of joining the euro area 
Since the our cost-benefit analysis has produced convincing evidence in support
of the existence of considerable gains in growth if the single currency is adopted,
the question of optimal timing seems easy to answer: the sooner the better. The
findings suggest that by postponing entry, Hungary will miss out on extra growth.
Nevertheless, the situation is not as simple as that, since nominal convergence, a
prerequisite of joining the euro area, may entail real economic costs, which are not
unrelated to the speed of the accession process. Currently, the rapid fulfilment of
the Maastricht criteria on inflation and the fiscal deficit may be problematic. There
is the danger that rapid disinflation and fiscal adjustment (aimed at a changeover
in 2007) may entail excessive sacrifice of growth. It should be noted however, that
quite a few current euro area countries had to accomplish a similar degree of
fiscal adjustment and disinflation during a similarly short period of time. Follow-up
studies (see for instance, ECB (2002)) reveal that these countries have not
incurred any significant costs in connection with this rapid adjustment. 
Should the issue of postponing Hungary’s adoption of the single currency arise,
the following three implications should be considered. The first is the fiscal policy
obligations emerging right after Hungary joins the EU. The second is the rise in
exposure to speculative capital flows, especially during the period between the EU
entry and joining the euro. The third factor is the effect on the credibility of the
disinflation programme of postponing the participation in the euro area. 
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euro area, since the Agreement requires member countries to reduce fiscal
deficits below 3% as early as accession. Furthermore, the Stability and Growth
Pact also requires that member nations seek to attain a balanced fiscal position
at a prescribed pace and as laid down in their convergence programmes. 
If non-resident investors are confident that Hungary will join the euro area in the
near term, it may trigger speculative capital inflows and start off a ‘convergence
play’ similar to the ones that had involved other countries earlier in preparation
of Monetary Union. This threatens a rapid reversal of capital flows and drastic
depreciation, should investor confidence drop unexpectedly (due perhaps to
exogenous factors). It is easy to see that Hungary’s accession to the EU will give
continued momentum to speculative capital inflows, as the entry will give investors
a clear signal that the country has passed a major milestone on the way towards
adopting the single currency. The history of a few current euro area members in
the 1990s well illustrates the proposition that EU membership by itself does not
provide protection from a sudden reversal in capital flows, speculative attacks on
the national currency and a potential currency crisis (see EMS crises in 1992 and
1995). Another argument in favour of the earliest possible participation in the euro
area is that it would shorten the period marked by intensive exposure to speculative
capital flows. Volatile investment flows could trigger extreme fluctuations in the
exchange rate of the forint. Steady inflows of capital may cause the exchange rate
to appreciate steadily at first, only to be replaced by rapid depreciation once there
is a reversal in the direction of capital flows. A successful accession programme
may also enhance stability of the exchange rate, since international experience
suggests that as the date of entry gets nearer, exchange rate expectations tend to
approach the expected conversion rate. 
Commitment to joining the euro area at an early date is one of the key factors
enhancing the credibility of the disinflation programme in the eyes of market
participants. In turn, the credibility of the disinflation programme has a major
impact on the magnitude of the real economic sacrifices involved in achieving it.
The lower the level of inflation expectations in response to an announced disinflation
path, the easier and faster it is to actually reduce inflation to the desired level, in
other words, the smaller the real economic sacrifice of disinflation. Commitment to
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the central bank and the government, signifies an ‘end point’ to market participants
which lends credibility to the preceding disinflation process and is extremely
favourable for inflation expectations, ultimately reducing the costs of disinflation.
On the other hand, this also means that should the expected end point become
uncertain for any reason (such as postponing the entry to some unspecified date),
that may significantly push up the costs of disinflation.
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PARTICIPATION
This analysis starts with a discussion of what considerations should be used to
decide whether it is worthwhile for Hungary to give up its autonomous monetary
policy and join the euro area.
In the academic literature, the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCAs) deals
with the conditions and the analytical framework that can be employed to
assess when a country should fix its exchange rate, that is give up its monetary
independence. The classic theory of OCAs was established in the 1960s as a result
of research by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). These
authors attempted to establish guidelines for the selection of the most suitable
exchange rate system.
Mundell’s line of reasoning, in fact the starting point of the theory, can be best
presented within a two-country model. Let us assume that there is an increase in
demand for the products of country (region) A at the cost of the products of country
(region) B, implying a change in consumer preferences. If there are nominal rigidities
in B (for instance, nominal wages are inelastic downwards), equilibrium (of the
trade balance) may be restored via a depreciation of the currency of B. If there is
a pegged exchange rate regime or currency union, mobility of labour is needed, or
else B will suffer a rise in unemployment and a trade deficit vis-à-vis A. Thus,
Mundell believes that the widest boundaries of an OCA are designated by labour
mobility. Many authors have since pointed out the existence of other equalising
mechanisms, such as fiscal transfers, which makes labour mobility no longer
necessary for a currency union.
The theory has drawn attention to the conditions that must exist for asymmetric shocks
to occur at all, that is disturbances affecting the economies of various regions to differing
degrees, potentially requiring adjustment via relative prices once they occur. An
adequately diversified sectoral structure may ensure that the effects of sectoral shocks are
averaged out. Structural similarity between countries also rules out major incidence of
shocks at the aggregate level. Sections III and IV examine whether it is worthwhile for
Hungary to join monetary union, analysing several aspects of the OCA theory.
15
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were not among the conditions of a sustainable currency pegging. One of the
conditions for participating in the European currency union is meeting the Maastricht
convergence criteria, which establish numerical values for nominal variables (for
more details, see Section V). It is perhaps less well known that the Maastricht criteria
include real measures as well, although without numerical values. These indicators
provide supplementary information about the extent to which nominal convergence
is sustainable (e.g. trade and current account balances, unit labour costs, labour
productivity, developments in real wages, etc.)
2. Nevertheless, the main reason for
giving nominal criteria the primary role is that meeting solely the real economic
criteria derived from the OCA theory does not automatically guarantee monetary
stability in the region introducing the common currency. But the designers of EMU
did not simply wish to create an ‘optimal’, or put more practically, well functioning
currency area. Rather they wished to create an area of monetary stability.
It is important to note that neither the OCA theory nor the convergence criteria
involve the economy’s ‘level of development’, as it is traditionally measured by
per-capita GDP. The official standpoint of the ECB and the European Commission
is included in the press release
3 issued about the Helsinki seminar
4.  This states that
real and nominal convergence should proceed simultaneously. During real conver-
gence, the economic structure will become similar to that existing within the EU,
while growth picks up speed via structural reforms, helping living standards
approach the levels seen in the EU. Referring to historical examples, they stress
that this progress should proceed in parallel with nominal convergence, by which
they mean price stability and sound public finances. As progress towards meeting
the Maastricht criteria does not impede the implementation of structural reform,
they also suggest that monetary policy should be directed at achieving price
16
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2 It must have been an important factor in setting the Maastricht criteria that it was not possible to specify
optimal levels for real-convergence indicators in numerical terms. The lack of numerical values would
have hampered the objective selection of eligible participants. However, decision-makers were in
agreement as to the need for basing participation in the currency union on objective and quantifiable
criteria which leave only minimum space for discretion.
3 http://www.ecb.int/press/pr991112.htm
4 The Helsinki seminar was held in the capital of Finland in November 1999. High-ranking officials
of the ECB and accession-country central banks met to discuss strategic issues relating to EMU
participation. This was the first meeting of its kind aimed at establishing contact between the ECB
and the accession-country central banks. See also pp. 20-21 in Bini-Smaghi et. al. (1994) on the
circumstances which led to the formulation of this position, called ‘parallelism’ during the course of
the Maastricht Treaty preparatory talks.stability, which should also be supported by fiscal policy. Finally, they add that it
is at each country's discretion to choose which path for convergence to follow
towards currency union membership, as long as the ultimate objective remains
convergence. Similar statements could be cited from speeches by high-ranking
officials of the ECB delivered at various forums and from European Commission
documents
5.  They all have one feature in common in that by real convergence
they mean the similarities between economic structures and the level of economic
development, while regarding economic integration, privatisation and progress
with structural reform to be more important than the catch-up in respect of per-
capita GDP.
Taking into account the requirements of economic theory, the ECB and the
European Commission, we view real economic criteria marked by the optimum
currency areas as authoritative in deciding whether Hungary is sufficiently mature
to become a member of the monetary union. These criteria are discussed in detail
in Section III. But before examining the issue, we would like to analyse using another
method whether Hungary has already achieved the level of economic development
required for accession to the euro area. In the following, we will compare
Hungary's most important economic properties with those of the less advanced
euro area member states in the five years preceding their entry. A comparison of
real convergence indicators allows us to judge whether or not Hungary is mature
for European Union membership. On the other hand, this comparison may serve
as a yardstick against which to measure the feasibility of meeting the convergence
criteria. However, the results of comparisons should be treated with reservations –
the accession countries are now faced with both a different external economic
climate and different economic policy challenges
6. 
The lower stage of development of the Hungarian economy has no bearing on the
question whether the economy is mature enough to join monetary union. But this
lower level does have an important macroeconomic consequence – should the
exchange rate be fixed, the process of catching up will entail higher structural or
equilibrium inflation. The Bank's estimate of expected equilibrium inflation is
presented in Chapter II.2.
17
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5 See, for example, Padoa-Schioppa (2002) and Rempsberger (2001), pp. 5-6. 
6  For more details, see Horváth-Szalai (2001).II.1. Hungary and the less advanced EU member states five years
prior to currency union membership
This chapter compares some of Hungary's key real and nominal convergence
indicators with those of the less advanced EU member countries. Assuming 2006
as the earliest possible date of joining the euro area, Ireland's, Portugal's and
Spain's data for 1994 and those of Greece for 1996 provide the basis for comparison
with Hungary's data for 2001.
Admittedly, in respect of per-capita GDP Hungary lags behind the four countries
examined – Hungarian per-capita GDP, measured on a purchasing power parity
basis, was 53% of the EU average in 2001 (see Chart II-1). Using OECD and
Eurostat methodologies, this ratio rose by 6% between 1997 and 2001. Thus,
Hungary managed to reduce this gap by an annual 1.5% on average. Taking other
real and welfare indicators into account, however, the calculation of Hungarian
GDP currently underestimates actual income, due to the differences between
Eurostat and CSO methods of calculating GDP (for example, the method of recording
imputed income from owner-occupied dwelling and tourism).
As noted earlier, neither economic theory nor the EU requirements contain numerical
criteria for economic development. Indeed, from which aspect may the stage of
economic development still be of relevance?
One of the issues to consider is that membership in the EU
7 and the euro area
entails certain commitments which place material burdens on the acceding country
(e.g. centralising part of international reserves at the ECB, or other obligations
stemming from the common monetary policy). The relevance of these for
membership in monetary union is not too large and they are not materially different
from the costs which would be incurred should independence be retained. Indeed,
some minor cost savings can be achieved, for example, by reducing international
reserves to lower levels over the longer term.
Second, the size of the income gap may reflect the expected structural tensions.
However, the importance of structural problems may be measured more accurately
using direct indicators. For example, the issue whether domestic companies will be  
18
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7 EU membership may involve major obligations in respect of issues such as environmental protection
and transport, which may entail financial burdens in the short term. Chart II-1
Per-capita GDP measured on a PPP basis (EU15=100)
Source: Eurostat.
able to stay afloat in a market also unified from a monetary perspective can be
examined through the depth of integration in foreign trade and production, in addition
to the general indicator of income levels (for more details, see Chapters III.1.1 and
III.1.2). The Copenhagen criteria for EU membership also follow the method of
direct comparison (e.g. the ability to undertake commitments arising from
membership or the ability of a country to withstand competition in the EU market). 
This approach makes the requirement for the use of the national income level as
indirect indicator unnecessary.
The level of economic development is also used to indirectly measure the expected
migration of labour force following accession. There are much more precise direct
indicators in this area
8; suffice it to note that monetary union membership influences
migration less than EU membership.
Finally, differences in income levels can show indirectly the extent of expected
structural inflation. It should be stressed, however, that the inflation criterion for
19
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%monetary union membership measures structural inflation directly, on the basis of
inflation convergence, and not indirectly, through the income level.
A comparison of major economic indicators, particularly those expressing the
degree of foreign trade integration, reveals that Hungary is at a more advanced
stage of integration with the euro area than the less advanced EU members had
been five years prior to the euro’s introduction (see Charts II-2, II-3 and II-4). The
euro area is Hungary's most important trading partner – Hungarian manufacturers
have increased their share in the European single market over the past five years;
the proportion of high value-added products has risen within exports to the EU;
foreign trade accounts for a relatively high percentage of manufacturing, a sector
reflecting the state of economic integration
9.  
Chart II-2 
Economic openness  
(goods and services exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP)
Sources: European Commission (2000) and Bank calculation.
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Proportion of exports to the euro area
within total exports
Sources: OECD SITC database.
Chart II-4  
Proportion of intra-sectoral trade within exports to the EU








































%A comparison of contributions to GDP by the main sectors shows that Hungary's
economic structure is very similar to that of Ireland, when it was at the same
distance from monetary union (see Table II-1). However, industry accounts for a
higher share and services for a lower share of Hungarian value added relative to
other countries. As in the case of Ireland, this relatively high proportion of industry
rests basically on comparative advantages
10;  being mainly reflected in business
services and less in financial services, the lag of services behind other sectors does
not hamper future economic growth. Moreover, with the increase in income levels,
the proportion of these up-to-date services will rise to the detriment of industry, as
is suggested by the Irish model.
Table II-1 
Sectoral breakdown on a value-added basis (%)
Sources: CSO and OECD SNAV databases.
The OCA theory places great emphasis on product and labour market flexibility,
being factors reducing the costs of adjustment in the event that the independent
exchange rate and monetary policies are abandoned. In the absence of a single,
consensus gauge for product and labour market flexibility, we have relied on the
OECD's 1998 indicators of composite market regulation (see Tables II-2 and II-3).
Clearly, Hungary's product market is similarly regulated, while its labour market is
much less regulated than the average for the less advanced EU member countries. 
An assessment of compliance with the Maastricht convergence criteria reveals that 
22
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10 For more details, see Chapter III.1.2.
Hungary Ireland Portugal Spain   Greece
2001 1994 1994 1994 1996
Agriculture, hunting, fishing, forestry 4.4 8.1 5.3 5.1 9.4
Manufacturing (including energy) 28.0 31.4 22.8 21.8 16.1
Costruction 4.8 5.2 6.4 7.4 6.4
Wholes. and retail trade, Repairs, Transp.,
Hotels and restaurants 22.3 18.0 23.6 26.6 27.0
Financial, real estate, renting
and business activities 20.9 16.1 16.4 18.5 21.5
Other services 19.2 21.2 25.4 20.7 19.623
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Table II-2
Product market regulation (OECD composite indicators, 1998)
Source: Nicoletti et al (2000), p. 81, Table A3.8.
Table II-3 
Labour market regulation (OECD composite indicators, 1998)
Source: Nicoletti et al (2000), pp. 82–84, Tables A3.9–11.
Hungary does not have a larger lag in fulfilling any of the criteria than the member
countries reviewed when they were five years prior to accession. Indeed, the picture
is much more favourable in respect of long-term interest rate convergence and
gross public debt (see Charts II-6, II-7 and II-8). 
Hungary's lag in terms of meeting the inflation criteria appears to be relatively
greater; yet the gap does not fall outside the range of values for the countries
examined (see Chart II-5). 
Hungary Periphery Portugal Spain   Greece Ireland
average
1. Administrative barriers 1.6 2.6 3.7 2.8 2.0 1.8
2. Direct cost of dismissals 2.6 3.0 5.2 2.1 2.9 1.7
3. Delay of dismissals 2.8 3.2 4.3 3.5 3.3 1.6
I. Regular contracts (1–3) 2.2 2.9 4.3 2.8 2.6 1.7
4. Administrative barriers 0.7 3.1 3.1 3.7 5.1 0.4
5. Duration 0.6 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.5 0.2
II. Temporary contracts (4–5) 0.6 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.5 0.3
Total labour market regulation (I–II) 1.4 2.9 3.7 3.2 3.5 1.0
Hungary Periphery Portugal Spain   Greece Ireland
average
I. State control 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.6 3.9 0.9
II. Barriers to entrepreneurship 0.7 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.2
III. Barriers to trade and investment 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.3 0.4
IV. Economic regulation 3.1 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.6 0.8
V. Administrative regulation 0.5 1.8 1.5 2.3 2.0 1.5
T To ot ta al l   p pr ro od du uc ct t   m ma ar rc ce et t   r re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   ( (I I– –V V) ) 1 1. .6 6 1 1. .6 6 1 1. .7 7 1 1. .6 6 2 2. .2 2 0 0. .8 824
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Chart II-5 
Deviations from the inflation criterion 
(HICP)
Sources: Eurostat and NBH.
Chart II-6 
General government deficit* as a proportion of GDP
Suorces: Eurostat and NBH.








































%Chart II-7   
Gross debt as a proportion of GDP
Sources: Eurostat and NBH.
Chart II-8  
Deviations from long-term interest rate convergence 










































% pointsHungary introduced a more proactive disinflation policy in 2001, with its constituents
being the changes made to the monetary and exchange rate policy regimes.
Similarly, there are no material differences in meeting the fiscal criterion. Thanks to a
steady reduction in gross debt in recent years, the fiscal indicator for Hungary has been
below the 60% reference value for a sustainable period. Hungary is faced with a fiscal
adjustment of a magnitude, in terms of general government finances, comparable to
that which the reviewed members, except Ireland, faced in the nineties (see Chart II-6).
The high degree of long-term interest rate convergence indicates that market
participants judge early membership in monetary union to be a realistic prospect.
II.2. Equilibrium level of Hungarian inflation in the event of entry
into monetary union
As discussed in Chapter II.1, although lagging behind the less advanced euro
area countries in terms of per-capita GDP, Hungary has reached, and in certain
dimensions even surpassed, comparable indicators of those countries in the
area of structural similarities and integration. Consequently, based on international
comparison, Hungary forms an optimum currency area with the euro area, but,
due to the phase of real economic catch-up, Hungarian inflation will likely be
higher than in the euro area following the changeover to the common currency.
Although the time that has passed since the introduction of currency union has
been too short to allow separation of cyclical from structural shocks, there has
been a higher level of inflation observable in the less advanced euro-area countries
as well. Excess inflation above the euro area average has been 1.1 percentage
points in Spain, Portugal and Greece, and 2.9 percentage points in Ireland, since
joining the euro. Below, we will attempt to quantify the size of the expected
excess inflation in the case of Hungary.
The size of excess inflation is determined by the equilibrium real appreciation of the
forint.
11 This means that at any given exchange rate, domestic inflation is derived as
the sum of average foreign inflation and equilibrium exchange rate appreciation over
26
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11 The remainder of the chapter draws on a study by András Kovács Mihály: Equilibrium Real Exchange
Rate in Hungary. See Kovács M. A (2001).a longer period.
12 The equilibrium real exchange rate is usually defined as the
relationship between foreign and domestic price levels in the same currency at which
the economy is in a state of external and internal equilibrium.
13 In other words, at a
given exchange rate level the economy grows along with the trend potential output, in
a way that the current account balance moves on a sustainable path over the long
term.
14 A general equilibrium model describing the Hungarian economy in detail would
be required in order to define the level of equilibrium real exchange rate. However,
such a model is currently not available. But, starting from the theoretical framework,
it is possible to determine the most important factors underlying the variations in the
equilibrium real exchange rate. Below, we attempt to provide estimates for this.
The real exchange rate is the ratio of general domestic and foreign price levels
expressed in the same currency. The aggregate real exchange rate can be decomposed
into two factors – (i) real exchange rate of tradables,
15 i.e. external real exchange
rate (the ratio of domestic and foreign tradables prices expressed in the same
currency) and (ii) the ratio of services and tradables prices (both for domestic and
foreign prices), i.e. the domestic real exchange rate.
16 According to economic theory,
the first component does not reflect a trend over the long term, developing as it
does in a stable way.
17 In contrast, the second component grows along a long-
term trend, according to both theory and the empirical literature.
The consumer price-based real exchange rate appreciated by 28% in Hungary in the
period 1990–2000. This implies a 3.2% real appreciation on a yearly average.
However, the evolution of the indicator can be divided into two clearly distinguishable
phases. Annual average appreciation amounted to 8.5% in the period up to 1993; 
and since then appreciation has only been of the order of 1%. In the first, transition
27
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12 The calculation of the equilibrium real exchange rate uses inflation data on Hungary’s major trading
partners according to their weights in trade, which is not identical with the weighting applied in the
HICP. The section below does not take account of the bias arising from the composition effect.
13 See Black (1994).
14 Balance of payments current account sustainability can be interpreted in several different ways. In its
stronger version it can be viewed as a path for the balance of payments which allows debt accumulation
to be covered by future savings. Its weaker version refers to a current account that is consistent with
a constant debt rate. Sustainability is also sometimes seen as a deficit that can be financed by capital
flows stable over the medium run.
15 This study undertakes a separate analysis of two sectors within the economy, with regard to price
behaviour. They are the sectors of internationally traded and non-traded goods, hereinafter referred
to as tradables and services, for simplicity. 
16 See Kovács and Simon (1998).
17 See, for example, Rogoff (1996).phase, massive appreciation was required as a consequence of market liberalisation,
although available information suggests that the extent of this appreciation was
exaggerated, contributing to upsetting external equilibrium in 1993–1994.
18
However, the 1% real appreciation observed ever since has been somewhat less than
the 1.5%–3% values estimated for the equilibrium real exchange rate so far.
19 This is
attributable mainly to the fact that, while the domestic real exchange rate has appreciated
continuously, the external real exchange rate has depreciated due in large part to the
operation of the crawling-peg exchange rate mechanism (see Table II-4).
Table II-4
Components of the real exchange rate between 1991–1999*
(Annual average growth in per cent)
External real  Domestic real  Weights** Aggregate real  
exchange rate exchange rate exchange rate
–2.1 3.5 –0.1 1.2
* The Bank's own calculation based on the methodology by Kovács and Simon (1998); on a GDP
deflator basis. Negative values denote real depreciation.
** Statistical impact arising from the domestic and foreign sectoral differences.
In the monetary union, variations in the external real exchange rate can be 
treated as negligible. Therefore, the factors determining the services-to-tradables
prices ratio should be taken into account in order to estimate the expected size 
of equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation. These factors can be categorised
into the main groups below.
20
Supply-side shocks: the Balassa-Samuelson effect
On the supply side, the mechanism hallmarked by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson
28
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18 See Kovács (1998).
19 See Oblath (1997), and Kovács and Simon (1998).
20 In the following, any reference to the relative situation of the service and the tradables sectors (relative prices
and productivity) is intended to describe domestic conditions relative to abroad even when there is no explicit
indication. This is because the constant repetition of the long phrase ‘services/tradables price ratio relative to
the corresponding price ratio abroad’ would be rather cumbersome stylistically. Whenever the reference is to
the tradables/services price ratio or productivity ratio of one single country, there is a special note made.(1963), based on the productivity gap between the services and tradables sectors,
is generally taken into account. On the assumption that the profitability of wages
and capital is equilibrated across the two sectors, the following relationship
emerges. If the tradables sector is more capital intensive and/or, by nature, offers
higher productivity gains, the services sector will only be able to maintain its initial
profitability by raising services prices, due to the general wage increasing pressure
from the productivity gains in the tradables sector. If the difference in productivity
gains between the two sectors persists, services prices will continue to increase as
a trend relative to tradables prices. This implies that the equilibrium real exchange
rate will be under permanent pressure to appreciate.
Chart II-9
Tradables/services sector productivity and the services-to-tradables
price ratio between Hungary and its competitors (1992=100)
Source: Kovács (2001).
A number of studies have attempted to quantify the pressure of real appreciation
arising from productivity gaps in the cases of developed, catching-up and transition
economies. In general, a significant relationship has been found between relative
prices and productivity rates. There are a number of studies on developed










1991       1992       1993       1994       1995       1996       1997       1998       1999
Tradables/services productivity
Services/tradables price ratiothe performance of the services and tradables sectors. A major finding of these
studies is that, over the long term, services/tradables price indices correlate, with
unit elasticity, with movements in labour productivity in tradables/services.
21 No
similar exact econometric tests have been conducted for the transition economies.
The studies have in general searched for a relationship between the real exchange
rate and aggregate productivity, and between the real exchange rate and real
productivity rates, or else they have applied indirect methods to investigate the
Balassa-Samuelson effect.
22 Although these studies have also not tested the unit
elasticity between labour productivity and relative prices, the majority of estimates
do not contradict with the unit productivity–relative price elasticity, provided the
assumptions are plausible.
23 Unit elasticity appears to be supported by
Hungarian data as well. Table II-5 clearly shows that gains in tradables/services
productivity entailed price changes of virtually the same order in Hungary
between 1991 and 1999.
Table II-5
Developments in relative prices and productivity
in Hungary and its competitors*
(Annual average rises between 1991–1999)
Hungary Competitors Relative
Services/tradables productivity 6.5 2.3 4.1
Services/tradables prices 6.2 0.9 5.3
* The Bank's own calculation based on the methodology by Kovács-Simon (1998).
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21 See Canzoneri et al (1998) and Alberola et al (2000).
22 Halpern et al (1997, 1999, 2000), Krajnyák et al (1997), Oblath (1997), Corricelli et al (2001),
Darvas (2001), De Broeck et al (2001) and Dobrinsky (2001), Jakab and Kovács (1999).
23 By taking into account the CPI weight of the service sector and the relationship between aggregate
productivity and the tradables/services productivity ratio.Demand-side shocks
Cyclical swings in demand generally do not influence the equilibrium real
exchange rate. In contrast with this, lasting structural changes in the pattern of
demand do have an impact on the size of the equilibrium real exchange rate. The
impact of these permanent demand twists is clearly demonstrable in the opposing
developments in the services-to-tradables price ratio and consumption. Should the
services-to-tradables price ratio be exclusively determined by supply, a rise in the
services-to-tradables price ratio would cause the share of services consumption to
fall relative to the share of tradables consumption. However, it has been observed
empirically that simultaneously with the rise in the services-to-tradables price ratio,
there is also an increase in the consumption of services/tradables, in evidence of
the role played by demand over the longer term. This is generally attributed to a
shift in consumer preferences or the increasing role played by fiscal policy.
Research into the role of demand factors has generally been less successful than
research based exclusively on productivity regressions. The analysis of cyclical
effects has revealed significant relationship between certain demand variables and
relative prices over the short term, but the coefficients obtained for the long term
often proved to be non-significant and highly volatile.
24
Other factors may influence the size of equilibrium real appreciation, in addition to
demand and supply shocks. A change in the terms of trade will alter the amount
of disposable income and induce substitution on the part of consumers and producers.
In addition, it directly influences the goods balance. Whether this terms-of-trade
shock will be negative or positive is not unequivocal, due to the complexities of the
impact, although empirical evidence has generally shown that deterioration in the
terms of trade tends to devalue the equilibrium real exchange rate, as it worsens
the external balance.
25
The analysis of the Portuguese catch-up process has raised the issue that EU 
transfers following accession put significant upward pressure on the equilibrium
exchange rate.
26 An explanation for this is that such funds were used in large part
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24 See Micossi et al (1994), De Gregorio et al (1994), Jakab and Kovács (1999), Halpern et al
(2000), Dobrinsky (2001).
25 See Williamson (1994).
26 See Abreu (2001).to finance infrastructural investment, which in turn boosted the economy's supply
capacity. The impact of financial integration may also increase upward pressure on
the real equilibrium exchange rate. Accession to monetary union tends to reduce
a country's risk premium. This implies more capital for the domestic economy and
so greater economic potential, which is also a factor putting pressure on the
exchange rate to appreciate.
27 These two influences, ceteris paribus, would imply a
greater Balassa-Samuelson effect. However, we believe that economic and
institutional change influencing the earnings potential of capital investments in the
years of transition were at least as influential as those associated with EU membership
and creation of the currency union. Hence, the Balassa-Samuelson effect observed
in the recent period is probably an adequate estimator of expected developments
following the creation of currency union.
Based on the theoretical and empirical considerations outlined above, in the following
we will attempt to estimate the evolution of the forint real exchange rate during the
convergence period. Taking the theoretical considerations into account, we have
focussed primarily on the productivity impact and, secondarily, with a higher uncertainty,
we have tried to quantify the impact of the preference shifts as well. The estimate of the
productivity impact is based on the hypothesis that services/tradables productivity
raises the services-to-tradables price ratio according to unit elasticity.
It is important to note that, theoretically, unit elasticity relates to value added deflators.
This impact is presumably smaller on final, i.e. consumer, prices. An explanation
for this is that the services-to-tradables price ratio has risen by less in the consumer
price index since the political changeover in Hungary than suggested by the value
added deflators. The principal reason for this is that services in the consumer price
index include a tradables component and vice versa, tradables in the index include
a services component. Based on average deviation in the past, this impact may
reduce the impact of the productivity gap on consumer prices by a couple of
percentage points.
We have used two scenarios in the case of productivity gaps. In the first case, we
have assumed that the relatively stable trend observed between 1991 and 2000 will
continue, which implies a 6.5% gap in productivity gains in the services/tradables
sectors. In the second case, we have assumed that the domestic productivity gap
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27 See the analysis by Abreu (2001) of the experiences with inflation in Portugal.is somewhat less, at 4.6%, which is broadly comparable with the values for Portugal
in the 1980s and 1990s.
28 In each case, foreign productivity is assumed to be equal
to productivity values registered by Hungary's trading partners between 1991 and
1999, at 2.3%.
Two scenarios have been tested in relation to a lasting demand impact – (i) there
is no such demand effect and (ii) the coefficient of the lasting demand effect is
0.12.
29 In this case, the proxy-variable of demand is real GDP growth, set at a 4.5%
rate. Hence, demand raises the services-to-tradables price ratio by an annual 0.5%
over the longer term.
30
The behaviour of products belonging to the non-tradables and non-services price
categories of the consumer price index must be determined, in order to quantify
real appreciation. Market energy, motor fuel, and drinks and tobacco prices have
been assumed to move in line with tradables prices. We have been faced with
uncertainties mainly in respect of assumptions for food prices and regulated prices.
According to economic theory, foodstuffs are tradable goods. However, in practice their
prices may differ significantly from the exchange rate due to various administrative
measures. Observing past trends, food prices have been moving somewhere
between tradables and services prices. Taking this into account, we have examined
two scenarios – (i) food prices are assumed to behave similarly to tradables prices
and (ii) food prices are determined 50% by tradables prices and 50% by services
prices.
Regulated prices have risen more strongly than market services prices in the past
(see Table II-6). This, however, is attributable in large part to the very depressed level
of the relative prices of government services in the communist era. In developed
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28 See Alberola et al (2000).
29 As noted earlier the coefficients of the estimates for the demand effect vary widely. This paper has
drawn on estimates by Micossi et. al. (1994), which relate to the service-tradables price ratios with-
in the EU countries. We have adjusted the coefficients estimated by the authors so that they show
the effect as projected on the overall CPI. We have relied on the cited authors’ estimates because we
have been curious about the relationships prevalent in normal market economies rather than in
transitional economies. Note, however, that the coefficient obtained in this way does in effect correspond
to Dobrinsky’s (2001) estimates for transitional economies.
30 This refers to the demand impact prevalent over the long term, measuring thus not the impact of
excess demand due to unsustainable economic policy which may divert the current real exchange
rate from its equilibrium vale, but rather the impact of generally manifest long-term change in
private or state preferences. Being permanent demand shocks, they will modify price relations over
the long term so that the price of goods in greater demand will rise. If services are in relatively greater
demand than tradables during the convergence process, services prices will increase.market economies, government services prices move in tandem with market
services prices; we have therefore built this assumption into our forecast. 
Based on the factors noted above, we have conducted our simulation taking three
major factors into account:
– How large will Hungary's productivity advantage be in the future?
– Should we reckon with a lasting demand impact?
– What assumptions should we use for movements in food prices?
Based on all these, there are altogether eight possible scenarios, which are summarised
in Table II-6:
Table II-6 
Equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation 
(annual percentage change)
Productivity difference
Assumptions for  High Low
food prices (Average of past 8 years: 4.1%) (2.2%)
Without lasting demand effect
Move aligned   1.6 0.8
with tradables prices
Move 50% per cent aligned  2.0 1.0
with tradables prices
With lasting demand effect
31 
Move aligned 
with tradables prices 1.8 1.0
Move 50% per cent aligned 
with tradables prices 2.2 1.3
Based on the calculations, the measure of equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation
moves in a range of 0.8%–2.2%. This is somewhat higher than the Bank of Spain's
estimate of ±1% inflation volatility for the euro-area countries, which, however, was
34
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31 This relates to the special long-term demand effects. See footnote 30.entirely based on quantifying the productivity impact.
32 Our estimate is comparable
in size with earlier calculations for the Hungarian economy
33 and the result of inter-
national panel estimates.
34 However, as noted earlier, our estimates may be down-
ward biased, due to the not quantified effects, so a higher equilibrium real exchange
rate appreciation than the estimate cannot be ruled out. It is important to stress,
nevertheless, that the actual equilibrium inflation difference may perhaps diverge
from the estimates in a direction which cannot be determined beforehand, due to
the not quantified effects noted (joining the euro area, the difference between final
prices and value added deflators).
On the whole, our calculations show that inflation in Hungary as a member of the
euro area will exceed inflation of our major trading partners by 0.8%–2.2%. This
higher rate of inflation will not jeopardise either Hungary's competitiveness or price
stability in the euro area, as it will be made necessary by the economic catch-up
and restructuring rather than by rapid economic growth above its potential.
Another consequence of equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation is that
monetary conditions will be less tight in Hungary than in the countries of the region
with lower inflation rates. The implications of this are dealt with in Chapter III.2.
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32 See Alberola et al (2000).
33 See Oblath (1997), and Kovács and Simon (1998).     
34 Halpern et al (2000). Even though the latter authors forecast the Balassa-Samuelson effect to be of
the order of magnitude of roughly 3%, their calculations focus on the services/tradables price ratio,
with the foreign variables treated as exogenous. Correcting the CPI with the weight of the service
sector and extrapolating the historical path of foreign variables, the calculations derived from Halpern
and Wyplosz‘s equations yield an approximately 1.5% real appreciation of the overall CPI. This falls
within our estimated range.III. COSTS OF JOINING THE EURO AREA
Participation in the euro area entails the abandonment of an independent exchange
rate and monetary policy, and importation of a monetary policy that takes into
consideration economic developments within the entire euro area. In principle,
monetary autonomy is a device which helps to manage certain kinds of shocks
affecting the economy, thereby dampening business cycle fluctuations. Thus, the
size of costs arising from giving up monetary autonomy broadly depends on
whether there is an increase or decrease in the volatility of Hungarian business
cycles following entry into the monetary union. This is because business cycle
volatility also passes through to household income. In turn, strong volatility in
national income will create lower welfare than stable income, even if the two
income levels are identical on average. Recent research, relating in particular to the
USA, suggests that the welfare costs arising from cyclical volatility may be high
(see Box III-1). However, it is extremely difficult to quantify these costs in the case
of Hungary. This is because such quantification would require not only knowledge
of prospective changes in volatility but also that of such illusive parameters as the
risk aversion preferences of Hungarian households and the cyclical vulnerability of
resource allocation efficiency. Therefore, the noted difficulty of estimating an
absolute measure of welfare costs has prompted us to apply a different approach
based on a relative view. We have compared Hungary with the present member
states of the euro area from the point of view of exposure to asymmetric shocks
and the effectiveness of alternative devices available for the management of these
shocks. The following analysis will prove that the state of affairs with regard to
these factors is at least as promising in Hungary as in the currently less-developed
euro area member states. 
In addition to the above factors, there is a palpable and easily quantifiable cost
associated with giving up autonomous monetary policy, namely the loss of
seigniorage. Once a member of the euro area, Hungary will also have its share of
seigniorage revenue from the use of euro notes and coins, but due to accounting





Measuring the welfare loss arising from cyclical fluctuations of the
economy
The higher volatility of business cycles arising as a result of a country maintaining
its own currency causes losses in welfare. This can partly be explained on the
basis of the assumption that households are risk averse, in the sense that faced
with future consumption paths with equal expected values they will prefer the
more certain path (showing lower variance). Using US consumption data series,
Lucas (1987) showed that given plausible parameters for risk aversion, welfare
losses associated with the economic cycles are negligible; households would
sacrifice only a tiny 0.1% of their annual consumption in order to reduce the
variability of their consumption from the observed level to zero.
Recent research has, however, revealed that the welfare losses arising from
business cycle fluctuations cannot be identified simply with losses arising from
fluctuations in consumption. Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2002) claimed that
due to price and wage rigidities presumed to exist within the economy, business
cycles cause inefficient fluctuations in resource allocation. They measure the
efficiency of resource allocation in terms of the size of the wedge between the
marginal product of labour and the marginal rate of substitution between labour
and leisure, referred to simply as ‘the gap’.
35 Deviations of this gap from zero
reflect an inefficient allocation of labour during the period reviewed. Based on US
data, they demonstrate that this gap, which measures the inefficiency of resource
allocation, shows strong correlation with the business cycle. However, its
fluctuations are asymmetric, i.e. the losses incurred on inefficient allocation during
a recession by far exceed the advantages arising from improved efficiency when
output rises above the potential level. Hence, even if the fluctuations of economic
activity are symmetrical, the bigger they are, the more strongly they will increase
the losses caused by inefficient resource allocation. Based on research of
post-war US business cycle data, Galí, Gertler and López-Salido conclude that
the ensuing welfare losses are not negligible, perhaps even one order of magnitude
higher than those estimated by Lucas.
35 Put differently, the ‘gap’ denotes the difference between ‘reservation wages’ related to labour supply
and labour demand existing at a given rate of employment.38
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The literature on OCA suggests that a final fixing of exchange rates cannot be
optimal unless there is only a small likelihood that the participating countries are
exposed to asymmetric shocks. For example, if demand for a particular country’s
goods declines asymmetrically, autonomous monetary policy would be able to offset
this fall in demand by lowering interest rates, that is by encouraging domestic
demand and/or having a weaker exchange rate make domestic products cheaper
relative to foreign goods. Within monetary union, however, the common monetary
policy will not react unless the impact of the demand shock has an effect at the
overall level of the union. Even then, the size of monetary easing might be smaller
than if the country had an autonomous monetary policy, and would also affect the
countries that had no need for it. Furthermore, changes in the exchange rate affecting
the structure of demand will have to be given up altogether.
The probability of asymmetric shocks occurring depends primarily on the similarity,
the degree of integration and diversification of production structures. Structural
similarities will cause common shocks, especially when there is a high proportion
of intra-industry trade. The markets for individual goods within monetary union will
be linked by intra-industry foreign trade, making it unlikely that an asymmetric
shock will only affect the goods produced by one particular country. On the other
hand, provided there is a sufficiently diversified economic structure, the treatment of
temporary shocks affecting one particular industry would not require the adjustment
of the exchange rate even given an autonomous monetary policy. Such an
adjustment would only be necessary if the industry involved were of crucial
importance at the macroeconomic level.
To assess the probability of asymmetric shocks, the first two sections compare
the production structure of the Hungarian economy, the depth of foreign trade and
production integration with those of the euro area participating countries. The
analysis of these two dimensions has not revealed a lag in respect of the real
economic convergence of the Hungarian economy. As the Hungarian economy
has implemented structural convergence towards the euro area over the past
decade, there is not a single industry left that contributes to the Hungarian GDP
with a weight unprecedented in other euro area member countries. As there has
been a sharp rise in export diversification, a change affecting one single industry
can now have only a minor impact on the evolution of GDP. At the same time,there has also been a shift in the structure of exports, with a considerable fall in
the share of goods with high price sensitivity and an increase in the weight of
goods requiring high technological standards and greater human capital. 
The third section will look into the question of whether the Hungarian economy has
been subject to asymmetric shocks in the past. Our findings suggest that industrial
production is in close cyclical correlation with that of the euro area. As far as demand
shocks are concerned, even the past decade has been characterised by a high
degree of synchrony. By contrast, the supply side has not historically exhibited such
a high measure of harmony, due to structural changes in the Hungarian economy
concomitant with the economic transition. Nevertheless, as a production structure
similar to that of the European economies is in place now, the Bank believes that
the significance of prospective asymmetric supply shocks has declined. 
A common currency may be optimal for a country even in the presence of asymmetric
shocks, if there exist some adjustment mechanisms that can substitute for the
exchange rate changes and smooth the production and consumption fluctuations.
Based on the OCA theory, we will look at some potential adjustment mechanisms
such as wage and price flexibility, factor mobility and fiscal policy. 
Historical analysis paints a favourable picture as far as price and wage flexibility are
concerned. Available data show that the repricing period is short by international
comparison. It calls for caution, however, that empirical studies on the issue were
conducted when inflation was still in the double-digit range, and a lower inflation
environment is likely to increase the duration of the repricing period. Wages have
also adjusted rapidly in the past, but lower inflation is expected to lead to
higher nominal wage rigidity as well. It is promising, however, that in view of
the institutional features determining wage and price flexibility over the longer
term, Hungary is in a better position than the majority of the euro area countries.
Just as the other EU member states, Hungary faces low labour mobility and permanent
regional differences. International mobility is hindered by linguistic and cultural barriers,
restricted mobility of social insurance, pension schemes and other social benefits, and
temporary restriction on the free flow of labour in respect of certain members. In addition,
even national mobility is low, attributable to a number of factors including regional
differences in housing costs. Nevertheless, this low labour mobility is not viewed as an
obstacle to Hungary’s entry into the monetary union, as even for the present euro area
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Fiscal policy’s role of regulating aggregate demand may be restricted in the coming
years by the need to adjust in order to meet the Maastricht criteria and the Stability
and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, the present structure of the budget also enables a
certain degree of smoothing of aggregate demand to be made, partly via the automatic
stabilisers and partly via the funds earmarked for extraordinary expenditures. From
another perspective, participation in the euro area will even facilitate compliance with
the SGP, as real interest rates of forint-denominated public debt are expected to
decrease inside the monetary union (for more on this, see Chapter IV.4).
The Bank believes that Hungary has achieved a stage of integration where the real
economic costs of fixing the exchange rate are low. However, the costs are also
influenced by the extent to which autonomous exchange rate policy can be an
efficient means of managing asymmetric shocks under the Hungarian economic
conditions. Providing that certain conditions are met, exchange rate policy may
assist economic policy in its efforts to restore and maintain domestic firms’
competitiveness. The main question is whether the exchange rate has preference
over other objectives within a particular country or economic region’s monetary
policy. Under an inflation targeting regime the primary objective of the central bank
is to meet the inflation target, while the exchange rate may be used to enhance
competitiveness to the extent that it does not pose a threat to meeting the inflation
target. In the past, nominal exchange rate fluctuations could not permanently
influence the evolution of the real exchange rate. Any change in the exchange rate
passed through rapidly to consumer prices, thereby absorbing any increase in
competitiveness caused by devaluation. It is common knowledge that the more
open a country is, the less capable it is of influencing its real exchange rate on a
permanent basis by changing the nominal exchange rate (McKinnon, 1963). And
Hungary is one of the most open economies in Europe. 
The most important question in the presence of asymmetric shocks is what structural
weight the sectors hit by negative shocks hold within the economy. Unless the
afflicted sectors have a crucial share, exchange rate policy may predominantly
improve the position of sectors that have not suffered, triggering an upsurge in nominal
profits, which may soon exert inflationary pressure. The share of transnational
companies in the afflicted sector’s output should also be taken into consideration,
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is because this set of economic agents tends to focus on the profitability of the
entire corporate group, making the factor of prices governed by the exchange rate
not necessarily of paramount importance to them.
The exchange rate can also influence aggregate demand by affecting incomes and
economic agents’ wealth. The literature on the sustainability of currency areas does not
deal with the role which exchange rate devaluation and the resulting rise in inflation play
in the conduct of economic policy, focussing as it does on the effect of the exchange
rate on relative prices. Nevertheless, the importance of this channel must not be
neglected from the Hungarian perspective, as the nominal imbalances of the past ten
years, originating from the preceding period, have been typically corrected by devaluing
the forint. In the early 1990s, the pegged exchange rate in principle represented a
nominal anchor for the economy. However, this announced anchor lacked credibility
and economic agents had expectations of an exchange rate adjustment. Indeed, wage
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36 Although here the purpose of the exchange rate correction is also to improve competitiveness, it is
important to distinguish between the situations when an unforeseen shock necessitates a correction and
when devaluation to restore competitiveness is applied due to the economy’s lack of nominal discipline.
forint inevitable.
36 In the past, inflation was instrumental in formulating the general
government position. This is because a portion of general government expenditures
is not fully indexed. Hence, an unexpected rise in inflation following forint devaluation
had the effect of improving the fiscal position, affecting as it did a much wider section
of the receivables from the state. In the wake of the 1995 correction, the value of
existing nominal wages and other expenditures plunged in real terms and the real
burden of the fixed-interest domestic debt also eased. Devaluing a currency will reduce
the purchasing power of a country’s income as well as the real value of national-
currency-denominated liabilities. Thus, surprise inflation triggered by the devaluation
proved to be an efficient instrument in rapidly lowering the current account deficit.
After the entry into the euro area, economic policy will no longer be able to take
advantage of the income and wealth effects of the exchange rate. However, the
likelihood will also decrease that the country faces a situation where devaluation is
the most efficient solution. The strengthening of ownership controls has significantly
reduced the danger that nominal wages will grow at a rate far removed from
corporate income growth, and it is no longer typical that wage settlements determine
wage increases for several years ahead. One of the requirements of joining the euro
area is that the fiscal position is sustainable and can be financed over the long term.
This also implies that once the fiscal adjustment set as a necessary condition for
monetary union membership is attained, the chances that the fiscal authorities have
to resort to surprise inflation will fall substantially. Furthermore, the future lack of
today’s permanent inflation gains will be offset by the prospect of robust growth and
the fall in interest rates on the general government debt (see Chapter IV). Hungary’s
participation in the euro area will cause a shift in the significance of the balance of
payments. Of course, every country should seek to achieve a sustainable balance
of payments position over the long term, but as a euro area participant Hungary will
run a much smaller risk of losing investor confidence to an extent that would call for
urgent and radical change in the external balance position.
Another further implication of the common currency is that Hungary will also adopt
the common interest rate policy. Should monetary conditions for the euro area as a
whole be inconsistent with domestic economic developments, the economy would43
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incur excess costs. The effectiveness of the common monetary policy in the
domestic economy depends on several factors. The most crucial factor appears to
be that we now have in place the institutional conditions facilitating the effective
transmission of monetary impulses towards the real economy. Private sector
indebtedness which is lower than the euro-area average and the low stock of lending
makes the transmission mechanism less efficient in Hungary. Thus, one unit of
change in central bank interest rates has a smaller impact on the interest spending
of the corporate and household sectors, investment and consumption decisions
and, ultimately, inflation. This impact dampening effect is partially offset by faster
interest rate transmission in Hungary than in the European countries, and by a high
proportion of short-term and floating rate loans.
The second condition for monetary policy efficiency is that the reviewed economies
should be in cyclical harmony, as the ECB decisions take into consideration the
average cyclical position of the euro area. As noted earlier, the Hungarian economy
is characterised by a high degree of cyclical co-movement with the EU. Due to the
similarity of production structures and the high weight of EU imports, there is also
a high degree of synchrony in respect of the price shocks. Therefore, the Bank
believes that the ECB’s interest rate policy would be consistent with the requirements
of the Hungarian economy. Indeed, it can even be argued that should Hungary not
enter the euro area, this would lower its ability to adopt an interest rate policy that
is consistent with the economy’s cyclical position. The reason for this is that the
countries outside the euro area fall into a different risk category, which makes them
much more exposed to financial market contagion (see Chapter IV.3).
The impact of an imported monetary policy also depends on the equilibrium real
appreciation concomitant with real economic convergence. Due to higher inflation,
a single level of nominal interest rates leads to lower real interest rates than in the
more advanced countries of the region. The fall in real interest rates will in turn set
the economy on a new growth path, presumably characterised by more rapid
growth financed by larger amounts of foreign funds. The short-term expectation,
however, is that the drop in interest rates upon accession will trigger asymmetrical
demand shocks, while supply will only be affected more slowly. The ensuing
imbalances will have to be offset by fiscal policy, that is common monetary policy
will impose increased burdens on fiscal policy in controlling aggregate demand.III.1. Integration and structural similarity
The size of the costs entailed when a country gives up its own monetary policy
depend on the extent to which the economic behaviour of the member countries
(regions) participating in monetary union is in synchrony. A condition for similar
behaviour is the similarity of economic structures, and at least as importantly,
similar behaviour by economic agents. Similar structures enhance the probability
that the individual shocks will affect the economies of the various countries to a
similar extent. In turn, similar behaviour implies that economic agents’ responses
to the shocks will be broadly consistent, and hence that the intertemporal
behaviour of the economies will remain similar. The section below will use multiple
indicators to explore the extent of this similarity between Hungary and the euro
area member states. Based on the OCA literature the probability of the incidence
of asymmetric shocks to an economy is affected by the following factors:
– structural similarities;
– degree of trade integration; 
– synchrony of business cycles.
As economic theory fails to provide precise numerical measures for optimality, the
degree of real convergence attained by the Hungarian economy can be assessed
by a comparison with euro area countries that are closest to Hungary in terms of
the level of development and economic structure. This is based on the implicit
assumption that participation is beneficial to the least developed euro area
countries. 
III.1.1. Similarity of economic structures
A comparison of the contribution of the main sectors to GDP reveals that the
Hungarian data fall between euro area extreme values in respect of each sector
(see Table III–1). As far as the sectoral breakdown of employment is concerned,
the percentage of manufacturing employment shows some deviation from the
maximum value for the euro area (see Table III). It is a fair assumption that as
manufacturing productivity increases, the employment ratios will also converge
towards the euro area average.
44
OCCASIONAL PAPERSTable III-1 
Shares of value added by economic sector (%)
Note: 1999 data, except for Hungary (2001), and Ireland (1998).
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts (SNAV) database, CSO.
Table III-2 
Shares of employment by economic sector (%)
Note: 1999 data, except for Ireland (1997), Portugal (1998), Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic
(2000).
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts (SNAV) database, Czech and Polish
2001 Regular Reports, CSO.
International experience suggests that industrial production follows a cyclical growth
path, posing excess risk to countries (including Hungary) where manufacturing
45
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Hungary Poland Czech EMU12   EMU EMU
Republic weighted min. max.
average
Agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing  4.4 6.4 5.3 2.9 0.8 8.9
Manufacturing (including energy) 28.0 33.4 36.8 23.2 15.2 32.8
Construction 4.8 7.9 4.6 5.5 4.2 7.9
Wholesale and retail trade; repairs;   22.3 28.1 25.2 21.3 17.7 28.3
transport, hotels and restaurants
Financial intermediation; real estate,  20.9 8.3 18.0 26.1 17.9 38.6
renting and business activities
Other service activities 19.2 15.9 10.1 21.0 17.0 23.9
Hungary Poland Czech EMU12   EMU EMU
Republic weighted min. max.
average
Agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing  5.9 18.8 5.1 5.3 1.9 18.1
Manufacturing (including energy) 28.1 23.8 30.2 20.4 13.9 23.7
Construction 6.4 7.0 9.3 7.3 6.0 10.5
Wholesale and retail trade; repairs;    24.5 23.4 25.6 25.0 22.3 28.2
transport, hotels and restaurants
Financial intermediation; real estate, 
renting and business activities 7.2 7.7 10.6 13.0 7.0 23.5
Other service activities 27.9 19.3 19.2 29.1 22.0 36.346
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Source: OECD ISIS (isic_3) database, except for Hungarian data for 2001,
reported by the CSO. 
GDP weights are derived from the European Commission (2000) appendix.
Notation:
Bold print denotes Hungarian data for industries in 2001 which exceeded the EMU weighted average
by at least 20% and have an over 5% share of Hungarian gross manufacturing output.
The upper index ‘e’ indicates that the value is outside the minimum or maximum for the EMU-10.
Technical notes:
We have increased the French figure for Category 15 from 1.6% to 16%, by multiplying it by ten, to
correct what was clearly a misprint. The weights are derived from GDP data at current prices, in
euros. The weights have been corrected for the missing data for each industry. All data are unavailable
in the case of Belgium and Luxembourg. Data for Austria and France are unavailable in respect of
category 16 and for Greece and Ireland in respect of category 25. Data for the Netherlands is absent
in respect of categories 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35, and for France and Ireland in respect of category 37.
Due to the missing data, the EMU average has had to be rounded to 100%.
Table III-3
Shares of gross manufacturing output by industry
MANUFACTURING Hungary EMU- EMU10
average (excl. Belgium , Luxembourg)
2001 1997 Weighted Min. Max.
15 Food products and beverages 15.5 21.7 15.0 9.3 28.7
16 Tobacco products 0.8 0.7 1.5 0.1 2.6
17 Textiles 1.3 2.2 3.0 0.8 7.6
18 Wearing apparel and fur 1.9 1.5 2.0 0.3 6.9
19 Leather and leather products; footwear 0.6 0.8 1.3 0.2 4.5
20 Wood and wood products; furniture 1.1 1.6 1.5 0.9 5.1
21 Paper and paper products 1.8 1.9 3.0 1.4 14.2
22    Publishing, printing and recorded media 2.6 3.3 3.7 2.6 7.7
23    Coke and refined petroleum products; nuclear fuel 5.0
e 7.1
e 2.1 1.4 2.9
24    Chemicals and chemical products 6.8 9.2 11.8 5.1 17.8
25    Rubber and plastic products 3.7
e 3.6
e 1.4 0.7 2.2
26    Other non-metallic mineral products 2.8 3.3 3.7 1.9 6.5
27    Basic metals  3.9 5.5 5.1 0.9 7.8
28    Fabricated metal products, exc. machinery 4.1 4.5 6.1 2.1 7.0
29    Machinery and equipment 4.3 5.5 9.6 3.1 12.4
30    Office machinery and computers  5.2 6.0 1.9 0.0 17.8
31    Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 11.2
e 4.3 4.6 2.2 5.4
32    Radio, TV, and communication equipment 10.0
e 5.0 3.6 1.1 8.1
33     Precision instruments 1.0 1.4 1.9 0.3 3.0
34    Road vehicles 14.5 9.0 11.9 0.6 14.5
35     Other transport equipment 0.5
e 0.4
e 2.4 0.7 3.7
36     Furniture and manufacturing not elsew. classified 1.2
e 1.2
e 2.7 1.4 4.6
37     Recycling  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total 100 100 10047
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holds a relatively high weight within the economic structure. Hence, whenever the
manufacturing sector as a whole is hit by a symmetrical shock, the aggregate
impact will be greater in the case of Hungary than the euro area average.
In the following, we will attempt to determine those manufacturing sectors that are
most exposed to asymmetric shocks entailing considerable macroeconomic
implications. As will be pointed out in the next section, due to the large share of
intra-industry trade, foreign direct investment and intermediate goods, manufacturing
is closely integrated with the euro area countries, sharply reducing the probability
of asymmetric shocks. Nevertheless, there are a couple of industries with a higher
weight in industrial production than is typical in the European countries, and hence
a shock to the sector will likely have a greater impact on domestic output. (See
Table III-3.)
Source: OECD SNAV database. 
Note: data for 1999, except for Hungary (2001) and Ireland (1998). 
* Sum of absolute values of the differences between the shares of gross manufacturing output by
industry and EMU-weighted average. The higher the indicator, the greater the deviation from the

















Of the euro area countries, Greece and Portugal appear to be the closest to
Hungary in respect of the size of structural asymmetry within manufacturing (see
Table III-4). Ireland and Finland show the greatest variance from the euro area
average, while France and Germany are the closest to it. 
A comparison of the manufacturing structures of the two economic regions has
revealed four industries with a large weight in Hungarian gross manufacturing output,
which may thus expose the Hungarian economy to asymmetric shocks. Table III-5
lists the detailed industries and products involved. 
37.
As shown in Table III-5, the individual industries carry significantly different
weights as a proportion of exports and GDP. While the specified industries account
for 51% of exports, their share of GDP hardly exceeds 4%, due to the high share of
37 Hereinafter referred to as ‘specified industries’.
Table III-5
Industries with a large weight in manufacturing GDP,
exposed to asymmetric shocks
Source: CSO; data on enterprises required by the tax authority (APEH) to complete
corporate tax returns, 2000 report.
Export revenue Gross value
Industry Products and industries  of industry/  added of
with the largest weights Total export (%) industry/GDP
(%)
30 Office machinery, computers 30.02 Computers 11.4 0.5
31. Electrical machinery and  31.50 Lighting equipment 3.4 0.5
apparatus n.e.c 31.61 Elect. equip. for engines and veh. n.e.c. 2.6 0.3
32. Radio, television and  32.10 Electronic components 2.4 0.4
communication equipment 32.30 Television, radio receivers, sound 
or video recording etc. 5.2 0.3
34. Road vehicles 34. Road vehicles 26.1 2.349
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imported components. Car and motorcycle manufacturing and computer manu-
facturing deserve special attention as they account for merely 2.8% of GDP but as
much as over 37% of exports. As will be shown later, these industries have large
shares not only in total Hungarian exports but also exceed the corresponding
European Union average. This means that a potential asymmetric shock hitting
these industries would have a deeper impact on Hungarian exports and imports
than on the EU members on average, while such an industry-level disturbance
would have only moderate implications for domestic GDP. It should be noted,
however, that a specific shock affecting a particular industry may, in the long run,
feed through to the performance of other sectors. Taking this multiplier effect into
account, Appendix F1 attempts to quantify the effect on Hungarian gross domestic
product of a negative external demand shock to the specified industries.
In order to assess the effects of structural asymmetry, one must examine the likeli-
hood of shocks affecting the industries reviewed.
38 Domestic data for the past 12
years are an inadequate basis for making inferences about the cyclical vulnerability
of Hungarian manufacturing. Certain industries have experienced annual increases
in volumes amounting to several hundred per cent, which cannot be explained by
an increase in external demand. These increases basically reflect growing output
as a result of foreign direct investment in new production capacities.
Nevertheless, production structures involving sales activities that already reacted
to potential demand shocks were more or less in place by the late 1990s.
Remarkably, even in this phase of tremendous growth, manufacturing of electronic
component parts showed surprisingly high volatility, with real output in 2000 up
to double the figure for 1998, only to plunge in 2001 to below the level of three
years before. 
There are no international data available to compare volatility in the various
manufacturing industries. According to a less detailed OECD time series, the
38 Examination of production volatility can only be the first step in analysing risk. Another non-negligible
threat to Hungary is that there are only a small number of companies active in any one industry.
Hence, macroeconomic analysis should also be complemented by exploring risk at the company
level within the key industries. Note also that the main players in the Hungarian economic arena are
transnational companies, which may make business policy decisions (use of internal transfer prices,
etc.) without regard to the risk profile of the industry or the company as a whole. This would also
have a significant effect on their Hungarian subsidiaries’ operations, with special regard to profitability.metal and machinery industry, which includes some key areas for Hungary, has
been even more volatile than manufacturing over the last 25 years, while its
average rate of growth has surpassed that of the manufacturing sector as a
whole.
Chart III-2
Volume of industrial production in OECD countries, 1975–1998
(Seasonally adjusted data, 1990=100)
Source: OECD.
Detailed OECD data on individual industries are only available for the post-1995
period. On the basis of assessing this short period of time, the production volumes
of three industries – such as the manufacturing of computers, manufacturing of
electronic component parts and manufacturing of consumer communication goods
– appear to be highly volatile. Meanwhile, production of road vehicles and related
industries shows moderate variability, similar to the industrial cycles, while lighting
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and its individual industries in the European Union, 1995-1999
(Seasonally adjusted volume indices, 1995=100)
Source: EUROSTAT, representative data collection, with not every member
country included.
Hungary’s economic development lags behind that of Europe only slightly with
regard not only to structure but also quality. In respect of its economic structure,
Hungary was sixth place in a ranking of OECD countries according to the relative
weights of industries belonging to the knowledge-based (technology/knowledge
intensive) economy. Such industries account for 25.9% of Hungarian gross value
added, relative to the OECD average of 27% and the EU average of 26.1%.
Hungary is in 11th position with regard to the share of knowledge and technology
intensive services.
40 It should be mentioned, however, that in addition to these
indicators, the OECD report also tested forty other, mainly microeconomic, indicators,
and Hungary performed less well in terms of these. Nevertheless, the results are
40 OECD (2001b). D5. pp 124-125. The study was conduced by the OECD, and the results were
published in November 2001.
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crucial for highlighting the many structural advantages the Hungarian economy
possesses, enabling it to achieve a rapid catch-up and make the best use of the
advantages of participation in monetary union.
The similarity of economic structures and the likelihood of asymmetric shocks are
not exogenous but rather endogenous properties, as they may change under the
influence of monetary union. Frankel et al. (1998) and Krugman (1997) predict
economic structures and diversification to develop along two opposing lines. On the
one hand, Frankel et al. anticipate that with deepening integration and participation
in monetary union, countries’ economic structures will assimilate and cycles will
converge. By contrast, the ‘Krugman hypothesis’ claims that by encouraging a
regional agglomeration of industries, the common currency will enhance regional
specialisation. This would in turn raise the likelihood of asymmetric shocks, as the
economies are becoming less and less diversified as a result of monetary union
(automobile industry in the area of the Great Lakes in the USA, semiconductor
manufacturing in California, etc.). For the time being, however, there is no evidence
in Europe of the American-type agglomeration predicted by Krugman.
41
III.1.2. Integration of the Hungarian economy into the euro area
We describe the state of economic integration in terms of the volume change affecting
the goods and services trade and the structural and qualitative indicators of trade.
The structure of trade with the EU and the various indicators of comparative
advantages can reveal which Hungarian product categories may be exposed to
asymmetric shocks. In particular, we will examine how successful Hungary has
been in increasing the market share of products with higher added value. This is
because goods representing higher quality are less exposed to competition based
on cost competitiveness, thus reducing the importance of exchange rate policy as
an economic policy instrument.
Thanks primarily to foreign direct investment, the openness of trade increased at a
rapid pace in the 1990s. Total export volumes exceeded the level for 1989 as early
as 1994-1995. Hungary’s current degree of economic openness exceeds the
41 Mindelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000). 53
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European average, with trade (comprising exports plus imports of goods and
services) estimated at 124% of GDP in 2001 (see Chart III-4).
Table III-4 
Export plus import trade as a percentage of GDP (2001)
Source: OECD database, 2001 Regular Report for the Czech Republic and
Poland, NBH.
The western orientation of Hungarian trade became nearly exclusive in the course
of the 1990s. While 67% of exports went to the developed countries in 1992-93,
the corresponding percentage was up to 82% in 2000. Hungary’s main trading
partners today are Germany, Austria and Italy. Exports to the euro area accounted
for 70% of total exports in 2000, higher than that of any euro area members. The
euro area is the source of 54% of Hungarian imports, which is also above the EU
















































































































































Shares of EU/euro area exports plus imports of selected
countries’ total exports plus imports (%)
Source: OECD database. 
* The data for Portugal are for 1999. The countries are ranked on the basis of export plus import
shares  vis-à-vis EMU in 2000.
The past ten years have also witnessed landmark changes in the structure of trade.
Manufacturing exports rose at the most exceptional rate, up from 55% to 92% as a
proportion of total exports to the EU between 1989 and 2000. The fastest growing
manufacturing industry has been machinery, with its share of EU exports up from
11% to 66% over the noted period.
The exposure of the export sector to asymmetric shocks can be assessed by comparing
Hungarian and EU trade structures. Table III-7 shows that Hungary has more than
doubled its share of EU imports over the past five years. This increase in market share
54
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Exports Exports Imports Imports
to EMU12 to EU15 from EMU12       from EU15
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
Hungary 58 70 63 75 Portugal* 66 69 75 78
Portugal* 65 68 81 83 Austria 71 62 76 67
Czech Republic 42 62 44 69 Belgium 61 57 73 68
Belgium 67 62 73 68 Czech Republic 40 56 43 62
Spain 62 60 72 70 Spain 56 54 66 63
Poland 60 60 69 69 Hungary 56 54 62 58
Netherlands 60 57 71 71 Poland 53 52 64 60
Austria 58 55 64 61 France 55 49 65 60
France 52 50 63 62 Italy 52 48 60 56
Italy 49 46 57 55 Germany 45 41 55 51
Germany 44 43 56 55 Netherlands 49 37 61 49
Ireland 44 38 72 62 Finland 35 31 58 52
Finland 32 33 55 54 Ireland 19 21 56 5555
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Table III-7
Shares of main trade categories
of exports directed to the EU  (%)
Source: OECD SITC database and CSO Trade Statistics Yearbooks.
has been accompanied by a restructuring of exports, with the main category of
machinery and transport equipment increasing its share of EU imports more
than fivefold, while other products with a low degree of manufacture have lost
significance.
The similarity of trade structures can be measured in terms of Balassa’s revealed
comparative advantage indices (RCA). An RCA index larger than one means that
a particular product category accounts for a higher share of a country’s total
exports than its share of EU exports. In other words, the country involved exports
a higher proportion of that particular product than the EU members on average,
which implies that it may possess a comparative advantage in that particular
area.
The similarity of trade structures is analysed in two dimensions. First, the structure
of Hungary’s extra-EU exports is compared to that of the European Union. If exports
directed outside the EU show some structural similarity, it is a fair assumption that
the EU (member countries) would have largely the same response to potential
external shocks as Hungary. This implies that giving up autonomous monetary and
exchange rate policy will effectively entail no costs. Table III-8 shows that
Hungary’s trade structure is very similar in respect of the main categories. Only
food products, accounting for 15% of Hungarian extra-EU exports, differ as
Hungary                    Poland Czech Republic
1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000
I. Food, beverages and tobacco 13.4 4.1 7.3 5.3 3.1 1.6
II. Crude materials 5.3 2.2 3.8 3.1 6.6 3.9
III. Energy 4.3 1.3 6.3 5.4 4.2 2.9
IV. Manufactured goods 49.6 26.3 58.0 49.5 52.4 43.4
V. Machinery and transport equip. 27.4 66.0 24.6 36.6 33.7 48.256
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Hungary exports three times as much food as EU members. Of the other main
categories, only manufacturing of plastic raw materials and computers has a higher
proportion in Hungary’s extra-EU exports.
Table III-8  
Structure of extra-EU exports of Hungary and the EU
Source: OECD SITC database and CSO Trade Statistics Yearbooks.
* Extra-RCA-index shows the share of Hungary’s exports directed outside the EU by product category
divided by the corresponding export share of EU members of the same category. 
Next we compared the structures of intra-EU exports. The implication of a similarity
in the structure of intra-EU exports is the assumption that Hungarian economic
policy will probably respond in a similar way to the demand shocks hitting an
Share of commodity  Growth  Adjusted  
group in Hungary’s total extra rate Balassa
EU exports (%) index (RCA)* 
(%) (1999)
1996 2000 2000/1996 Extra EU-export
alapján
I. Food, beverages and tobacco 26.6 15.5 –42 3.0
Meat and meat preparation 6.1 3.2 –47 6.2
Cereals and cereal preperations 2.6 3.5 +32 5.8
Vegetales and fruit 6.6 3.0 –55 5.6
II. Crude materilas 5.2 2.9 –45 1.6
III. Energy 3.7 3.0 –17 1.0
Crude oil and oil products 2.9 2.5 –16 0.8
IV. Manufactured goods 42.1 36.9 –12 0.9
Organic chemicals 2.5 2.7 +9 0.9
Medical and pharmaceutical products 5.6 4.3 –23 1.1
Plastics is primary forms 3.7 3.2 –14 2.4
Paper, paperboard  3.0 2.5 –17 1.7
and articles of paper pulp
Non-metallic mineral manufactures 2.5 2.3 –9 0.7
Manufactures of metals 2.0 2.3 +13 1.1
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 2.6 2.4 –7 1.5
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3.0 2.7 –9 0.7
V. Machinery and transport equipment 22.4 41.7 +86 0.8
Power-generating machinery and equipment 1.1 2.0 +84 0.6
General industrial machinery and equipment 2.8 2.8 +1 0.5
Office machines and automated 0.3 16.7 +4923 5.7
data-processing machines
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 7.0 7.5 +7 0.9
Road vehicles 6.9 5.7 –17 0.7
Total (I–V.) export share 100 10057
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industry as other EU member nations. Table III-9 illustrates that even though the
Hungarian export structure is essentially similar to that of the EU, the proportion of
the machinery sector, with special regard to the manufacture of automobile motors
(power generators) is significantly higher than in the EU.
Table III-9  
Structure of exports by Hungary
and the EU members directed to the EU
Share of Hungarian Growth rate Adjusted
exports in total (%) Balassa index  
EU imports*(%) (RCA)** 
(1999)
1996 2000 2000/1996 Based intra-
EU export
I. Food, beverages and tobacco 0.6 0.6 –5 0.5
Live animals 1.7 1.5 –12 1.1
Meet and meet preparations 2.2 2.1 –6 1.5
II. Crude materilas 0.5 0.6 +16 0.8
Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 1.3 1.8 +34 4.5
Cork and wood 0.9 1.0 +18 1.5
III. Energy 0.2 0.2 –38 0.6
IV. Manufactured goods 0.5 0.6 +31 0.6
Rubber manufactures 0.6 1.2 +97 0.9
Cork and wood manufactures (excl. furniture) 1.0 1.3 +34 1.3
Manufactures of metals 0.8 1.0 +32              0.9
Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting 1.0 1.7 +77 1.5
fixtures and fittings
Furniture and parts thereof 1.1 2.2 +104 2.0
Articles of appareal and clothing accessories 1.3 1.5 +12 2.4
Footwear 1.6 1.7 +7 1.9
V. Machinery and transport equipment 0.3 1.6 +410 1.5
Power-generating machinery and equipment 0.2 4.7 +2012 5.2
Offices machines and automated data proc. mach. 0.0 2.0 +6487 2.2
Telecommunications and sound recording 0.4 3.0 +575 2.5
and reproducing apparatus and equipment
Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 0.9 1.8 +94 1.9
Road vehicles 0.1 1.0 +774 0.7
Total (I–V.) export share 0.4 1.0 +134 1.0
Forrás: OECD SITC database and CSO Trade Statistics Yearbooks. 
Notes:
*   Data in the table indicate the share of Hungarian exports directed to the EU by industry. The total
value of the italicised entries accounts for two-thirds of total Hungarian exports (both intra and
extra EU). 
** Intra-RCA-index is derived by dividing the shares of Hungarian exports directed to the EU by
products category with EU members’ shares of intra-EU exports of the same product category.58
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Intra-industry trade is an indicator of the degree of economic integration. The
higher the proportion of intra-industry trade in total trade, the smaller the probability
of asymmetric shocks and the tighter cyclical co-movement is between the
economies. The size of the intra-industry trade is usually expressed in terms of the
Grubel-Lloyd index.
42
Of the EU periphery and Visegrad countries, the indices for 1998 exceeded the EU
average in the case of Spain and the Czech Republic. Hungary lagged only slightly
behind, approximating the value for Portugal (see Chart III-5).
Chart III-5  
Intra-industry trade
as a proportion of trade with the EU 
(Grubel-Lloyd index, %)






















42 Formula of the Grubel-Lloyd-index:
where xij and Xij denote exports from country i to country j by product category and total exports
respectively; mij and Mij denote imports to country i from country j by product category and total exports
respectively, and k stands for the number of product categories. The closer the value of the index to 100,
the higher the proportion of intra-industry trade.
GLij=  (1- ______________________) x 100,
Xij + Mij





An important question is to what extent the Hungarian goods have been able to
break into high-value-added markets. The 1990s saw an upsurge in the export
share of technology and human capital intensive goods to the detriment of
resource-based products requiring largely unskilled labour. In their studies on the
structure of exports, Landesmann (2000) and Freudenberg et al. (1999) reached
similar conclusions. The export-price/quality indicator reflects a country’s vertical
specialisation. Vertical specialisation shows whether the country in question is
specialising in high, medium or low quality segments of a particular industry,
and hence whether it is a supplier of high or low price market segments. A higher
quality/price class ensures more secure long-term growth for a country, as
competitors find it harder to break into these segments, there is higher value
added and cyclical vulnerability is also assumed to be smaller than that of products
in a lower-quality class. Landesmann finds that Hungarian manufacturing exports
approximated the euro area market average in terms of the price/quality indicator
to 95% as early as 1996, which is very close to the performance of the less
advanced participants of monetary union.
43
The groundwork for the competitiveness of Hungary’s manufacturing sector has
been laid by foreign direct investment, with annual average FDI inflows amounting
to 5% of GDP in the first half of the 1990s. Human capital and technology transfers
by non-resident-owned companies and the possibility integrating into European
networks made a major contribution to rapid economic restructuring and the
increase of Hungary’s market share in Europe in respect of higher value added
products.
The Central Statistical Office’s FDI statistics indicate that over two-thirds of Hungary’s FDI
stocks come from EU countries (76% in 1998) and the euro area (70% in 1998). Detailed
flow data, which are available for the post-1999 period, also reflect that European
residents continue to be Hungary’s main foreign investors. The inflow of FDI has
43 In addition to the output of domestic producers, every country in the world exports to the euro area
market. This implies that the average may be derived from generally higher-than-average indicators
for countries inside EMU and nearly exclusively lower-than-average rates for exporters outside EMU.
In fact, this seems to be the case, as of the EMU participants, only Greece and Italy fell short of 100%
in 1996. The value for Greece was also below that for Hungary, showing a downward trend, while the
value for Italy was slightly above it and remained flat. See Landesmann (2000), Chart 4.6.1, page
108. It is unfortunate that the detailed WIIW database series used by Landesmann did not go any further
than 1996, as based on the rapid pace of the Hungarian catch-up process, the picture of the
Hungarian economy must be even better today.60
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enhanced Hungary’s economic integration in several respects. First, investment in
Hungary was usually aimed at increasing export capacities, which strengthened the
country’s trade integration. Second, the transfer of technology and human capital has
improved conditions for long-term growth. Third, via the flow of incomes produced by
non-resident-owned companies the degree of harmonisation of cycles has also been
enhanced.
Table III-10 
Foreign direct investment stocks as a percentage of GDP
Source: World Investment Report (2001), Annex, Table B.6.
1990 1995 1999
Hungary Inward 1.7 22.4 39.9
Outward 0.6 0.9 3.2
Czech Republic Inward 4.3 14.5 33.0
Outward .. 0.7 1.3
Poland Inward 0.2 6.6 17.2
Outward 0.2 0.5 0.9
Ireland Inward 12.2 18.6 50.7
Outward 4.8 6.4 16.4
Greece Inward 16.9 16.6 17.7
Outward 1.0 0.7 0.4
Portugal Inward 15.3 17.6 21.2
Outward 1.3 3.0 10.6
Spain Inward 13.4 23.3 20.5
Outward 3.2 7.8 19.061
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III.1.3. Business cycle linkages
Structural similarities and differences provide a picture of the extent to which the
economy is exposed to asymmetric shocks and of the likelihood of those shocks
occurring. In contrast, co-movement between observable business cycles, such as
upswings and slumps, suggests that either there were no asymmetric shocks or
autonomous monetary policies neutralised them in the period under review. Thus,
a comparison of cyclical movements in the real economy across countries may
provide useful information on the extent to which the countries examined have
behaved as optimal currency areas in the recent past.
Similarly to the structural differences, individual countries’ diverging cyclical
positions cannot be taken into account by a common monetary policy, which
therefore cannot be optimal for those countries whose cycles are desynchronised.
In the worst scenario, common monetary policy responses would not smooth
out but rather increase economic fluctuations. This, in turn, would have negative
implications for a given country's economic performance.
Several studies have dealt with the cyclical alignment of the Hungarian economy and
other accession-country economies. Although the methods of measurement and the
chosen time series have varied, the studies have unequivocally found that Hungary is
not far from the European average regarding the co-movement of business cycles.
44
A comparison of even rough GDP data series reveals that the cyclical position of
the Hungarian economy is often determined by factors identical to those affecting
Western Europe. Co-movements observed in the first half of the 1990s cannot be
attributed to symmetrical economic shocks in the usual sense. Hungary's economic
transition and German reunification, ultimately responsible for the economic slow-
down in Hungary and Europe in 1992–93, are both seen as the consequences of
the political restructuring in Eastern Europe. Similarities in cyclical movements are
more clearly visible in the second half of the decade. Both in the European Union
and Hungary, the slump caused by the Russian financial crisis was followed by
rapid growth in 1999 and the first half of 2000, whereas since then global
recession has hampered economic growth.  
44 IMF (2000), European Commission (2001a), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), Frenkel, Nickel and
Schmidt (1999), Boone and Maurel (1999).OCCASIONAL PAPERS
Chart III–6 
Quarterly real GDP growth
in the 15 EU members and Hungary*
* Quarter-on-quarter growth rates, derived from seasonally adjusted data. Data for Hungary for the
period prior to 1995 Q1 are NBH estimates.
In order to define the cyclical position more accurately, the trend (potential GDP)
should be detached, and the output gap isolated. We have accomplished this by
using the time series for industrial output.
45 Although industrial output accounts for
only a portion of total output, it is nonetheless a good cyclical indicator for several
reasons. First, international experience
46 has shown that industrial output correlates
well with GDP. Second, industrial output data are available more frequently, on a





































































45 The cyclical component has been extracted from the logarithm of quarterly series measured at constant
prices using the Baxter-King filter. According to international practice, the two parameters were
selected to be 6 and 32, removing movements with wave length shorter than one 1.5 years and
longer than 8 years. In this way seasonality and the trend have also been removed.
46 See, for instance, ECB (2001a). OCCASIONAL PAPERS
available only quarterly. Finally, it is reasonable to choose industrial output, which
can be measured quickly and accurately, for data quality reasons, as the GDP
times series for accession countries under observation are much less reliable and
the scope of their international comparability is much more limited.
Chart III-7
Cyclical component* of industrial output
in the euro area** and three accession countries
* Natural logarithm of the deviation from trend.
** An aggregate re-calculated for earlier periods using the current composition of EMU.
It is characteristic for each of the accession countries observed, namely the Czech
Republic, Poland and Hungary, that, whereas the EU’s cyclical position was on an
upswing in 1991 (mainly on account of stronger demand on the heels of the German
reunification), these three Eastern European economies were still dominated by the
recessionary effects of the transition process. Recession in Europe following the EMS
crisis in 1993 had only a subdued impact, leaving Hungarian industrial output, which
had just begun to recover, virtually unaffected. In the second half of the 1990s,
synchronised movements became characteristic, replacing the earlier divergence,
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trade. After the CMEA market collapsed, the role of the EU increased gradually.
Meanwhile, the correlation coefficient,
47 taken as the cycle of the euro area, rose above
0.6 in all four countries. Nevertheless, it remained characteristic throughout the
decade that the cycles of accession countries were comprised of wider swings, which











































1996 Q1 – 2000 Q4 1992 Q1 – 2000 Q4
0          0.2          0.4         0.6         0.8           1 –0.4   –0.2      0       0.2     0.4     0.6     0.8       1
47 Four-year rolling correlation of cyclical components with those of EMU (an aggregate re-calculated
for earlier periods using the current composition of EMU).
Chart III-8   
Correlation of cyclical components of industrial output in the
countries observed with those of the euro area*
* An aggregate re-calculated for earlier periods using the current composition of the euro area.65
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Convergence among the peripheral member nations of the euro area developed
similarly. The initial asymmetric shocks were primarily the consequences of
German reunification and the EMS crisis. Except in the case of Portugal, correlation
coefficients of between 0.4 and 0.8 were typical both in this group of countries and
the accession countries towards the second half of the decade, which suggests the
adequate synchrony of the cycles. It is worthy noting that in the past 5 years the
cyclical asymmetry among countries has moderated across Europe, except in
Portugal and the non-EU member Norway.
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models may help to decompose business
cycles into shocks originating from the demand and supply sides. Distinguishing
between demand and supply effects may be useful for two reasons. First, supply
shocks may be interpreted as autonomous factors which affect the economy anyway,
even in a currency union. Explanation for this is that supply shocks do not reflect
the effect of monetary policy influencing typically the demand side. At the same
time, monetary policy may behave differently from country to country, which affects
the symmetry of demand shocks. Consequently, they give limited information on
future co-movements within the euro area.
The second advantage of segregating demand and supply shocks is that in this
way we can distinguish between long-term (supply) and short-term (demand)
effects. Supply shocks tend to be more persistent, as they are partly attributable to
changes in and development of production technologies. According to modern-day
theory, the primary task of monetary policy may be to smooth out temporary
fluctuations rather than influence trends. Accordingly, it can achieve price stability
and contribute to more balanced output growth mainly by neutralising demand
shocks. So, somewhat in contrast with our previous argument, the degree to which
a currency area is optimal will depend on the similarities of demand shocks.
An analysis of the past suggests that the second approach can be seen as more
relevant, as the post-communist countries experienced economic restructuring in the
1990s, which was accompanied by a series of country-specific supply shocks. In
contrast with technological innovation in the developed regions of Europe, technology
imports appear to have played a dominant role in supply shocks in the accession
countries. That is why it is not surprising that we have been able to find only modest
correlation for supply shocks. However, the catching-up process will likely entail a66
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reduction in supply-side asymmetries, and thus supply correlation is expected to
increase in the coming years.
Our method, pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989), was introduced to the
literature on OCAs by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). Segregation of demand and
supply fundamentally rests on the simple assumption that demand-pull price
increases induce a temporary rise in output, whereas supply-push inflation triggers
a lasting drop.
48
After calculating demand and supply shocks for each country, they can be compared
to demand and supply series relating to Europe or the euro area as a whole. Three
methods are used to determine the latter. These methods are similar insofar as the
European or euro-area demand and supply shocks are derived as some kind of
weighted average of the individual country series. In the first method, the basis of
comparison is the component that principally accounts for variance in the series of
the West European countries. In the second method, individual countries’ demand
and supply shocks are weighted together on the basis of their effect on inflation in
the current euro area. Finally, in view of the fact that external demand is crucially
important for the state of the Hungarian business cycles and external balance,
comparison is made with the weighted average of the roles of Hungary’s trading
partners in Hungarian exports.
The advantage of using the principal component analysis to derive European
demand and supply serie
49 is that larger countries will only carry a higher weight to
the extent that they exhibit actual correlation with the cycles of several other countries.
Thus, this approach provides a numerical representation of genuine shocks common
to several countries simultaneously. During the period between 1992 Q1 and 2000
Q4, France, Germany and Belgium showed much higher-than-average correlation
with the European component in respect of both demand and supply. Similarly,
Switzerland, Spain and Finland also exhibited significant correlation in terms of
both constituents. Luxembourg and the Netherlands preceded all the other
European states with regard to demand and supply correlation, respectively. Of the
48 For a detailed description of the method applied, refer to Appendix F.2.
49 The inclusion of other principal components in addition to the first principal component, which
accounts for 10-50% of the demand shocks and 0-45% of the supply shocks to non-peripheral EU
member states, will not significant increase explanatory power. This justifies the proposition to view
the first principal components as common European components, with their values interpreted as
pan-European demand and supply shocks.67
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accession countries under review, the Czech Republic can be viewed as the country
least exposed to asymmetric shocks in the 1990s. Demand shocks affecting
Hungary showed broadly the same degree of correlation (0.4) with Europe as those
in Italy, the Czech Republic and Great Britain. Its correlation coefficient of 0.2 for
supply fluctuations, corresponding to the level for Norway and Luxembourg,
represents a slightly greater degree of symmetry than that of Austria and Greece,
and slightly smaller degree than that exhibited by Spain and Portugal.
It is primarily Hungary’s demand correlation that exhibits symmetry of a magnitude
that corresponds to that of many current euro-area member nations. At the same
time, the inference suggested by the country’s supply correlation is that the
exchange rate of the home currency is needed as a shock absorber. Nevertheless,






































Demand and supply correlations with the all-European component
(1992 Q1 – 2000 Q4)because the results seem simply to reflect the characteristics of the transition and
catching-up process noted earlier, thus an increase in the symmetry of supply
shocks is to be expected in the future.
Even though pan-European shocks may play a crucial role in euro-area business
cycles, it seems worthy to concentrate on inflation shocks relevant for decision making
within the ECB. Assuming that the European Central Bank seeks to neutralise only
demand variability and only insofar as it causes excess growth in the harmonised
index of consumer prices (HICP) expected in six quarters’ time, we have constructed
a European demand shock series effective for the ECB. The weights applied to this
series are the current HICP weights, and the inflationary effect of unit demand shocks




50 The correlation coefficient for the series obtained in this way and the principal component of demand
is 0.82 for the sample as a whole and 0.84 for the period between 1992 and 2000. 
Chart III-10  
Four quarterly moving averages of demand shocks in Europe*
and the accession countries 
* First principal component






























































































The degree of correlation with European demand defined in this way shows how far the
adoption of the ECB’s monetary policy assists, or in the event of negative correlation,
hampers the smoothing of demand fluctuations. Hungary’s correlation coefficient is
in effect identical to the value calculated using the principal component of demand,
implying that the symmetry of Hungarian demand shocks is already at par with or
above that for several current euro-area member nations.
Finally, we have attempted to find the degree of symmetry in the variability of
Hungarian demand and supply in respect of our key international trading partners.
To this end, we have weighted the demand and supply shocks of the individual
countries with their shares within Hungarian exports towards the euro area in 2001.
This has enabled us to directly estimate the effect of losing the ability of nominal





























































































  Hungary Europe Czech Republic   Poland
Chart III-11  
Four quarterly moving averages of supply shocks in Europe*
and the accession countries
* First principal component70
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Demand and supply shocks calculated using export weights appear to be less
correlated with those of Hungary than the series estimated earlier using the other
two methods. This is primarily due to the fact that cyclical co-movement with the
two key destinations for Hungarian exports, and especially Germany, was negligible
in the decade as a whole. It should be noted, however, that demand and supply
correlation between Germany and Hungary also showed a slightly upward trend
during the decade.
Recent research using a similar approach has also found that of the former CMEA
countries Hungary can be viewed as the economy showing the highest degree of
symmetry with the euro area. Based on SVAR estimates of quarterly GDP and GDP
deflator series by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), the Hungarian supply correlation
coefficient equals 0.46 relative to the euro area, while the demand correlation
coefficient is 0.25. This puts Hungary directly after the four largest euro-area member
Chart III-12 
Correlation of demand in the reviewed countries with the average
of the euro area weighted with HICP effect of demand shocks
1992 Q1–2000 Q4
















































nations in respect of symmetry. Estimates by Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999)
also based on GDP and its deflator suggest that of the accession countries, only
Hungarian demand and supply shocks are positively correlated with those of both
Germany and France. It should be kept in mind, however, that although based on
an essentially identical SVAR model, the results of the two papers cited and of our
calculations differ significantly. This is partly because estimation is sensitive to
specifications (such as the selection of lags in the VAR model, the length of the
sample period) and data selection, and partly because the benchmark for
comparing the correlations is different (the euro area, Germany and France,
European principal component).
Table III-11  
Demand and supply correlations with Hungary 
(1992 Q1 – 2000 Q4)
Demand Supply Export share  
(%)
Germany 0.12 –0.08 52
Austria 0.10 –0.07 11.3
Italy 0.36 0.23 9.1
France 0.39 0.19 8.6
Netherlands 0.15 0.17 6.6
Belgium 0.03 0.33 4.8
Finland 0.24 0.05 2.9
Spain 0.17 0.17 4.8
Weighted with their
share in exports 0.22 0.0472
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III.2. Adjustment to asymmetric shocks
As shown in the previous chapter, Hungary has a similar production structure to
the European Union, and the Hungarian economy has achieved a high degree of
integration with the European Union. Nevertheless, the incidence of asymmetric
shocks cannot be ruled out. One of the conditions for monetary union participation
is that the economy is able to adjust to potential disturbances via either the
markets or economic policy. Movements of the exchange rate cause shifts in the
relative price of goods produced by the various countries, thereby affecting the
demand for these goods, and thus smoothing cyclical fluctuations of the economy.
The effect of the exchange rate on relative prices may be substituted for by flexible
price and wage adjustment and a flexible flow of labour towards production
sectors with improving sales prospects. As far as the aggregate smoothing of
cyclical fluctuations is concerned, fiscal policy can take over the role of the
exchange rate.
III.2.1. Price adjustment
There is only one international study available on the comparison of Hungarian and
European product and labour markets in terms of flexibility. This OECD study
51 found
the composite indicator of product market regulation in Hungary to be 1.6 in 1998
52
This means that prices in Hungarian product markets are at least as competitive as
those in Spain (1.6), and even more so than those in Finland (1.7), Belgium (1.9),
France (2.1), Greece (2.2), Italy (2.3) and Portugal (1.7). Thus, only four euro area
countries rank higher than Hungary in terms of product market regulation. 
Recent Hungarian price setting behaviour is covered by two empirical studies. The
first paper
53 is based on a questionnaire survey conducted in the summer of 1998
51 Nicoletti, G. et al. (2000).
52 The composite indicator of product market regulation shows how restrictive the regulatory environment
is for competition in the product markets of a given country. When constructing the indicator, the
authors did not assess the objective of regulation, the aptness in achieving this objective or the
grounds for setting the objective. Nor did they cover competition policy regulation or its effectiveness,
although these factors bear essentially on price flexibility in product markets. The indicator ranges
from 0 to 4 - the higher the number the less competitive the regulatory framework.
53 Tóth I. J. and Vincze J. (1999).73
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and the second paper
54 is based on micro-econometric studies on a panel series
ranging from 1993 to 1996. The questionnaire surveyed 451 manufacturing,
construction and retail companies. As it dealt only with pricing behaviour on the
Hungarian market, the sample did not include companies that exported their total
output during the period reviewed. The database of the other paper includes
monthly price data of nine Budapest processed meat retail units, operating
throughout the sample period.
Perhaps the most important indicator of price rigidity measures the average time
between two price revisions. The questionnaire-based survey suggests that 15.6%
of the firms queried revise their prices once a month, 28.5% once a quarter and
22% once a year. The econometric study measured not the frequency of price revisions
but of the actual price changes. Accordingly, during the first part of the sample
period from 1993 to 1995, a price had an average life-span of 2.71 months, whereas
the corresponding value during the second part of the sample period, from 1995 to
1996, was 3.64 months. Although both studies covered only a narrow sample of
firms, one may risk the inference that in the period of 1993 to 1998 Hungarian
pricing behaviour was characterised by quarterly or more frequent price changes
or at least price revisions.
For comparison’s sake, let us add that based on questionnaire surveys in the US
prices are typically revised on an annual basis there
55 Other US studies reveal that
catalogue companies change their prices with even less frequency
56 Hence,
Hungarian pricing behaviour is relatively flexible. However, caution is needed
when using the aforementioned findings to draw conclusions about the present. It
is a well-documented fact of empirical literature that one of the key determinants of
pricing behaviour is the rate of inflation. In a high inflation environment, pricing
behaviour tends to be more flexible and prices are reviewed more frequently.
By contrast, when inflation is low, prices tend to be sticky and are revised more
rarely.
54 Rátfai A. (2000). 
55 Blinder, A. (1991).
56 Kashyap, A. (1995).74
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III.2.2. Wage adjustment
Countries participating in the monetary union vary substantially in terms of labour
market flexibility. There are differences in terms of labour market regulation and
institutions, with trade unions not having the same significance everywhere and the
framework of wage negotiations also showing variance (see Box III-2), in addition
to the institutions relating to employment, dismissal conditions and unemployment
benefits. Hence, both labour mobility and wage flexibility may vary substantially
from country to country, leading to potentially different responses to a common
asymmetric shock. Less flexible labour markets may trigger higher unemployment
and inflation, and weaker long-term growth.
On the basis of the aforementioned OECD study, the Hungarian labour market
appears to be flexible in an international comparison.
57 The study shows that the
EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) index, which is one of the indicators of
labour market rigidities, stands at 1.4 for Hungary. Corresponding figures for the
English-speaking countries are 0.2 and 0.5, with those for Germany at 2.8, for
France at 3.1, and for at Belgium 2.1. Of the countries with more relevance to
Hungary, Spain has an index of 3.2, Portugal 3.7, Greece 3.5 and Ireland 1.
Hungarian wage bargaining has no elements that would hinder wage flexibility in the
course of or following accession. Even though the employers, employees and the
Government’s representatives meet to reach an agreement on the recommended
rate of earnings growth within the private sector, bargaining at the company level
is the most crucial instrument of wage setting, which is conducive to flexible
adjustment.
58 In this way, wages can be set that are in line with the level of productivity
at the individual companies.
57 Nicoletti, G. et al. (2000). o. The OECD’s EPL index gives summary information on how easy it is
for companies in terms of money and time to reduce the number of their employees. A low value
indicates flexibility, and a high value inflexibility. The indicator also shows how easily companies can
take on new staff during an upswing. Hence, low values should signal low unemployment, which
appears to be approximately the case. The European Commission DG Employment and Social
Affairs held an interesting debate on the methods and concepts of labour market flexibility liable to
be operational for policy purposes. For contributions to the debate, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment_social/empl&esf/concepts_en.htm
58 Neuman L. (2000). 75
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Box III-2
Institutional framework of wage bargaining in the EU member
countries
Every EU member nation has multilevel wage bargaining both at the industry
and the company level. Five countries even have wage negotiations between
the individual industries - Finland and Ireland between representatives of the
entire economy, Belgium and Greece within the private sector and Denmark
between industry representatives.
The importance of any particular level in wage bargaining varies across
countries. Inter-industry coordination is dominant in Belgium and Ireland,
while France and the UK put greater emphasis on negotiations at the corporate
level. While industry-level bargaining is effective in eight member countries,
there appears to be no dominant level in Denmark and Luxembourg, and the
identity of the dominant participant varies from negotiation to negotiation in
Finland.
Although every member country has a certain measure of industry-level
bargaining, there are significant differences in terms of content and the number
of industries involved. Irish and UK industries participate in extremely limited
numbers. While in France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain mainly small
and medium-sized companies take part in industry-level talks, and large firms
typically meet at the company level, in Italy small and medium-sized firms are
not at all represented at industry-level talks. Wage negotiations also vary in
terms of geographical coverage. While the talks have nation-wide relevance
in most of the countries, they only relate to the region in question in France,
Germany and Spain.
Another difference is that most countries set a minimum wage growth rate at
the industry or inter-industry levels, which could be in significant variance with
the results achieved at the company-level bargaining (e.g. in Denmark). By
contrast, the practice in Ireland and Belgium is to prescribe a maximum rate
for wage growth, which of course allows for different outcomes at the company
level of bargaining. 76
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As far as wage flexibility is concerned, a look at the years of economic
restructuring suggests that apart from the early stage of economic transition,
nominal wages have changed in line with the inflation rate, and real wages
have also been in correlation with growth of productivity. The flexibility of
wages in relation to productivity rose substantially, from 6% to 20%, over the
period from 1986 to 1996.
59
One of the indicators of labour market flexibility describes the sensitivity of real
wages to unemployment. In the early 1990s, regions hit hard by the shock caused
by the economic transition experienced a marked fall in labour costs. The flexibility
of the wage level in relation to regional unemployment levels rose from –0.015 to
–0.1, a ratio typical for market economies. However, in the subsequent stages of
the transition period, these regions lost most of their labour market edge, due
primarily to the productivity advantage of regions with lower unemployment. From
1996, wage flexibility in relation to unemployment started to decline. Although
even as late as 1998 earnings flexibility remained around the value of –0.1, noted
as typical by the literature, there was some degree of loosening apparent in the
correlation between wage costs and unemployment. 
60
III.2.3. Labour mobility
The traditional OCA theory places great emphasis on the adjustment to asymmetric
shocks by means of factor (especially labour) mobility. This is a focal issue
because nominal wages are assumed to be rigid downward, and hence wages
cannot adjust to a negative demand shock, which might lead to high unemployment.
Recent literature on the subject has, however, questioned whether labour immobility
represents a genuine obstacle to a country giving up its own currency. Under this
approach, labour mobility is not a response to shocks that monetary policy is able
to handle. Monetary policy is primarily useful in dealing with temporary shocks.
Obviously, due to the substantial costs of moving, there is no need for regional
labour adjustment in the face of transitory shocks.
Even giving up the autonomy of monetary policy, it is not true that the market will
59 Kertesi, G. et al. (2000).
60 Kertesi, G. et al. (1999).77
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have no other way to adjust but via mobility. The primary means for the labour
market and companies to respond to temporary adverse demand shocks will be by
downward flexibility in wages and prices. Once a shock is over, the labour force
that has left for abroad cannot be expected to return shortly, as the costs of moving
are substantial. Flexibility or mobility in this sense is not only hard to imagine but
would literally threaten long-term growth in the region or the countries hit by the
shock. Adjustment to permanent shocks may naturally be made easier if labour
supply can adjust to the geographical distribution of demand. This, however, has
little to do with the fact whether the country in question has an autonomous monetary
policy. Mobility can first and foremost be promoted by instruments of structural
policy, such as training, the removal of linguistic barriers, higher mobility in the
housing market, etc.
The geographical mobility of the Hungarian population is by no means negligible.
In the early 1990s about 3.5-4.6% of the country’s base-period population (360-
470 thousand people) went to live in a different location. This, however, does not
mean that the interregional unemployment gap can be reduced automatically by
movements of the population (see Table III-12). Assuming this relatively strong
domestic mobility to be stable it would take as much as 20 years to reduce the initial
20% difference between the unemployment rates of the 170 regions to12.8-
15.8%.
61
As shown by Table III-12,
62 differences in terms of both unemployment and earnings
have been rather persistent over the last decade. The possibility of equalising
unemployment rates and wage levels across the various regions by commuting is
restricted due to high transport costs and the consequent segmented nature of the
labour market.
In addition to the regional imbalances in terms of unemployment, the Hungarian
labour market is also troubled by relatively low employment and participation rates.
The mechanism of labour market adjustment to negative shocks by increasing
inactivity is also known in Europe. While in a global comparison, the EU member
countries also have a low employment rate, the figure for Hungary is even lower.
The EU’s employment target is set at 67% in 2005. The Hungarian employment rate
61 Kertesi, G.  (1998).
62 Fazekas, K. (2000). pp. 278-282stands at roughly 56%, relative to 61.3% for the EU-11 (and 63.1% for the EU-15)
in spring 2000.
63 Of the EMU participants, Greece, Spain and Italy have lower rates
than Hungary. Our relatively lower participation and employment rates are primarily
due to the large-scale restructuring that has been implemented. By consequence,
the geographical distribution of newly created jobs differs from that of the jobs that
ceased, and these new jobs require considerably different skills. Hence, there
appears to be a permanent structural gap between labour market demand and
supply. Consequently, the inactive can be viewed as potential labour only to a
limited extent not only during a cyclical upswing but also in the medium term.
III.2.4. Adjustment via fiscal policy
The success of economic policy adjustment hinges on the efficiency of fiscal policy.
By giving up autonomous monetary policy, the task of dampening the aggregate
effects of asymmetrical shocks is taken over by fiscal policy. Fiscal policy can only





* Unadjusted for the effect of age differences, sex, education, etc.
Percentage differences
between the unemployment





monthly earnings levels of
regions with the highest
and lowest levels*
Relocation in the 15-55/59
age group as a percentage
of population
in the 15-55/59 age group
1989 21.1 2.2
1992 6.7 38.9 2.3
1993 7.0 35.8 2.3
1994 7.3 38.2 2.3
1995 9.0 39.7 2.3
1996 8.2 41.1 2.2
1997 7.9 41.9 2.3
1998 6.6 48.5 2.4
1999 7.1 48.4 2.4
2000 5.9 55.8 2.679
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way. Should a negative shock hit the economy when the budget is already suffering
from high debt and/or deficit, fiscal policy would not be able to respond immediately
and there might even be a worsening in the factors bearing on its ability to adjust.
Fiscal policy works in two ways: the automatic stabilisers and  discretionary
measures.
64 These channels are not effective unless fiscal policy has the necessary
scope of action.
Two of the nominal convergence criteria pertain to the budget, requiring that
consolidated government debt and current deficit not exceed 60% and 3% of GDP,
respectively. Unlike the relative criteria on inflation, exchange rates and interest
rates, these are absolute figures. Within these limits, the Stability and Growth Pact
requires that the planned deficit be zero on average over the economic cycle, and
that countries with large debt and high future fiscal commitments (e.g. expected
pension increases) even plan for a slight surplus. These requirements are designed
to ensure that accession countries have the necessary leeway for manoeuvre in 
fiscal adjustment, both in respect of the automatic stabilisers and active policy
instruments.
65
The automatic stabiliser effect of government arises from the fact that receipts and
expenditures change in opposing directions over the cycle, i.e. when activity is
strong, social spending (such as unemployment benefits, for instance) declines
64 In practice, it is methodologically difficult to measure the size of the necessary transitory deficit and
the cyclical position of fiscal policy. It is even one of the requirements for EU membership that in
addition to fiscal stability member countries should also include a historical and prospective description
of their cyclical budgetary positions in the convergence programmes, using a uniform methodology.
These indicators are instrumental in economic policy coordination within the EU. Countries
participating in the monetary union draw up stability reports while non-participant union members
(members with a derogation) submit convergence reports every year. The reports must be in line with
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines passed by ECOFIN. Accession countries prepare a Pre-
Accession Economic Program, which is also aimed at stability and convergence.  
65 The experience of the EU countries suggests that the Maastricht deficit criterion leaves sufficient
leeway for fiscal policy to adjust to the cyclical movements of the economy. In the past, shocks would
have only rarely led to a situation when the 3% limit is exceeded, provided that the countries involved
did not have an initial deficit higher than 1 to 2%. Providing that the initial deficit is near zero, only
permanent and severe recession would lead to exceeding the 3% criterion. However, the sanctions
contain exemptions for such situations, especially if the recession is caused by factors that are not
controlled by economic policy. Furthermore, in the past there were no similar restrictions on fiscal
policy as those laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact, so, clearly, these requirements are not so
strict that they hinder adjustment within EMU.80
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and tax revenues rise, thereby increasing the government’s receipts. As the two
items are entered on opposite sides of the budget, their changing in opposing
directions dampens the cyclical upswing. At the time of a downswing, everything
happens the other way round, with the automatic stabilisers mitigating the
economic slowdown. Not every budget item has equal importance to cyclical
stabilisation. The most sensitive items are corporate profit taxes, and the least
sensitive are social security contributions, which are, in general, regressive. The
sensitivity of personal income taxes and value added taxes lies somewhere in
between the previous two.
Comparable calculations for automatic stabilisers (or cyclical components) carried
out by the EU member countries have revealed that the automatic stabilisers within
monetary union vary widely in size. They are typically in the upper range in small
and Northern countries relative to larger and non-Northern countries.
66 According
to the EU Commission’s calculations the marginal sensitivity of the budget balance
as a proportion of GDP is at 0.5% on average for the EU-15 as a whole, with
individual percentages of 0.5 for Germany and Portugal, 0.6 for Denmark,
Belgium and Spain, 0.7 for Finland, 0.8 for the Netherlands and 0.9% for
Sweden. By contrast the figure for Greece was as low as 0.4. These numbers indicate
that based on the EU-15 average, if GDP grows at one percentage point below
trend, the budget deficit will increase by 0.5% as a proportion of GDP.
As the highest tax receipts are associated with the evolution of wages and consumer
spending in Hungary, fluctuations in the economic cycle will not automatically
create significant tax surpluses or losses, as wages and consumption fluctuate less
markedly than the cycle. Items on the expenditure side are not significantly sensitive
either, with unemployment benefits having a low weight and wages, linked to
pensions via Swiss indexation, fluctuating only moderately. As far as tax receipts
are concerned, corporate profits and investment are the two areas that could be
affected more by the cycle. Due to the low tax burden on these items, however, the
current budgetary sensitivity is estimated to be merely 15% in Hungary.
66 In the period from 1960 to 1997, the largest negative cyclical component within the EU-15 countries
stood at –1.3% on average, and the largest positive figure was 1.7% as a proportion of GDP. In a
breakdown by country the corresponding percentages were –1.1 and 1.6 for Greece, –2.1 and 2.8 for
Spain, –2.7 and 2.0 for Ireland, –2.4 and 2.4 for Portugal and –5.9 and 5.3% for Finland [see Buti et
al. (1998)].81
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The smoothing effect of the automatic stabilisers also depends on factors such as
the openness of the economy and the share of the public sector, in addition to the
deficit’s marginal sensitivity and the tax receipts and expenditure structure. In
small open countries, the smoothing effect tends to be smaller, due to the imported
components of aggregate demand. Accordingly, achieving the same smoothing
effect requires higher variability in the deficit. A larger public sector also tends
to have a greater smoothing effect. The European Commission estimates the
automatic smoothing effect for EU member states to be in the range of 15% to
41%, assuming unit shocks. In other words, if automatic stabilisers are allowed to
work, cyclical swings will be 15-41% lower than otherwise.
67 
No comparable calculations have been prepared to describe the fiscal smoothing
effect in Hungary. As in terms of the government’s tax and expenditure structure
Hungary resembles the class of less cyclically sensitive European countries, and in
terms of openness it is like the countries that have a small stabilising effect, the
Hungarian fiscal sector will resemble the group where the automatic stabilisers
play a less pronounced role (such as mainly the South European countries, with a
value below 20%). On the other hand, due to the openness and the ongoing catch-
up process, Hungary must be prepared for higher-than-average volatility in the
output gap. Consequently, stabilising the economy may require stronger reliance
on discretionary moves aimed at boosting investment activity, which tends to be
more exposed to cyclical fluctuations.
Smoothing by discretionary moves is allowed as fiscal planners have some leeway
in modifying the majority of expenditures. Apart from the relative inertia they have,
state-financed or subsidised projects - expenditures typically viewed as provisional
items - can react flexibly to cyclical changes. This is because, depending on
commitments and the state of completion of various projects, it is equally possible
to launch or speed up projects and slow down or postpone new ones. Flexibility to
make adjustments is also there during the year as the government controls the
allocation of reserves set aside to cover unforeseen expenses (and unrealised
receipts), in addition to having the power to decide on the utilisation of chapter and
institutional residual funds or the freezing of appropriations. It is also possible for
67  Measures obtained are 15% for Greece, 18% for Portugal and Spain, 31% for Ireland, 30% for the
Netherlands and Germany, 41% for Finland. Buti et al. (1998) P. 135 Table 9.4. 82
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
Parliament to pass a supplementary budget if there is a danger of a higher-than-
planned deficit, or to amend the budget to decide on the allocation of possible
excess revenues. The Budget Act contains fewer constraints for institutions that
perform government functions outside the government’s legal framework. Specific
regulations govern the activity of the State Privatisation and Holding Company
(ÁPV Rt.), with the exception of reserve utilisation. As far as other organisations are
concerned, the Act sets a ceiling for state-guaranteed borrowing. As some of the
capital expenditures at the government’s discretion, such as road construction, are
financed by such extra-budgetary organisations, there is a high degree of flexibility
during the year.
III.2.5. Financial integration, international risk sharing and asymmetric shocks
To the extent that it reinforces international risk sharing, financial integration may
dampen the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. If, for instance, instead of holding
their savings exclusively in domestically-issued securities, households also
diversify them within the monetary union, this will help reduce the impact of negative
shocks on incomes in their countries or regions. A fall in the price of domestically-
issued securities triggered by a negative shock would also reduce the value of
household savings. By contrast, the prices of foreign securities would remain
unchanged which may act as a stabilising force for their savings. If households in
a region comprising several countries increase the share of foreign (but intra-
regional) assets within their savings portfolios, this will enhance risk sharing in the
region. With the increase in international risk sharing, households would be better
able to smooth their consumption over time, which could also dampen the effect
of asymmetric shocks to the individual countries.
Although securities issued abroad account for only a modest share of household
financial wealth even in the developed countries, this proportion is expected to
increase within EMU. In addition to the common currency and the resulting elimination
of exchange rates, further harmonisation in the field of financial regulation will
encourage portfolio diversification and risk sharing within EMU. The greatest
progress in this area is expected from pensions funds and equity purchases by
pension funds. The relaxation of rigid restrictions on foreign investment (currency83
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matching) and on the proportion of equities is expected to induce a large-scale
reallocation of portfolios, which will also involve Hungarian households. All in all,
financial integration will enhance the stability and closer correlation of incomes and
ultimately output, across the participating countries.  
III.3. Effects of the common monetary policy
Joining the euro area will mean that Hungary adopts a single, uniform monetary
policy. This common monetary policy will not be efficient unless imported monetary
conditions are consistent with domestic economic developments. This requires
meeting a number of conditions simultaneously. First, the direction of interest rate
moves should be in line with the cyclical position of the Hungarian economy,
based on the condition that the Hungarian economy shows strong co-movement
with the euro area economy. Second, the interest rate moves by the ECB should
also be of the appropriate size. This can only be guaranteed if transmission has
similar speed and effect in the different member countries. The third requirement
is that fiscal policy play an active role in aggregate demand management, sub-
stituting for monetary policy in dealing with potential macroeconomic imbalances
that might arise within the single interest rate policy environment. This is not merely
a theoretical possibility as the first such situation can already be anticipated.
Joining monetary union will trigger a fall in the level of nominal interest rates, causing
an asymmetric demand shock relative to the other euro-area countries.
III.3.1. Optimality of the uniform interest rate policy for the Hungarian
economy
To the extent that the ECB sets its key interest rate at any point in time in
accordance with conditions in the euro area, it will be automatically acceptable
for Hungary as well,
68 provided that domestic business cycles are sufficiently
synchronised with those in the euro area as a whole. The chapter dealing with
68 This is meant to refer to the cyclical position, i.e. whether nominal euro rates are at the peak, the
trough or somewhere in between. The same nominal levels will presumably represent different real
rates for the catching up and the most advanced EMU members.84
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Box III-3 
Change in the lender of last resort function after joining monetary
union
The central bank can act as a lender of last resort if the banking system has a
temporary shortage of liquidity, which cannot be remedied by private means and
poses systemic risk. In accordance with international financial institutions’
recommendations, central banks do not in general make public the procedures
followed when acting as a lender of last resort, and apply the principle of
constructive ambiguity to reduce moral hazard. 
When Hungary enters monetary union, this central bank function will be trans-
ferred from the National Bank’s authority to the Eurosystem. Similarly to the inter-
national and current Hungarian practice, the Maastricht treaty makes no mention
of the lender of last resort function among the Eurosystem’s functions either. This
can only be derived from its other functions. Accordingly, the Eurosystem
contributes to  the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the
stability of the financial system and promotes the smooth operation of the
payment system. In  critical situations the national authorities and the Euro-
system can cooperate on an ad hoc basis to eliminate the systemic risk.
Based on the reasoning of Chapter IV. 3, the Bank believes that the risk of a
liquidity crisis with a potential for systemic risk is much lower in the unified
financial market of the monetary union. Were a liquidity crisis to occur, the
Eurosystem, also including the National Bank of Hungary, would take the necessary
measures to maintain the stability of the financial system and ensure the smooth
operation of the payment system. Thus, joining EMU will not affect the operational
conditions of domestic banks in respect of the lender of last resort function.85
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
business cycle correlation cites research results derived by various methodologies
and the Bank’s own calculations, which reflect sufficiently strong co-movement.
Accordingly, assuming a greater degree of correlation following accession,
Hungary will not suffer a greater disadvantage than most current euro member
countries.
The question, however, is whether monetary policy as it has been conducted so far
is not more in harmony with the cyclical position of the Hungarian economy.
Answering this question is no easy task, but recent experience shows that, in addition
to monetary policy, emerging market financial crises as well as global investor
sentiment have also had major effect on the evolution of exchange rates and interest
rates in Hungary, an emerging economy itself. Under the exchange rate system
based on a narrow fluctuation band, interest rate policy had but limited room for
manoeuvre. Thus, movements in the risk premium required by foreign investors
appeared in forint yields. The same is the case now under the broad-band
exchange rate regime, with the exchange rate continuing to play a key role in
disinflation.
It should be borne in mind when determining the factors affecting the cyclical
movements in forint yields that the recent gradual disinflation has caused forint
yields to evolve along a trend. In order to obtain data that are dynamically
comparable with risk indicators and euro yields, we have transformed one-year
zero-coupon forint yields into ex ante real interest rates using expectations derived
from the Reuters inflation survey.
69, 70 The real yields derived in this way have shown
strong negative correlation with euro yields over the past five years. By contrast,
international risk indicators are, at least in certain periods, in clearly positive
correlation with forint yields.
Joining the euro would in effect terminate Hungary’s status as an emerging country,
eliminating the effect of factors that bear on the returns of risky investments and
are totally independent of the Hungarian business cycle. Furthermore, the ECB’s
69 Derived from government securities market data using Svensson’s method (Svensson 1993.). The
inflation expectations are computed by interpolation from the Reuters inflation survey about the year end.
70 To support our reasoning, it is worthwhile to look at longer-term interest rates rather than very short-
term ones, because they are affected more markedly not only by the central bank base rate but also
the impact of market demand. interest rate policy would have a direct impact, which would presumably be in
much greater accordance with the state of the economy at any given point in time.
Hence, it is expected that giving up the country’s autonomous monetary policy
would be conducive to better interest rate cycles.
Another question is whether the level of interest rates is consistent with the needs
of the Hungarian economy. Due to the higher inflation level concomitant with real
appreciation, the uniform nominal interest rate entails a lower level of real interest
rates in Hungary than in the more advanced countries of the euro area. Economic
theory offers no guideline about the magnitude of the equilibrium real interest rate
in a small open economy or about the implications of a possible permanent divergence
from this level. In a large closed economy, the stock of capital changes only slowly,
and the equilibrium level of real interest rates is determined by the marginal product
of capital in addition to the existing stock of capital. In small open models, the
economy imports the level of interest rates, and the supply of capital changes
86
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Comparison of forint real interest rates with the euro yields
and the EMBI+ index
Source: Bank calculations, Reuters, JP Morgan.87
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rapidly, due to the mobility of production factors. The path of the economy can
only be determined by incorporating different friction variables,
71 such that can
often be calibrated only in an ad hoc fashion. One can thus only predict that, given
a lower level of real interest rates, the economy may embark on a path of faster
growth characterised by stronger involvement of foreign funds until the stock of
capital reaches the size at which the marginal product of capital is equal to the
imported interest rate.
It should be kept in mind, however, that lower interest rates will affect demand
sooner than there is an expansion in supply. This will trigger an asymmetric
demand shock relative to the countries of the euro area. This is not an unknown
phenomenon in the euro area either, where economic policy debate about the ECB
often focuses on the question whether the common interest rate level is appropriate
for the peripheral economies (such as Ireland and Portugal) with higher inflation and
faster growth.
When formulating an economic policy response to higher inflation, it is crucial to
distinguish between an inflation differential arising from equilibrium appreciation
and that due to cyclical factors. Structural inflation is not a consequence of actual
output beginning to exceed potential output. Such regional differences are common
within every large monetary union, such as the USA and today’s euro area as well.
There is no need for economic policy to adjust as long as the cyclical position is in
accordance. 
Cyclical misalignment may be due to several factors. One possible mechanism is
that faster price increases are incorporated into expectations as a secondary effect,
leading to inflation that is higher than structurally justified. If wages increase at a
pace not supported by better productivity, with higher inflation expectations built
into wage demands and companies’ pricing behaviour, this may worsen producers’
competitiveness in any given country.
72 Due to excessive wage and price increases,
the real exchange rate appreciates more strongly than justified on the basis of the
catch-up process and relative productivity improvement. Market adjustment
implies that aggregate demand for domestically produced goods declines due to
71 These include the cost of changing the capital stock and the tolerable level of the current account
deficit, for instance. Such a model is described in Chapter IV.  
72 Alberola et al. (1998), pages 47-48.  the worsening competitiveness, slowing down the rate of economic growth until
inflation only contains the structurally justified component in addition to average
euro-area inflation.
The cyclical position of the country may also be diverted if the lower real interest rates
create too lax monetary conditions in a rapidly catching up country, causing output to
grow above potential. The other threat is asset (securities and real property) price
inflation due to increased borrowing enabled by the low real interest rates. Asset
price inflation frequently lacks the ability of self-correction. When a market
becomes overly optimistic, there is a danger of bubbles forming, which may burst
after a while, causing a sudden plunge in prices. Drastic corrections lead to
financial uncertainty and instability, with real economic repercussions. The threat
of asset price bubbles is greater in economies that grow at a robust pace, especially
where, due to the catch-up process, the rapid growth is due to structural and not
cyclical factors. 
For a rapidly catching up country, all the aforementioned sources of the inflation
differential may exist simultaneously. In the case of Ireland and Spain, for instance,
the inflation divergence could be attributed to both the Balassa-Samuelson effect
and cyclical asymmetry.
73 The practical difficulty this entails for economic policy
is to determine the sources of the inflation differential and the relative weights
attached.
Dealing with the excess inflation arising from the cyclical divergence depends on
the source of the excess demand.
74 If the factor behind the upswing is external
demand, then optimal adjustment means that the real exchange rate appreciates
due to the inflation differential, dampening the rate of economic growth via worsening
competitiveness. Thus, higher inflation creates its own correction mechanism.
There is however, the danger of overshooting, which may result in a long recession
in exchange for correcting the macroeconomic imbalance. If one wishes to avoid




74 Alesina et al. (2001), and Blanchard, O. (2000). 89
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growth, there may arise a need for adjustment by fiscal policy.
75 The optimal
method of adjustment may thus involve a combination of accommodating higher
inflation and implementing fiscal tightening.
The danger of the formation of asset price bubbles calls for economic policy analysis
and appreciation of micro- and macroprudential information so that no systemic
instabilities are generated. A partial safeguard against financial market imbalances,
the harmonisation of microeconomic prudential regulations, is virtually complete
in the case of Hungary. This is not a perfect guarantee though, but the EU directives
allow countries to tighten prudential requirements if deemed necessary.
Supervisory authorities have the power to revise banks’ collateral assessment
procedures and sanction excessive growth in the balance sheet total or individual
items. From a macroeconomic point of view, a stable macroeconomic environment
(characterised by price stability and the smoothing of the rate of growth, etc.) and
credible communication are the most crucial factors in preventing financial market
instability.
III.3.2. Efficiency of monetary transmission
Monetary union cannot function properly unless the member economies react
similarly to the common monetary policy moves, in other words there should be
no major divergence between the monetary transmission mechanisms of these
countries. Otherwise the common monetary policy cannot be effective, and may
even become itself a source of asymmetric shocks. Failure to fulfil this condition
is a frequent argument against early EMU entry by transitional countries. It is
argued that in countries with relatively underdeveloped financial systems, interest
75 Another complication with this simplified selection algorithm arises if the optimal choice for a
rapidly growing economy is not a balanced trade deficit but trade deficit of a certain sustainable size.
In this case the optimal real exchange rate appreciation is stronger than that consistent with
equilibrium. The fiscal position also has a bearing on the optimal economic policy choice. If debt
is low and falling, and if the recovery of public investment is high, optimal adjustment could mean
accommodating higher inflation rather than fiscal tightening. On the other hand, if the debt and
deficit are high and the rate of recovery on public investment is low, the optimal strategy may call for
dampening aggregate demand by reducing fiscal expenditures. Ibid. Page 21.90
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rate policy can make a much weaker impact than in the present euro area
countries.
If transmission mechanisms are different, the common monetary policy may
magnify existing cyclical differences, hence an interest rate change  following an
inflationary shock may widen the inflation differential.
76 From a Hungarian
perspective, principally the common monetary policy would entail higher costs if
the transmission mechanism were stronger than the euro area average. This is
because in that case - assuming that the ECB takes into account the transmission
differences when making interest rate decisions - countries with stronger trans-
mission would shoulder a higher portion of the real economic costs of disinflation
in the euro area. This is not to say that countries where transmission is weaker only
enjoy the advantages. Weaker transmission implies that the common monetary
policy moves are weaker than those viewed as optimal under an autonomous
monetary policy. In other words, monetary policy would not be quite as effective
in smoothing cyclical fluctuations. This could ultimately hamper convergence
and, in an extreme case, lead to divergence unless fiscal policy can adequately
offset the effects of asymmetric transmission.
Empirical comparisons of monetary transmission across countries, relying on
data from the pre-EMU period, reveal significant differences in the way the real
economy responds to monetary shocks. At the same time, caution should be
taken in evaluating these results, as they are by no means unanimous: the various
studies estimate different measures for the asymmetries, sometimes even the
directions of differences in transmission are contradictory. Nevertheless, it is
possible to make a few general inferences. Most VAR models confirm that
transmission is weaker in some peripheral countries, such as Spain and Ireland,
than in the largest core countries, such as Germany and France. However, the
various estimates are not consistent in terms of the relative situations of core
countries or the assessment of transmission in some countries, such as Austria,
76 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that countries do not differ in terms of the response by
inflation to the output gap. Accordingly, this study does not deal with the differences between the
sacrifice rates of disinflation. The other assumption is that the shocks to which the common monetary
policy responds are symmetrical. 91
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Portugal and Italy.
77  Elbourne et al. (2001) suggest that the contradictory results
are primarily due to the fact that the sample periods and data sources are not
identical, and to a lesser extent, to the choice of different models. 
Comparative research on euro-area countries suggests that the euro area is far
from being homogenous in terms of transmission, so it cannot be said that Hungary
is exceptional, relative to the other member countries. Also, as will be seen, the
Hungarian financial system is undergoing major structural changes, projecting
improvement in monetary transmission over the medium term.
Factors bearing on transmission
The varying strength and speed of monetary transmission can be largely traced
back to differences in the size and structure of the financial intermediation. It
should be stressed, however, that different characteristics of the financial system
are relevant in the different phases and channels of the transmission mechanism,
and these characteristics are not necessarily in correlation and often have opposing
effects on transmission.
The speed and strength of monetary transmission depend first of all on the speed
and extent to which market and bank interest rates react to changes in central bank
77  Keier et al. (1998) find no significant divergences between the transmission mechanisms of France,
Germany and England. Similarly, the SVAR analysis of transmission within the G7 countries by
Gerlach et al. (1995) reveals no significant differences. Using a VAR analysis, Ramaswamy (1997)
divides European countries into two groups according to how output responds to monetary tightening.
For countries belonging to the first group, such as Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the
UK and Finland, the real economy takes much longer, say 10-12 quarters, to adjust, and the
adjustment is much deeper, accounting for 0.6-0.8% of GDP. Monetary policy moves affecting the
other group, comprised of Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden take a very short
time, that is 6 to 8 quarters, to come through, but the impact is weaker. In a study of 13 European
countries, Phillipsen and Wuyts (1999) also classify countries into two groups, but their classification
is not the same as that of Ramaswamy, with Italy being in the ‘strong’ group and Great Britain and
the Netherlands in the weaker group. Comparing 14 countries, using a structural VAR model,
Ehrmann (2000) also notices major differences. Interestingly, he finds the strongest transmission in
the UK, in contrast with what is suggested by Dedola and Lippi (2000), and Phillipsen and Wuyts.
Altavilla (2000) also defines two groups, which again differ from the above classifications. One of his
key inferences is that countries vary more markedly in terms of the real economic response to
monetary shocks than in terms of the adjustment of inflation.92
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rates. The intensity of interest rate transmission is governed by the structural
properties of financial intermediation [see Ehrmann et al. (2001)], with special
regard to:
– the role of non-bank financing: if capital markets play a major role in the
financing of firms the private sector is less vulnerable to a decline or increase
in credit supply in response to a central bank interest rate move;
– the maturity of loans, fixed or variable interest rates, and collateralisation: if
short-term and variable rate loans are dominant, then interest rate trans-
mission is faster, while high collateralisation indicates a strong balance sheet
channel, which further boosts the efficiency of transmission;
– market concentration and the intensity of competition: obviously, the more
intense competition is, the faster the reaction of commercial bank rates to
central bank rate changes.
78
The above characteristics imply the existence of fast interest rate transmission
within the Hungarian banking system, as financing via the capital market is
insignificant, and both loans and deposits have short terms to maturity. In addition,
there is a high share of variable rates and competition is strong, especially in the
corporate business. The Bank has also researched interest rate transmission, the
first phase of monetary transmission (see Árvai (1998)). The study has found
effective transmission between market rates that respond immediately to central
bank rate changes and bank rates, although since rates followed a downward trend
throughout the period under review, it was not possible to analyse the transmission
of central bank rate rises.
Rapid interest rate transmission does not in its own right ensure that monetary impulses
can efficiently guide the behaviour of non-bank sectors. Interest rate policy can be
expected to have a stronger impact in countries where bank lending plays a significant
role in corporate financing, and where there is a high level of private sector indebtedness.
This is because if private sector indebtedness is low, central bank rate changes will
not have a sufficient impact on the interest expenditures of the corporate and house-
hold sectors, investment and consumption decisions and, ultimately, inflation.
78 The assets side is primarily affected by a rate cut and the liabilities side by a rate hike.93
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The ratio of financial intermediation to economic activity, and particularly the
relative size of financial markets, vary significantly across the euro area. At the
same time, Hungary lags considerably behind the average euro area levels, and in
fact each euro participant has deeper financial intermediation than Hungary (see
Chart III-14).
Chart III-14  
Banks’ total domestic lending as a percentage of GDP (1998)
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
As far as the private sector is concerned, both household and corporate indebtedness
falls short of the characteristic level for euro member countries. The difference is
especially large in respect of households: while the ratio of financial liabilities to
disposable income is in the range of 50 to 100% in developed countries, the
corresponding ratio for Hungary stands currently at 7%. Furthermore, bank lending
to households amounts to merely one-tenth of the euro area average as a percentage
of GDP (see Table III-13). However, the past few years have witnessed a sharp






































































expected to continue over the coming years. Thus, the savings ratio is primarily
governed by structural factors in the short term, over which interest rate policy has
only limited effect. Over the medium to long term, however, the substantial rise in
household indebtedness will improve the effectiveness of transmission.
79
Over the past five years, the level of corporate indebtedness has risen rapidly,
although still somewhat more slowly than within the household sector. By 2000,
the stock of lending to non-financial corporations had reached 25% of GDP, still
much below the 40% euro area average. It should be noted, however, that the share
of direct corporate sector borrowing from non-residents has been substantial over
the last decade, accounting for 13% of GDP in 2000. Taking these factors into
account, the share of bank lending in Hungarian corporate financing is signifi-
cantly higher than that indicated by banking statistics. Companies’ balance
sheets reveal that previously very low capital gearing ratios had approached those
of the more advanced economies by 1999 (see Chart III-15). Another important
feature of the corporate debt structure is that the proportion of foreign-currency,
largely euro denominated loans accounts for over 60% of the total stock of lending,
which reduces the sensitivity of corporate credit demand to changes in forint
rates.
To sum up, after initial caution, commercial bank lending to the corporate and
household sectors has gathered pace over the past one or two years, and is
expected to remain buoyant. As starting from a low level, household indebtedness
is approaching the long-term equilibrium level, households’ contribution to financing
capacity is expected to be limited over the medium term. Therefore, direct and
portfolio financing by non-residents is expected to play a permanent role in the
catch-up process. 
It can be said in relation to monetary transmission that once Hungary enters
monetary union, the harmonised regulatory and institutional framework is in
place in the financial markets, hence the financial sector is capable of efficient
intermediation. The financial sector is structurally stable, thanks primarily to
privatisation (over 70% of banking sector capital held by non-resident professional
investors) and the largely harmonised regulatory environment. Prior to monetary
79 Árvai–Menczel (2000).Table III-13  
Bank lending to households in euro member countries in 2000
As a percentage of GDP
Households Of which:
Real property loans Consumer credit
Austria 28 12.7 11.7
Belgium 34.1 23 3.6
Finland 27.3 18.5 2.4
France 34.4 21.2 7.8
Netherlands 67 57.9 3.4
Ireland 39.9 29.8 9.1
Luxembourg 38 27.4 3
Germany 67.6 42.7 10.9
Italy 21.2 8.4 1.8
Portugal 61.5 45.3 7.5
Spain 46.1 29.1 8
Euro area – average 42.3 28.7 6.3
Euro area – weighted average 45.9 29.1 7.3
Hungary 4.7 1.5 3.2*
Czech Republic 6.3 … …
Poland 7.0 … …
Source: ECB, Banco de Espana Annual Report 2000, p.116 and NBH.
* Consumer credit and other loans.
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union entry and during the initial years, bank intermediation is expected to
remain less deep than the average for the euro area, which will negatively affect
the effectiveness of monetary transmission. On the other hand, the structural
properties of Hungarian financial intermediation allow for more effective interest
rate transmission.Prospective changes in the monetary union
Empirical studies spanning the period prior to monetary union reveal significant
variance across member countries in terms of the real effects of monetary
shocks and the strength and timing of transmission. These differences are
partially explained by the differences in the structural properties of financial sectors
and banking systems. This raises the issue of what predictive power these
historical differences have for the period following the establishment of the
euro zone and whether common monetary policy may become a source of
instability. There are a number of arguments in favour of the proposition that
monetary union will decrease these differences. First of all, financial market
integration is likely to reduce the differences between the financial systems of





















































































Chart III-15  
Corporate sector indebtedness, total liabilities
(excluding suppliers) as a proportion of equity
Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN, BACH database, NBH calculations and APEH tax
authority corporate database.Second, several analyses,
80 claim that prior to monetary union, countries showed
differences in terms of the effect of monetary policy not merely because they had
different transmission mechanisms but also because central banks used different
reaction functions.
Transmission is expected to improve more strongly in countries, including
Hungary, that have small liberalised capital markets but are, at the same time,
characterised by considerable and volatile risk premia. The effectiveness of interest
rate policy in such countries is significantly limited by the easy access to and high
proportion of foreign-currency (mainly euro) denominated loans, which weaken
sensitivity to changes in domestic interest rates. This was broadly the case for the
other small euro member countries as well, prior to their entry into monetary union,
regardless of the fact that they had larger financial sectors than Hungary. As most
of the loans are provided by euro area countries and are denominated in euro, the
problem will ease once Hungary joins the euro area.
III.4. Seigniorage loss as a result of entering monetary union
If a country retains its national currency, the government obtains seigniorage revenue
from its monopoly on currency issue. The monetary base is basically an interest-free
loan granted by market participants to the central bank. Seigniorage is the revenue
derived by the central bank from the issuing of coins and banknotes. Seigniorage
revenue increases central bank profits, which are transferred to the Budget at the
year-end accounting of profits. In this sense, seigniorage can also be viewed as a
special kind of tax paid by holders of the monetary base to the government.
Seigniorage revenue is traditionally calculated in two different ways. Under the first
approach, the monetary income is derived as the annual real increase in the monetary
base. Here, symbolically, the central bank transfers to the budget the notes and coins
produced since the previous year, in exchange for nothing. This approach has
relevance only for countries where the central bank lends directly to the government.
Under the other, opportunity cost-based, approach, seigniorage is the income arising
from the assets held as a counterpart to the monetary base. In this approach, the
97
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80 E.g. Clements et al. (2001).98
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size of the interest income is usually quantified via multiplying the (real) monetary
base by short-term domestic market yields. This, however, is only acceptable if the
increase in the monetary base is derived from the rise in the central bank’s net
assets denominated in the national currency (e.g. via the purchase of domestic
government securities). If the monetary base grows via the increase of the central
bank’s foreign currency denominated net assets (via intervention in the foreign
exchange market, for instance), the monetary income obtained is calculated using
foreign and not domestic yields.
In the second half of the 1990s, seigniorage in the more developed Central and East
European countries (such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia) no
longer played the role of intended fiscal revenue. Rather, it was a kind of by-product
of exchange rate and interest rate policy dilemmas as these countries sought to
prevent the appreciation of their currencies in order to stimulate competitiveness,
while maintaining domestic interest rates high in order to reduce inflation. Under the
fixed exchange rate regimes run by these countries, the national central banks
frequently implemented foreign currency purchases in order to prevent appreciation,
and then sterilised part of the excess liquidity created. The interest paid on the
sterilisation instruments decreases seigniorage revenue. Finally, potential exchange
rate changes may lead to substantial forex losses/gains due to the different foreign
currency structure of the assets and liabilities sides of central bank balance sheets,
which also has a bearing on central bank profits.
Schobert (2001) demonstrates that, taking account of these factors, seigniorage
revenues obtained by the more advanced transitional countries in the period
between 1995 and 2000 were much lower than those indicated by the traditional
opportunity-cost-based approach. This is partly because the interest income
earned on foreign currency assets as a counterpart to the monetary base was lower
in these countries than that earned on domestic currency denominated assets.
Secondly, the costs of sterilisation were hefty. On the other hand, depreciation of
the domestic currency contributed a great deal to seigniorage revenues, via the
forex gains appearing in central banks’ balance sheets.
However, the question we would like to answer in this section is not the historical
evolution of Central and Eastern European seigniorage but the costs of lower
seigniorage, were the euro to be adopted in Hungary. This cost can be derived by99
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
comparing monetary incomes if the country joins monetary union and, alternatively,
if it stays out..
Monetary income if Hungary participates 
Hungary’s adoption of the euro will, in principle, mean the end of the government’s
revenue from issuing the country’s own currency. However, the monetary income of
the euro area is distributed among participant national central banks, according to
their shares of the subscribed capital of the ECB. The size of the share in the ECB
is determined as the sum of 50% of the share of the member state in the population
of the Community and 50% of its share in the gross domestic product of the EU.
81
Assuming that only Hungary joins the EU, based on 2000 figures the country’s
share in the ECB would amount to 1.6%, to be paid on Hungary’s entry into the
monetary union.
82 The more countries join the EU in the first round, the smaller
Hungary’s share is. With ten new members, for instance, it would drop to 1.4%.
Profit accounting within the Eurosystem (ECB + euro area national central banks)
is governed by stringent rules. At first glance, it seems disadvantageous for
Hungary that a certain part of the euro area monetary income (the exact amount
to be determined by the Governing Council, but may not exceed 20% of the net
profit) has to be transferred to the General Reserve Fund of the ECB to cover
prospective losses. As a result, participating countries receive only a reduced portion
of the seigniorage revenues, which is part of the profit accounting. In practice, how-
ever, seigniorage that remains with the ECB should be viewed not as a genuine
loss, but simply as a higher claim on the ECB’s capital.
The Eurosystem did not officially have a monetary income until the euro was
adopted in 2002, as, under a provisional arrangement, seigniorage remained with
the member countries. Therefore, the seigniorage income of the euro area is also
estimated using the opportunity cost approach, taking into account that the
81  A country’s share of the subscribed capital is set already on accession to the EU and the start of
ESCB membership, but only 5% of the amount has to be paid up on accession, with the remaining
95% left until joining EMU.
82  The data for 2000 provide a good starting point as the capital subscription is set by using the
average for the five years prior to ESCB membership. Although economic growth in Hungary will
presumably exceed the corresponding rate for the euro area in the coming years, this will not have
a significant impact on Hungary’s share.100
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Eurosystem pays market rates on required reserves. If Hungary’s capital share is
1.6%,
83 it will receive 0.24% of its GDP as redistributed income between 2006 and
2008, while under the 1.4%-share scenario, the corresponding figure will be 0.21%
of GDP (including the portion transferred to the General Reserve Fund).
Monetary income if Hungary stays out
If the country does not enter monetary union, the size of the seigniorage will be
determined by the level of the monetary base and the yields on the assets backing
it in the central bank’s balance sheet. Thus, seigniorage can only be calculated if
there are data on the size of the monetary base, the central bank assets backing
the monetary base and the yields on those assets at, and following, the earliest
possible date of monetary union entry (2006).
The change in the average monetary base is primarily determined by such factors
as the Hungarian cash/GDP ratio,
84 which is well above the EU average, and faster
economic growth in Hungary than in the euro area. These factors are partially
independent of monetary union membership and appear to be permanent over the
long term. The cash holding ratio is not expected to change considerably over the
medium term, although the widespread use of cash substitutes is likely to exert
downward pressure both inside and outside the euro area. The calculations in this
study are based on the assumption that the 7.6% cash ratio, measured in 2001, will
remain in the future.
The monetary base has two components: notes and coins in circulation and the
reserves of credit institutions held at the central bank. The calculations in this study
only take account of the seigniorage revenue arising from cash balances. This is
because the central bank will start paying market rates on required reserve balances
at the latest following the EU accession. This will also be the end of the seigniorage
income arising from this component of the monetary base.
It is more difficult to determine the prospective structure of central bank assets
83 Although, in all likelihood, Hungary will not be the only country to join the EU, the number of early
EMU aspirants is much lower.
84 In 2001, the cash to GDP ratio amounted to 7.6% in Hungary, relative to 5.4% on average in the euro
area. 101
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backing the monetary base, as this will depend, to a great extent, on the exchange
rate policy pursued until 2006 and afterwards, should the country remain outside.
The underlying assumption here is that the existing broad-band fixed exchange
rate system will remain in place over the medium term, and there will be no incidence
of foreign exchange market intervention. This implies that the expansion of the
monetary base will be, at least for a while, matched by an adjustment on the
liabilities side, i.e. the winding up of sterilisation instruments accumulated previously.
The Bank currently estimates that sterilisation instruments will be completely
eliminated from  the central bank’s balance sheet by around end-2003. The
expansion of the monetary base after this date will be countered by the rise in
domestic currency denominated assets, in other words, the central bank will switch
from its present liquidity-absorbing role to providing liquidity. After 2003, central
bank assets backing the monetary base will be comprised partly of foreign currency
assets (in an amount corresponding to the monetary base expected at end-2003)
and partly of forint assets.
Our final assumptions relate to the expected yields of the aforementioned central
bank assets in the period after 2006. Foreign currency assets are expected to be
denominated 100% in euro, in accordance with the currency basket. Based on the
implied euro forward curve in February 2002, short-term euro yields at end-2006
are assumed to be 5%.
85 As stressed in the cost-benefit analysis, with Hungary
remaining outside the monetary union, the risk premium component of forint
yields, compensating for the remaining exchange rate uncertainty will still be
around. Chapter IV.4.1 estimates the size of this premium in the range of 150 to
300 basis points. Thus, if Hungary does not adopt the euro, prospective short forint
yields may be in the range of 6.5 to 8%.
If Hungary remains outside monetary union, real GDP growth is estimated at 3.1%,
according to the baseline scenario of the exogenous growth model discussed in
Chapter IV.4.3. As far as inflation is concerned, a successful continuation of the
disinflation programme was assumed, bringing down and maintaining price inflation
at a 3% level even over the longer term.
85 Here, we implicitly assumed a short duration (of roughly one year) for foreign currency assets
backing the monetary base.102
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The assumption for the future path of the nominal exchange rate contains no trend-
like depreciation or appreciation. In other words, the expected value of forex
gains/losses is assumed to be zero.
86
If Hungary does not join the euro, the seigniorage revenues will remain low although
rising over time as the expanding monetary base will increasingly have high-yielding
forint assets and a shrinking share of foreign currency assets as a counterpart.
Based on the above assumptions, the seigniorage revenue in the period from 2006
to 2010 will account for 0.41-0.44% of Hungarian GDP.
Size of loss arising from lower seigniorage 
A comparison of seigniorage revenues in the case of Hungary joining and remaining
outside monetary union shows that the expected value of seigniorage loss caused
by monetary union entry will amount to 0.17-0.23% of GDP. It should be noted
that this estimate has been based on rather conservative assumptions. The loss
related to Hungary’s entry would be smaller if the cash ratio were to decline
towards the lower levels observed in more developed countries, as opposed to our
assumption of staying constantly at the currently high level.  The loss would be
also smaller if the central bank could maintain stable and low inflation only via the
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate in the case of non-entry, because then
monetary income would be reduced by the forex loss sustained on central bank
foreign currency assets. Moreover, medium- and long-term losses could be lower,
if the euro’s role as a global currency increased in third countries, as the redistributed
monetary income would be higher under the entry scenario.
86  Such an assumption is obviously not compatible with the assumption of stable inflation, inasmuch
as a Balassa-Samuelson type real appreciation is expected for the future (see Chapter II.4). If, in
accordance with its objective, the central bank manages to maintain a stable low rate of inflation
(near the euro-area rate), the expected nominal appreciation will have a negative impact on central
bank profits, due to the translation loss sustained on foreign currency assets. As this means a down-
ward revision to the Bank’s estimate of the seigniorage revenue, it can be viewed as a conservative
assumption.
87  Fischer et al. (2002) say that a 2010 entry would imply a positive outcome for Hungary in respect
of seigniorage. The authors base their estimates on a cash ratio that would decrease linearly to 5.9%
over the period to 2020, but a rate of real economic growth of merely 3%.Table III-14  
Parameter assumptions and calculation results
Outside EMU Inside EMU
(redistributed)
Cash/GDP 7.6% –
Interest rate differential relative to EMU 150–300 bp –
Real GDP growth 3.1% –
Inflation 3% –
Seigniorage revenue  0.41–0.44% 0.21–0.24%
as a percentage of GDP




IV. BENEFITS OF JOINING THE EURO AREA
In assessing the potential benefits of participating in a currency union, the academic
literature on optimum currency areas primarily considers the reduction in transaction
costs and its impact on foreign trade. If two countries (in this case Hungary and
EMU) are in asymmetrical positions with regard to their size, credit rating, inflation
record and monetary policy credibility, other factors must also be taken into
account, in addition to focusing on the likely benefits of a reduction in exchange
rate uncertainty. In particular, with the abandonment of the independent currency,
a country's exposure to financial contagion will decrease.
In this cost-benefit analysis, we attempt to measure the three most important 
benefits of monetary union membership. Using the methodology applied in the case
of countries that joined monetary union earlier, we estimate the reduction in 
transaction costs after abandonment of the independent national currency. We 
further attempt to provide an estimate of the expansionary impact of a currency
union on foreign trade by adapting to Hungary the results of empirical tests published
in academic literature. From among the likely benefits of a reduction in exposure
to financial contagion and an improved credit rating, we try to measure the impact
on GDP growth of a reduction in real interest rates and a rise in sustainable current
account deficits. However, we would like to note that a more favourable credit rating
(reflecting a reduced exposure to contagion), ceteris paribus, helps to reduce the
amplitude of business cycle fluctuations, which, in turn, lessens the costs of 
relinquishing independent monetary policy, as discussed in Chapter III. We finally
use two different approaches to measure the direct effect on growth. First, we present
the results of a simulation derived from the NIGEM model employed regularly by
Bank staff for economic policy analysis. Second, we also carry out simulations in
a calibrated growth model, with the aim of quantifying the effects of a reduction in
interest rates and a less tight current account constraint.
IV.1. Gains from reduced transaction costs
Transaction costs arising from maintaining the country's own currency whichHungarian firms and households would no longer incur after joining the euro area
may be categorised into two groups. One group consists of conversion costs which
banks and other financial intermediaries charge to customers as fees for converting
euros into forints (and forints into euros) and as differences between bid and ask
prices. The other group is comprised of ‘in-house costs’ which firms engaging in
foreign exchange transactions must bear due to extra administration and risk 
management linked with such transactions. We assume that the resources saved
by the disappearance of these activities may be re-channelled to support productive
activities in other sectors of the economy. Consequently, the reduction in transaction
costs entails a comparable rise in GDP.
Conversion costs
Conversion costs are an expenditure for firms and households but, on the other
hand, they represent an income for banks. The disappearance of conversion costs,
however, does not mean a simple transfer of income from the banking sector to
firms and households. The reason for this is that, with the reduction in currency
conversion, certain productive resources which have so far been tied up by an
essentially administrative ‘regulation’ (i.e. the use of a country’s own currency) will
be released. This reallocation of resources towards other sectors results in a 
permanently higher level of GDP.
Estimating the impact on GDP of a reduction in conversion costs requires at least two
assumptions. Assuming there is perfect competition in the banking sector or, at least,
in the currency conversion business, income from conversion fees charged on non-
bank customers and from bid-ask spreads should more or less be identical with the
marginal cost of resources tied up in this business activity. Another assumption is that,
after abandoning the independent currency, these resources could be used in other
activities within the banking sector or in other industries to produce value added
commensurate with their costs. If both conditions are met, then banks' income from
foreign currency trading with their non-bank customers produces a good estimate of
additional GDP growth induced by the disappearance of conversion costs. Two funda-
mental data sets are required for estimating this income – (i) turnover in the foreign




It is important to note that domestic banks' income from foreign exchange trading
with each other have not been taken into account when producing the estimate.
The reason for this is that domestic interbank foreign exchange trading is a zero-
sum business, i.e. the consolidated income of the domestic banking sector from
this business is zero. Consequently, this activity is practically financed from fees
charged on non-bank customers. This, however, is legitimate, as transactions
initiated by non-bank customers (for example, a bank hedges a forward transaction
concluded with a non-bank customer in the interbank market) account for a
considerable portion of interbank foreign exchange trading. In order to avoid
double-counting, therefore, forex turnover between domestic banks has not been
considered in reaching the estimate.
Foreign exchange market turnove 
Comprehensive surveys were conducted on the turnover of the Hungarian foreign
exchange market in 1998 and 2001, in the framework of the triennial international
evaluation spearheaded by the Bank for International Settlements. As part of the
survey, domestic commercial banks submitted detailed daily reports throughout an
entire month (April) on the volume of foreign exchange market transactions, in a
breakdown by currency, customer and types of transaction (spot, forward, swap,
etc.). After processing and adjusting for double-counting, the BIS published the
reported turnover data in internationally standardised statistical tables on an aggregate
basis.
88
The survey helps to obtain a picture of the size of the Hungarian foreign exchange
market. Daily average turnover in the domestic market (USD 587 million) accounted
for some 0.5 thousandths of the global foreign exchange market in April 2001 (USD
1,173 billion daily, excluding OTC deals). Transactions with non-bank customers
made up around 13% of global foreign exchange turnover in April 2001. The
Hungarian forex market had a comparable ratio of 18%, of which transactions in the
HUF/EUR currency pair accounted for some 6%.
April 2001, the period to which the survey organised by BIS referred, was the last
88 For the results of the April 2001 Survey, see http://www.bis.org/press/p011009.pdf.month prior to widening the intervention band of the Hungarian forint. Shortly after
band widening, and as a result both of increased exchange rate volatility and the
accomplishment of foreign exchange liberalisation, turnover in the domestic foreign
exchange market rose significantly. This appears to be reflected in turnover data
derived from banks' daily reports to the NBH.
89 Based on the experience of six
months following band widening, monthly average turnover doubled relative to
April. More or less simultaneously with this, trading volumes in the HUF/EUR 
currency pair increased, accompanied by an upsurge in swap transaction volume.
There was also a pronounced rise in transactions between the domestic banking
sector and foreign banks.
Chart IV-1 Monthly foreign exchange market turnover, USD billion
Source: NBH.
Average data for the period May–October 2001, which reflect turnover volumes
and composition following band widening, have served as a basis for our 
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89 Reports by commercial banks on their daily foreign exchange turnover are somewhat different in
terms of detail and the range of reporting institutions from those used for the purposes of the BIS survey.
But these time series illustrate well the fall in turnover in the domestic foreign exchange market
between 1998 and 2000, as noted in the BIS surveys. It is also observable that this decline, in line
with global trends, affected mainly interbank trading and that turnover with non-bank customers
remained much more stable.108
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likely produce a yearly average turnover of approximately USD 280 billion in
the years ahead, provided the current trends continue. Within this, the domestic
banking sector is expected to conduct business with non-bank firms amounting
to an annualised amount of USD 24 billion in the euro/forint segment and to
nearly USD 51 billion with foreign banks. These are the segments of the foreign
exchange market which are relevant to estimating conversion costs.
Fees charged
In addition to turnover data, fees charged by banks are also needed to enable us
to estimate the likely amount of conversion costs. These may vary depending on
the type of transaction (spot, forward or swap), the amounts involved and the
importance of the customer. In respect of fees charged, we rely mostly on expert
estimates. Fees charged by banks in the EUR/HUF segment of the interbank spot
market about which the NBH has accurate information represent the only exception,
as bid-ask spreads can be measured during the daily fixings. For a commercial













































































Average bid-ask spread at fixing (forints)
1 April 2001– 22 February 2002
Source: NBH.109
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Following band widening, the interbank bid-ask spread at the daily fixing increased
by an order of magnitude, to 15 basis points (about 0.3 forints) on average (see
Chart IV-2). However, this is not surprising, as foreign exchange trading carries a
much higher risk for banks, given the significantly more unpredictable movements
in the exchange rate within the wider band than in the narrow band.
The interbank spot market is the cheapest segment of the foreign exchange market.
Banks charge much higher conversion fees to non-bank customers (i.e. firms and
households). We used domestic commercial banks' euro/forint quotes for the
general public as a basis in dealing with the issue. Quotes of buying and selling rates
have revealed an approximate gap of 50 basis points. This is broadly comparable
with the buy/sell spreads experienced within the EU at the time of a survey of 
conversion costs conducted in 1992.
90 This survey also showed that forward 
contracts were much more expensive than spot transactions – the fees charged were
50% to 100% higher. Due to a lack of other meaningful information, we will use this
ratio (i.e. forward fees being 1.5 times higher than spot fees) in estimating the costs
of both forward and swap transactions in the Hungarian foreign exchange market.
As accurate data on fees charged were not available, we attempted to provide a 
conservative range estimate for the conversion costs. We calculated the lower boundary
of this range by halving the fees estimated on the basis of the principles outlined above.
Multiplying turnover of the relevant market segments (domestic bank/foreign bank
and domestic bank/non-financial company) and types of transaction (spot, forward
and swap) by the estimated size of relevant fees, we obtained a total conversion cost
of HUF 16–32 billion annually, which is 0.11%–0.22% of projected GDP in 2001.
According to our assumptions, this would be the size of the permanent gain in the
level of Hungarian GDP, if the physical and human resources tied up in the banking
sector due to the maintenance of the country's own currency were released following
the introduction of the euro.
Relating this result to data in the aggregate income statement of the Hungarian
banking sector provides an opportunity to check our estimate of conversion costs.
The aggregate income statement records income from foreign exchange trading
under ‘payment and transaction fees’, along with a number of other revenues. This
item amounted to HUF 104 billion in 2001 according to the banking sector’s aggregate
90 See, Emerson et al (1992), Annex A.110
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income statement. It does not seem to be unreasonable to assume that the size of fee
resulting from foreign exchange transactions may have been 15%–30% of this amount.
Our estimate is comparable with the results of an examination carried out in 1992,
which attempted to measure conversion costs arising in the EU. This revealed that
conversion costs accounted for 0.17%–0.27% of European Union GDP prior to the
introduction of the euro. The survey also shed light on the fact that EU-level conversion
costs were very unevenly distributed among the member states. In small, open
economies with less developed banking systems relative to the EU average, conversion
costs may have been 8 times higher than in the largest members, whose 
currencies functioned as generally accepted means of payment in international
payments. Consequently, through the reduction in conversion costs these small,
open economies, sharing many similar features with present-day Hungary, gained
the most from the introduction of the euro.
‘In-house’ costs
Companies participating in foreign trade suffer costs when transacting in foreign
currencies with banks due to the maintenance of the national currency. However,
financial burdens linked with foreign currency transactions also arise within the
firm. These ‘in-house’ costs may be divided into two groups.
Direct ‘in-house’ costs comprise the costs of human and physical resources tied up
in the administration of foreign currency transactions and (interest rate) losses
incurred due to the significantly longer time required for executing foreign currency
transfers than forint transfers. In addition, this group includes opportunity costs
which may arise as the consequence of a corporate strategy followed in order to
protect against exchange rate risk. The reason for this is that building natural hedging
positions (for example, a firm with foreign currency receivables attempts to switch
a part of its costs into foreign currency based costs) entails implicit costs, as this
forces them occasionally to miss certain business opportunities (for example, they
may be forced to purchase their input at less favourable conditions or to employ
narrower margins, etc.).
‘In-house’ costs may include indirect elements as well. In case of introducing a
common currency, performance analysis and evaluation within a company of itssubsidiaries' operating in various countries, establishing optimum transfer costs,
etc. may become much simpler. As a consequence of increased transparency, 
corporate management will gain in efficiency, with the result that investment decisions
and the business strategy will be more solidly based. These considerations appear
to reinforce the idea that, in the case of a changeover to the euro, the reduction in
indirect ‘in-house’ costs would mostly benefit multinationals.
‘In-house’ costs are even more difficult to measure than the conversion costs of
transactions conducted via the banking sector. As statistical data are not available,
corporate-level surveys and case studies are generally referred to. At the invitation
of the European Commission, Ernst and Young prepared case studies in 1990, 
surveying internationally active German, French, British and Spanish firms.
Relying on these and other expert estimates, Emerson et al (1992) estimated 
indirect ‘in-house’ costs to be 0.07%–0.08% of EU GDP.
Other data being unavailable for the purposes of our analysis, we have adapted
these ratios to Hungary. It should be added, however, that Hungarian goods exports
directed to the euro area are currently much higher as a proportion of domestic
GDP than the 20% accounted for by EU exports in the early 1990s, taken for the
purpose of the estimate noted above. Owing to this, the values adapted to Hungary
should be considered as a conservative, lower estimate. Contributing to this, the
above estimate merely referred to direct ‘in-house’ costs and it did not include 
indirect costs, as there was no available reference in respect of their size.
Summing up the gains derived from a reduction in transaction costs
Summarising our estimates derived from domestic data and international experience,
if Hungary introduced the euro, the reduction in transaction costs would increase
the level of domestic GDP permanently by 0.11%–0.22%, and the fall in firms' 
‘in-house’ costs by another 0.07%–0.08%. Accordingly, transaction costs that
could be saved annually by adopting the euro are estimated to be 0.18%–0.30%
of GDP. Similar estimates for euro area member states showed gains from the




90 Gros and Thygesen (1998); Emerson et al (1992).IV.2. Gains from foreign trade expansion
The contribution of the common currency to growth through foreign trade expansion
has two components – (i) foreign trade picks up as an effect of joining the common
currency; and (ii) the long-term growth rate of GDP rises as an effect of rising 
foreign trade. Neither of the two relationships has been unambiguously underpinned
by theory, and we must rely mostly on empirical work in evaluating them. In the
following, we take an overview of the most frequently cited theoretical 
findings and then proceed to present the empirical evidence. Finally, by drawing
the relevant conclusions, we attempt to quantify the growth gains which would
arise from the likely foreign trade expansion associated with Hungary's membership
in the euro area.
Theoretical considerations
Among the reasons behind the trade-creating impact of a common currency, the
disappearance of exchange rate volatility and other transaction costs, both impediments
to trade, are the most obvious and most frequently cited. But variations in the
exchange rate do not necessarily imply similar variations in relative prices. On the
contrary, in some cases appreciation or depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
may smooth out abrupt changes in the terms of trade. Moreover, financial markets
of developed countries offer efficient (cheap) hedging opportunities to protect
against fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. Due to its effects transmitted
through various channels which may even be opposing, it is not surprising that
exchange rate volatility has not proved to be a significant explanatory variable of
foreign trade in most empirical investigations dealing with developed countries.
For this reason, some authors have sought alternative explanations. Maurel (2001),
for example, emphasised the role of economic policy coordination accompanying
currency union. A coordinated fiscal policy brings business cycles of 
currency union members closer to each other. If a given country's business cycle
is aligned with the cycle of its trading partner, then exports and imports change
more or less at the same rate, thereby reducing the likelihood of a country running
into a current account constraint. In this case, imports are mostly financed by
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deficit. If, on the contrary, business cycles are grossly misaligned, the financial systems
will be unwilling to finance deficits accumulating over long periods, which, in turn,
may retard growth in foreign trade. According to this explanation, a currency union
is qualitatively different from pegging the exchange rate. In a currency union, the
primary source of the trade-creating effect is not the disappearance of exchange
rate uncertainty.
The boost provided by foreign trade expansion to growth, i.e. the second component
of the effect of a common currency, is primarily explained by factors playing a role
in endogenous growth theories, such as technology transfer, adaptation of know-how
and intensifying competition. However, theory cannot be considered as unambiguous
in assessing the effects of these factors.
The 1980s and 1990s saw the birth of new paradigms in the theories of both growth
and foreign trade. Endogenous growth theory appeared and proliferated. Its new
features were that it handled technological change within the models and emphasised
the role of human capital and research and development. Classical trade theory,
giving centre stage to factor endowment and specialisation, was replaced by ‘new
trade theory’, which focused more on horizontal, i.e. intra-industry, trade.
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) combined endogenous growth theory with 
traditional trade theory, which focuses on factor endowment. According to their
results, foreign trade expansion influences a small country's growth through two
channels. In their model, the allocation of resources between the two sectors of the
economy, i.e. the consumer goods and the research and development sectors, has
a profound impact on growth. First, through the expansion of trade, the adaptation
of ‘knowledge’ accumulated abroad (technology, know-how, management, 
organisational skills, etc.) may increase. This raises the productivity of the
research and development sector, through which innovation expands and the
growth rate rises. Second, an indirect impact may also play a role – higher imports
of human capital intensive consumer goods reduce the relative prices of these in
the domestic market. As a result, a part of the human capital employed in the 
consumer goods producing sector flows into the research and development sector,
which, in turn, also raises the rate of domestic economic growth.
Combining endogenous growth theory and ‘new trade theory’, however, has failed
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part of foreign trade involves horizontal (i.e. intra-industry), differentiated intermediary
goods. In their model assuming horizontal trade/innovation, Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991) demonstrated that the relationship between the extent of barriers to
trade (appearing as customs duties in the model) and growth is not monotonous –
with the raising of trade barriers, the growth rate falls for a while, before it resumes
rising. From their results it follows that the impact on economic growth of the
decline in trade barriers (for example, in a currency union) may be either positive
or negative, depending on the level of barriers in the period prior to currency union.
In addition, even if ‘new trade theory’ is applied, factor endowment may retain
some role. For example, in the model by Grossman and Helpman (1991b), 
providing there is free trade, in a country originally richer in human capital the
share of innovative products in output and in exports and, consequently, GDP
growth will be higher than in its trading partners originally poorer in human capital.
Empirical results
Due to a lack of theoretical consensus, the emphasis has been placed primarily on
empirical research into the issue of currency union, foreign trade and growth.
Several empirical studies have attempted to measure the impact of currency
unions on foreign trade expansion and the effect of foreign trade on growth. These
attempts have followed basically two methodological strategies.
The first strategy was to study the relationship between exchange rate volatility and
the volume of foreign trade using time series-based econometric methods.
Analysing trade and the exchange rate volatility of developed countries, Gagnon
(1993) did not find a significant negative effect between the two variables. Sekkat
(1998) provides a comprehensive survey of the empirical work aimed at examining
the issue. Based on the survey, he draws the conclusion that there is no clear 
evidence of a negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and the volume
of foreign trade. Analysing five countries that later became members of EMU in his
own model which uses the co-integration technique, he reaches the same conclusion.
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) also find that the academic literature is generally inconclusive
in respect of this issue. However, they note that the empirical tests that have
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strong negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and foreign trade
turnover. Their results contrast with those involving developed countries, which the
authors attribute to the relative underdevelopment of emerging-country foreign
currency derivatives markets and the absence of financial instruments serving to
hedge exchange rate risk.
The second strategy, which has proved to be more fruitful, was the use of the 
so-called ‘gravity’ trade models. The classical form of this was complemented with
a dummy variable representing the effect of a currency union. The ‘gravity’ models
are panel estimates, in which the cross-section dimension (often a sample of
50–100 countries) is given a much greater role than the time series dimension.
The first and most widely disputed empirical paper in this field was Rose (2000).
This gave an estimate of the expansionary effect of currency unions on trade which
sparked intense debate; then Frankel and Rose (2000) practically complemented
this estimate with the analysis of the effect on growth. The sample included foreign
trade data for more than 180 countries for the period 1970–1990. In the standard
‘gravity’ models, the most important explanatory variables that determine the volume
of foreign trade between two countries are the two countries' total and per-capita
GDP and the distance between the countries. Beyond these standard ‘gravity’ 
variables, Rose (2000) controlled with dummy variables for the effects of common
language, shared borders, free-trade agreements or common colonial history. The
novelty was the introduction of a currency union dummy variable, which had a
value of 1 if the two countries used a common currency and 0 if they did not. The
estimated model performed very well in statistical terms – the estimated parameters
for the standard variables were significant and they had the expected sign. The
biggest surprise was caused by the size of the parameter of the currency union
dummy – in addition to being statistically very significant, it showed that the use of
a common currency in two countries roughly tripled the volume of bilateral trade
over the long term. This measure was a shock to many observers, despite the fact
that some earlier studies reported similar magnitudes. For example, McCallum
(1995) showed that trade among Canadian provinces was around 22 times higher
than with US states located at the same distance and having similar size. The most
probable explanation for this is the use of a common currency within Canadian
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than large.
Despite all this, several authors have criticised Rose's estimate of the currency
union effect. Quah (2000) stressed that, first, observations of currency unions
accounted for a very small portion (less than 1%) of the entire sample and, 
second, they involved mostly small and poor countries with colonial past. The
results of estimates relying on such a sample are not sufficient to draw a 
conclusion for countries with other qualities which recently implemented the 
currency union (for example, members of EMU) or those considering the idea of
joining (for example, the CEECs, Sweden, the U.K. or Argentina).
Persson (2000) pointed out that, first, the factors affecting trading costs in 
countries which are in a currency union may be significantly different from those
in countries that do not use the common currency. In this situation, the full-sample
estimate may distort the estimated parameters. Second, the log-linear 
specification is inadequate. Persson's own estimates, which corrected for these
disadvantages, showed a much smaller, but still relatively high (40%), increase
in trade compared with Rose's 200%, though his results were statistically 
insignificant.
In response to the criticism, Rose (2001) stressed the robustness of the estimate
of the currency union in more than 50 specifications. However, in his original
paper he admitted that the results obtained could not be adapted to the euro area
directly. To this end, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) came up with a 
separate study. Complementing the earlier models, Rose and van Wincoop took
into account the role of multilateral trade barriers as well in estimating the effect
of currency unions on bilateral trade. Trade barriers are factors that tend to affect
the volume of trade between a pair of countries negatively. For example, 
customs, exchange rate volatility and the cost of transport (distance) between
two countries are barriers to trade. Theoretically, these may be expressed using
a common unit of measure known as the customs equivalent: thus barriers to
trade may be aggregated by individual trading partner (bilateral trade barrier) or
by all trading partners (multilateral trade barrier). The theory behind 
gravity-based models [see, for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2001)]
clearly shows that trade between a pair of countries is determined by the ratio of
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92 If a country
forms a currency union with another country (or group of countries) with whom it
previously conducted a significant share of its foreign trade, then the average 
multilateral trade barrier decreases considerably, as well as the bilateral trade 
barriers. As a result, the relative reduction in the bilateral trade barrier will not be
significant and, consequently, bilateral trade will not rise as strongly as it could in
a currency union with a country with which it originally traded relatively little. This
explains why the calculations by Rose and van Wincoop delivered a much lower
figure for the effect of a currency union in the case of the EMU-11 than Rose's original
200% trade expansion figure. The new estimates showed a 58% expansion of trade
within the EMU-11, corresponding to a 10% long-term rise in welfare (measured as
household consumption) as a result of introducing the common currency.
Partly in response to the criticism noted above, Glick and Rose (2001) examined
the issue from another perspective. After the earlier, mostly cross-section based
investigations, they placed their emphasis on the time series dimension. They
achieved this using a longer sample period (1948–1997) and estimating the fixed
effect using a ‘within’ estimator in the panel. This method answers the question of
‘what is the trade effect of a country’s joining (leaving) a currency union’. In this
respect, this approach slightly differs from the cross-section estimate by Rose
(2000), which put the question of ‘by how much trade of currency union members
is higher than that of non-member countries’. The magnitude of the results was
broadly the same as in the original study by Rose (2000) – joining (or leaving) the
currency union doubles (halves) trade between members.
The methodological approach of the empirical study by Flandreau and Maurel
(2001) follows Rose's approach in using the ‘gravity’ model, but the sample taken
for the analysis is significantly different – the authors examine the trade-creating
effect of European currency unions in the 19th century. Their results are surprisingly
similar to those estimated by Rose (2000) on ‘modern-day’ samples – currency
union nearly triples bilateral trade.
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practice often ignore this factor, and they exclusively attempt to measure the trade-creating effect of
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From the observations discussed above it follows that it is difficult to derive a clear
conclusion from the literature on the effect of currency union membership on trade.
Rose (2002) attempts to summarise the results of empirical papers examining the
issue quantitatively. For this purpose, he uses the meta-analysis approach in which
he analyses the estimates of 18 papers on the subject written by various authors
and employing different statistical methods (a total of 365 point estimates in the
various specifications). The conclusion of his meta-analysis is that the effect is 
statistically significant and robust – according to the ‘aggregate’ evidence of the
relevant papers, currency union roughly doubles the volume of bilateral trade.
The period since the launch of the common European currency in 1999 is too short
to confront the results with actual data. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth mentioning
that during the first two years of the euro trade in goods among euro area 
members did not grow faster than euro area trade with countries outside EMU.
However, it is too early to reach far-reaching conclusions from this development,
due to the short period of time elapsed and potential cyclical influences.
Trade expansion and growth gains for Hungary in the eurozone
In the following, we attempt to outline the results of the literature, which may help
to measure the potential foreign trade expansion and the resulting growth effects
for Hungary stemming from the country's future euro area participation.
Few studies with a special focus on Hungary have been written on the subject.
Jakab, Kovács and Oszlay (2000) estimated the volume of equilibrium foreign
trade of three CEECs using the standard gravity model. They found that Hungary's
foreign trade had already reached the potential level implied by the model by 1997.
This would suggest that relatively little room remained for further expansion of 
foreign trade. But because the estimated gravity model did not consider the effect
of a potential currency union, this finding does not rule out a considerable rise in
the potential level of foreign trade through joining the common currency, i.e. with
the disappearance of a significant barrier to trade.
Frankel and Rose (2000) published explicit estimates for several countries, including
Hungary, about the total gains in foreign trade and growth that can be expected if
the country introduced the euro (or the dollar). As was mentioned earlier, this119
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model delivers a multiplier of 3 for the long-term (20-year) effect of the currency
union on bilateral trade. They estimated another equation as well, in which they
measured the effect of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (i.e. openness) on output.
According to the results, every 1 percentage point increase in openness produces
a 1/3 percentage point gain in per-capita GDP on a 20-year horizon. Thus, the
expected impact of the currency union experienced by the various countries will
be different, depending on the importance of the euro area (or dollar zone) in the
given country's foreign trade turnover. The greater the importance, the larger the
impact of the introduction of the euro on total trade expansion and growth. As the
euro area is of utmost importance for Hungarian foreign trade, the results are high 
relative to those of the majority of countries covered by the sample – joining the
euro area would result in a 107% increase in openness and a 35% increase in 
per-capita GDP on the 20-year horizon.
93 Based on this, the estimated annual
growth gain from joining the euro is 1.5 percentage points.
94 The estimated
growth effect seems implausibly high. This, however, is not surprising, as the
estimate did not take into account the effect of multilateral trade barriers noted
earlier.
Although the model by Rose and van Wincoop (2001), which takes into account
multilateral influences, only provides an estimate for the EMU-11 countries, it can
easily be adapted to Hungary as well.
95 According to our calculations, within an
EMU enlarged with Hungary, bilateral trade (i.e. trade between Hungary and the
earlier EMU member countries) would expand by 75% over the long term. As an
effect of this, the average welfare of EMU enlarged with Hungary would see a 6.5%
increase over the long term.
96 However, the average welfare gain would not be
evenly distributed among the member countries – as Hungary's accession 
obviously would raise its own foreign trade by far the most, the welfare gain for
Hungary, at 16.7% over the long term, would also be the highest. Defining ‘long
92 Frankel and Rose made calculations using openness indicators and foreign trade patterns for 1995.
In the period since then, Hungary's openness has increased steadily (from 76% in 1995 to 130% in
2001), and the role of the euro area in foreign trade has grown as well (1995: 71%, 2001: 75%).
93 With the currency union, the majority of EMU members in the sample have had smaller estimated
GDP growth than this. The effect on Hungary is comparable to the estimated growth surpluses 
registered by Portugal, Ireland and the Netherlands.
94 For a description of the adaptation of the model, see Appendix F.3.
96 The standard error of the estimate is 1.7 percentage points.term’ as 20 years, and assuming that GDP rises at the same rate as household 
consumption (welfare), all this equals to an annual growth surplus of 0.76%.
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Although the theoretical framework of the model by Rose and van Wincoop
appears to be the most consistent from among those available, producing the most
plausible results as well, we have treated this value as the upper estimate of the
expected growth surplus. One reason for this approach is that a consensus has not
yet been reached in the academic literature on Rose's parameter used in the
model, the second being that Hungarian foreign trade has by now risen above the
values forecast by the standard gravity models. We have calculated the lower
estimate of the expected growth gains from trade expansion by substituting the
higher parameter value originally used in the Rose-van Wincoop model with the
‘result’ of Rose's meta-analysis (currency union, ceteris paribus, doubles bilateral
trade) which is actually a synthesis of results available in the academic literature.
According to the results obtained this way, joining the euro contributes 0.55–0.76
percentage points to Hungary's annual growth rate via the foreign trade channel.
It  should be added that the model used only provides information about the
expected long-term expansion of trade, and hence we have no picture of the
dynamics of the estimated gains over time.
Finally, let us return to the paper by Flandreau and Maurel (2001) which contains
an interesting section on economic history, relevant for Hungary, in addition to the
empirical estimates. In this paper, the authors group monetary systems in operation
during 19
th century Europe. Accordingly, in 19
th century Europe, beside floating
exchange rate systems and the gold standard, there existed three currency unions,
namely the Latin Currency Union, the Scandinavian Currency Union and the 
currency regime of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Of these, only the monetary
system of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy constituted a genuine currency union,
with a coordinated monetary and fiscal policy between the member states. The
Latin and Scandinavian Unions, contrary to their name, were not very much different
from the gold standard throughout the years of their existence. Although it 
happened long ago, in our view it is not negligible that Hungary was already a
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the Czech Republic and Poland. In this case, the Hungarian growth surplus is higher, at 0.82 
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member of a genuine, well-functioning currency union at one point in its history.
Moreover, it participated in a currency union which may be regarded as the 
predecessor of EMU in many respects. Although it cannot be determined how far
this can be owed to the participation in the currency union, it is an undisputed truth
that the period in question was one of the most dynamic stages in Hungary's 
economic development. It also deserves special attention that the significant
structural  asymmetry which existed between industrialised Austria and mainly
agricultural Hungary did not impede the successful functioning of the Austro-
Hungarian currency union.
IV.3. Benefits of a reduction in exposure to financial contagion
According to the traditional theory of currency areas, the exchange rate moves to the
extent and in the direction justified by economic fundamentals, thereby assisting the
economy in adjusting to various asymmetric shocks. According to empirical evidence,
however, the role of the exchange rate in neutralising shocks is actually weaker. This is
especially true for small, open and less developed countries. In these countries, foreign
investors’ willingness to take risk depends strongly on the general risk perception of
financial assets. This, in turn, leads to fluctuations in capital inflows and, consequently,
to exchange rate volatility, often independent of domestic economic fundamentals.
Moreover, the foreign currency markets of many small countries are not deep and
liquid enough, which may also cause excessive exchange rate volatility. The exchange
rate, therefore, may also become a source of destabilising shocks, instead of 
counteracting the effects of real shocks, thereby forcing economic agents to make
unnecessary adjustments.
Although speculative attacks are a source of danger mainly for countries with fixed
exchange rate regimes, financial contagion may cause significant fluctuations in the
exchange rate and capital flows even within the framework of a more flexible
exchange rate regime. The forex market developments in the Czech Republic and
Poland in the past few years provide several examples for currency depreciation 
attributable to reeling investor confidence – since 1998 the CEECs have experienced
6 crises originating in emerging-country financial contagion. These events have
resulted in the Czech and Polish national currencies losing 5%–10% of their values, andtheir effects on the foreign exchange markets have lasted for more than one month.
During the short period since May 2001 when the intervention band was widened, on
three occasions the Hungarian forint has fallen victim to the collapse of investor 
confidence towards higher-risk assets. Unfavourable macroeconomic news from
Argentina, Turkey and Poland in mid-July and early August, then uncertainty in the
wake of the terrorist attack against the US in September, were in the background of
capital outflows independent of domestic economic fundamentals. On each of these
three occasions, the forint depreciated by more than 4%, followed by a slow recovery
taking several weeks. The July–September events are evidence of the fact that, despite
the major improvement in Hungary's credit rating in past years, foreign investors 
entering the Hungarian financial market still react sensitively to unfavourable emerging
market events and to shocks from developed capital markets.
Joining the European Union, Hungary will rise from the emerging-country category.
Consequently, EU membership will itself reduce the probability of shocks caused by
financial contagion and, above all, their severity, without giving up the independent
national currency. However, both the theory of financial crises and experience of past
years allow us to draw the conclusion that Hungary's exposure to foreign exchange
market contagion will only cease with abandonment of the national currency, i.e. with
membership in EMU. This view is reinforced by the fact that even some developed
countries were unable to escape the financial contagion-induced shocks ensuing from
the currency crises of the 1990s. The experiences of Sweden and Denmark during the
Russian crisis in the autumn of 1998 are especially relevant for Hungary, as by this time
it had been decided that these countries would opt out from EMU. In September 1998,
the Swedish and Danish currencies were under pressure from the contagion originating
from Russia, and the interest premium jumped significantly higher.
98 Meanwhile, based
on the decision taken in the spring, the Russian crisis did not affect the countries
becoming members of EMU the following year. All this is a good illustration of the not
negligible likelihood of asymmetrical financial shocks to countries outside the euro
area. It cannot be ruled out that for the recently joined, less developed members of EMU
that have just passed the emerging-country category, such as Hungary, the rise in 
interest premium and the downward pressure on the exchange rate would be higher
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98 As an effect of the crisis, the spread of Danish short-term government paper over German government
paper yields soared by about 180 basis points, while the Swedish long-term government paper
spread rose by 80 basis points.than this in the event of a transmission of crisis. The example of Greece, which also
opted to stay out in 1999, appears to support this view – the contagion effect of the
Russian crisis on Greece was much stronger than on the more developed Denmark and
Sweden. In August 1998, the Greek drachma depreciated by more than 5%, and the
interest premium rose by over 500 basis points.
Costs of exchange rate volatility
The directly measurable cost of maintaining the independent currency is the
exchange rate risk premium on forint-denominated assets. The risk premium is the
price of unpredictable exchange rate movements, which makes it more expensive
for economic agents to borrow, not only during financial crises but on a continuous
basis. In the following, we attempt to estimate the size and effect of this spread.
For a small, open emerging country, maintaining the independent currency may
not only represent costs in the form of risk premium. In emerging countries, the
inflow of foreign capital is the key factor of economic growth. For international
investors, capital invested in these countries generally offers high returns, but
carries high risks as well. Investors, therefore, continuously monitor the possible
indicators of a given country's future capacity to generate income. Perhaps the
most important variable of these is the expected future exchange rate of the target 
country's currency.
The general risk perception of a region or even the whole emerging world tends to
influence investor sentiment towards a given country. Capital flows affecting a
given country, therefore, often change direction drastically, without being justified
by the country's economic fundamentals. As a result of such contagion shocks,
capital flows may be more volatile in emerging countries relative to developed
countries – steady inflows lasting for years may be replaced by sudden outflows,
even independent of domestic economic conditions. One of the most important
channels of the feed-through of contagion shocks is changes in exchange rate
expectations. Therefore, a higher volatility of capital flows can be regarded as a 
further cost linked with the maintenance of own currency in emerging countries.
Consequently, maintaining the national currency in a less developed, small, open




in a country which is a member of a currency union together with its trading partners.
This, in turn, affects business cycles – cyclical fluctuations may be much more 
pronounced than in more developed countries or in those that give up their own
currency.
99 The structure and financial development of the economy may aggravate
the effects of a major depreciation of the exchange rate.
100 One of the reasons for
output losses caused by sharp exchange rate movements is the development of
imbalances in economic agents' balance sheets. Imbalances do not only develop
because prudential regulations are not observed in these countries. According to
the original sin theory, emerging countries with good economic prospects and
open financial markets represent an attractive target for foreign investors, and so
ample amounts of short-term foreign currency funds are available, while their
access to funds denominated in their own currency or long-term finance abroad is
limited or expensive.
101 As a consequence, the corporate sector and the state
accumulate foreign currency debt without natural hedging, which causes large
financial losses in the event of currency depreciation or devaluation.
A further consequence of volatile exchange rate and capital flows, and the resulting
higher cyclical fluctuations is that, in formulating their risk perception of a country,
investors attribute a greater importance to developments in net debt and the 
current account balance than in the case of developed countries. A mounting 
current account deficit may cause devaluation expectations to develop and 
long-term foreign funding to dry up, which in extreme cases may necessitate 
economic policy adjustments (fiscal adjustment, devaluation), aimed at reducing
their current account deficit through the radical curtailment of domestic demand.
In order to avoid such situations, economic policy attempts to sustain a current
account deficit judged by investors as favourable. Restraining external borrowing
eventually retards economic growth.
Abandoning the national currency may help to reduce the welfare losses resulting
from fluctuations in economic activity, as the disappearance of exchange rate
99 Chart III.7 is a good illustration of this in respect of the central-east European accession countries
and EMU. 
100 Calvo and Reinhardt (2000) analysed the effects of currency crises in 39 countries between
1975–1999. This revealed that post-crisis declines in GDP amounted to 2% on average in emerging
countries, in contrast with only 0.2% in developed countries. 
101 Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). volatility reduces swings in risk perception, and the amplitude of business cycles
lessens as capital flows even out (for the effects of this on welfare, see boxed text
III.1). Due to exposure to financial contagion, therefore, joining EMU as early as
possible is the optimal policy choice. However, abandoning the independent 
currency means giving up independent monetary policy as well. The question is
whether the loss of this economic policy tool, suitable in principle to smooth out
business cycles, will not entail fluctuations in economic activity which exceed the
smoothing-out effect resulting from the disappearance of exchange rate risk. While
we do not endeavour to compare these two influences, we analyse in detail the
potential costs of losing monetary independence in Chapter III.
IV.4. Effect of falling real interest rates and more favourable
opportunities to borrow abroad on economic growth
Joining the euro area, Hungary will be given a more favourable credit rating and may
escape the costs of higher exchange rate volatility. We have attempted to capture the
resulting benefits using two variables. First, domestic real interest rates will be lower
due to the reduction in exchange rate risk; second, owing to the more favourable
credit rating and improved capacity to repay existing debt which becomes
independent of exchange rate volatility, the sustainable measure of current account
deficit may be higher. Both variables allow the economy to grow at a faster rate.
The expected easing of current account deficit constraint is well illustrated by empirical
studies which examined capital flows among the regions or provinces of a few large
countries. As an effect of a common currency, capital flows among member states
will, in principle, become as smooth as are capital flows among regions within
countries of large geographical dimensions. The phenomenon that the overwhelming
majority of a country's savings are invested in the given country is referred to as
the ‘Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle’ in the academic literature. But, providing perfect
international capital flows, there should be no relationship of any sort between the
geographical locations of savings and investment – savings should be used where
they produce the highest returns (at equal levels of risk). Presumably, the current
account deficit plays a role in this phenomenon – its high level indicates increased




With the creation of monetary union, the mobility of capital is likely to be higher,
as exchange rate risk, being an important risk factor, disappears. As other factors
also affect capital flows, it is not easy to isolate the expected effects of a common
currency from other (regulatory, cultural, etc.) effects. The academic literature
measures the expected effect by examining the interaction between savings and
fixed investment, and by assuming that the common currency will create a similar
relationship. The most frequently cited work is the study by Bayoumi and Rose
(1993) which analysed the interaction between savings and fixed investment in the
United Kingdom using various approaches. Other studies analysed the cases of
Canada, Japan and the United States.
102 These studies concur in their conclusion
that the relationship between savings and fixed investment is much looser and,
occasionally, the reverse, among the regions within a country than on a country
level. In other words, the current account balance of regions does not represent a
serious hurdle to capital flows. From this it follows that the magnitude of capital
flows among the participating countries will be significantly higher than earlier as
a result of monetary integration. Stating it differently, member countries' current
account deficits are much less of an impediment to capital flows within a currency
union.
In the next section, we measure the expected size of the fall in real interest rates
based on information inherent in the yield curve. We quantify the effect on economic
growth on the basis of two different model simulations. The effect of variations in
the current account balance has been built in our estimates on an ad hoc basis,
changing the parameters of the models.
IV.4.1. Expected fall in real interest rates as a result of joining the euro area
The return for foreign investors on their forint-denominated investments is
determined by the nominal depreciation of the forint, in addition to the financial
return achievable in their own currencies. As future developments in the
exchange rate cannot be forecast perfectly, forint yields may contain a significant
102 Thomas (1993), Bayoumi (1997), Dekle (1996), Sinn (1992), Iwamoto et al (2000) and Wincoop
(2000).  premium of exchange rate risk which foreign investors require due to unforeseen
exchange rate movements, i.e. exchange rate uncertainty. The exchange rate
risk premium is the positive function of exchange rate volatility, therefore, the
measure of this type of risk will cease with accession to the euro area, which, in
turn, will result in a reduction in real interest rate levels. Country and liquidity
(or size) risk premia are the other components of the risk premium on forint
yields. In the case of Hungary, as an emerging economy, the country risk
premium may also fall with accession to the EU and later to the euro area, as the
exchange rate risk premium and the country risk premium are not independent
of each other.
103
The size of the risk premium on forint yields, i.e. the sum of exchange rate risk
premium, plus country and liquidity risk premia, can be measured as the difference
between forint interest rates and euro interest rates and the expected nominal
depreciation of the forint exchange rate. The sum of country and liquidity risk
premia may be approximated with Hungarian foreign currency bond spreads, as
these do not contain exchange rate expectations or exchange rate uncertainty
components. Given that exchange rate expectations cannot be observed directly,
estimating the exchange rate risk premium carries an extremely high degree of
uncertainty.
In respect of measuring the exchange rate risk premium, the periods preceding
and following band widening in May 2001 must be treated separately. Within
the confines of the narrow intervention band, anticipated variations in the
exchange rate could be approximated with the pre-announced devaluation rate
of the forint over the short term, i.e. over a three-month horizon. Therefore, we
have used the interest rate premium, calculated as the difference between
three-month forint-euro interest rate differential and the pre-announced




103 The assumption that emerging-country exchange rate risks and the default risk on foreign currency
bond spreads are closely interrelated seems plausible. Explanation for this is that, in the event of 
a currency crisis, the likelihood of a state's default on its liabilities denominated in foreign currency
rises. Consequently, in our assumption the rise in exchange rate risk premium is accompanied by a
rise in foreign currency bond spreads.128
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
However, the depreciation of the central parity did not perfectly reflect actual
exchange rate expectations, as it did not contain anticipations of intra-band
exchange rate movements and of a change to the exchange rate regime.
104
Chart IV-3
Three-month interest rate premium
Source: NBH.
Now that the band has been widened, exchange rate movements are even
more difficult to forecast. We use two approaches to approximate expectations for
the future path of the exchange rate. First, we use the Reuters survey which
reflects macroanalysts' forecasts of the nominal forint-euro exchange rate
since May 2001. As the questions in the Reuters survey refer to forecasts of
the currency's future value at specific dates,
105 we calculate the exchange rate risk
104 Interpreting the three-month interest rate premium as a risk premium raises problems for other 
reasons as well: market considerations and mechanisms can only have a limited impact on the near
end of yield curves, given that central banks determine the near ends of curves using their policy
rates.






































































































premium for the years 2002 and 2003.
106 Due to the high degree of uncertainty
inherent in exchange rate expectations that can be derived from macroanalysts'
consensus forecast,
107 we have also calculated the exchange rate risk premium
assuming constant exchange rate expectations.
The three-month exchange rate risk premium fluctuated between 150–500
basis points in the period January 1998–May 2001, its average value being
310 basis points. The foreign currency bond spread, which reflects the country
risk premium, varied between 53–130 basis points. Following the band widening,
risk premia on short-term forint-denominated investments presumably rose
considerably, due to the much higher-than-earlier exchange rate uncertainty.
This appears to be confirmed by the data as well.
108 According to the Reuters
survey, the average measure of exchange rate risk premium for 2002 was
480–750 basis points, and 400–600 basis points calculating with constant
exchange rate expectations in the period May–December 2001, the country
risk premium fluctuating between 50–65 basis points.
106 The risk premium may be estimated using the differential between the forint and euro implied forward
curves. The difference between a one-year forward differential starting at a given point and an
exchange rate change expected for a given period equals to the risk premium expected for the period,
provided that forint and euro term premia are equal [see, Svensson (1998)]. RP(t,t’T)=Eti(t’,T)-
Eti*(t’,T)-Et(ST-St’), i.e. the risk premium expected for the period t’ and T at time t can be defined
as the difference between expected domestic and foreign yields and the exchange rate change
expected for period (t’-T). As f(t,t’T)= Eti(t’T)+TP(t,t’T), i.e. the forward rate starting in t’ with a
T-t’ maturity, can be written as the sum of the yield expected for the given period and the maturity
premium, f(t,t’T)- f*(t,t’T)- Et (ST-St’)=[TP(t,t’T)-TP*(t,t’T)]+ RP(t,t’T).
107 Only 10–15 macroeconomists contribute to the Reuters survey, and the range of analysts is not constant.
The volatility of forecasts in the sample is high; moreover, the day of responses cannot be defined
accurately.
108 As was noted earlier, the exchange rate risk premia, calculated form the three-month interest rate
premium and the forward differential, are not directly comparable.Chart IV-4
Interest rate differential and exchange rate risk premium
Sources: NBH, Bank calculations.
Chart IV-5
Path of differential between one-year forint and
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Risk premium for 2002 using exchange rate expectations in Reuters poll
Risk premium for 2002 assuming constant exchange rate expectations
Risk premium for 2003 using exchange rate expectations in Reuters poll
Risk premium for 2003 assuming constant exchange rate expectations131
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109 This value is consistent with the estimate of exchange rate risk premium on the Irish pound. See,
Fitz Gerald and Honohan (1996).
However, the above calculation overestimates the benefit of the disappearance of
exchange rate uncertainty arising from the abandonment of the national currency.
The explanation for this is that the exchange rate risk premium is not independent
of inflation uncertainty, and so the exchange rate risk premium will presumably
diminish with increased price stability and the strengthening of monetary policy
credibility, even without joining the euro area. As was discussed earlier, with
accession to the European Union Hungary will leave behind its emerging-country
status, which, in turn, is also likely to contribute to a fall in the risk premium. The
probable reduction in real interest rates, expected exclusively from relinquishing
the independent currency, can be defined by examining the forward differential in
a maturity bracket of the yield curve when Hungary will most likely be a member
of the EU and inflation will be lower, but the likelihood of monetary union 
membership will be zero. Assuming Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, the
earliest date of joining monetary union is 2006, and therefore the year 2005 satisfies
the criteria noted above the best. The differential between one-year euro and forint
implied forward rates starting in 2005 has been around 200 basis points in the period
since May 2001. Subtracting from this the 30–40 basis point value of country risk
premium expected within the EU, and assuming constant exchange rate expectations
for the same period, produces a 160–170 basis point country risk premium expected
for 2005.
109
However, we have treated this value strictly as the lower boundary of our estimate.
There are several reasons for this approach. First, it cannot be ruled out that 
following accession to the EU, market participants will expect a shift in the
exchange rate band and an appreciation of the forint. This would imply that the risk
premia, calculated from the forward yield curves on the basis of assuming constant
exchange rates, are biased downwards. Second, it can be assumed that market
participants will supposedly anticipate an orderly decline in interest rates rather
than a sharp fall in short-dated yields prior to accession to EMU, if the probability
of monetary union membership is within reach. Thus, the forward curve shows
lower expected interest rates even for the period when the likelihood of entry is still
zero. The estimated risk premium, calculated under the assumption that the dateof accession to EMU suffers a long delay (i.e. under the alternative scenario), also
underestimates the actual. Third, the method of estimating the yield curve does not
allow for a sudden drop in the slope of the forward yield curve, which may also
introduce a downward bias into the estimated risk premium.
An analysis of the experience of current euro-area member countries may provide
more guidance to measure the size of interest rate reduction stemming from the
disappearance of exchange rate risk, in addition to information that can be derived
from the yield curve. Although most EMU members were characterised by 
well-functioning, credible monetary policies even before the creation of the euro
area, real interest rates on the outstanding debt of a number of countries that joined
later, for example, Finland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, were 100–150 basis points
higher than Deutsche Mark real interest rates, due mainly to exchange rate risk.
Following the introduction of the euro, the risk premium component of interest
rates fell significantly. Since then, the widest gap to the nominal yield on German
government bonds, offering the lowest yield, has been fluctuating around 35–40
basis points at the ten-year maturity.
110 
The path of interest rate convergence shows wide variations both by country and
maturity. The convergence of long-term rates started years before the changeover
to the euro in 1999, and its trajectory was determined by expectations of the 
likelihood of membership. The yield curves of Germany, the Netherlands and
Belgium practically coincided in 1997, but interest rate convergence in the peripheral
countries only ended in January–May 1998, the period when it was decided which
countries would participate in currency union from 1999. Not surprisingly, the 
convergence of short-term yields showed even more marked differences – for
example, Italian and Irish three-month yields were nearly 200 basis points higher
than short-term Deutsche Mark rates in mid-1998. The example of Greece is even
more striking, where the three-month yield was 300–320 basis points above the
equivalent euro yields in August 2000, i.e. four months prior to the adoption of the
132
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109 Interest rate convergence was implemented below the average level existing prior to the creation of
the euro area. A part of academic literature simply explained with ‘economies of scale’ (e.g.
Coleman (1999)). For the smaller countries, the costs of maintaining the own currency are relatively
higher, due to limited opportunities of diversification. Following introduction of the common currency,
the improving opportunities for portfolio allocation are be reflected in the reduction in risk premium
of the entire system.133
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euro. In Portugal, the ex post real interest rate fell 4% between mid-1997 and 
end-1998.
111 Spanish ex post real rates experienced a 2.5% fall in the same period.
Taking into account the experiences of current EMU member countries and that
the risk premium estimated from the yields curve is presumably biased 
downwards, the size of a reduction in real interest rates due to joining the euro
area is estimated at 150–300 basis points. The following two sub-chapters
attempt to provide estimates on the effect of this fall in real interest rates on growth.
IV.4.2. NIGEM model simulation
The Hungarian block of the NIGEM world model is a frequently used tool by Bank staff
to carry out economic policy simulations.
112 NIGEM is a modelling framework
employed by several foreign central banks and economic ministries which has been
developed primarily to examine economic policy effectiveness in developed countries.
However, the model includes a block developed for the Hungarian economy as well.
NIGEM contains relationships estimated econometrically, so the results derived from
the model show, on the basis of past available data, the magnitude and the speed of
economic agents' reactions to various economic shocks. The structure of the model is
basically Neo-Keynesian. This means that economic agents behave in a forward-looking
manner, but there exist certain nominal rigidities over the short term which act to slow
adjustments to various shocks. In the following, we present the results of simulations
carried in this model. Our aim is to measure the likely effects of a fall in risk premium
resulting from monetary union membership relevant to growth and external balance.
The reduction in risk premium affects GDP growth through the major mechanism in
the NIGEM model as follows. The fall in risk premium reduces both short and 
long-term real interest rates and, consequently, it reduces the cost of capital. Falling
costs of capital induce fixed investment, as a result of which economic capacities
expand from the supply side and increased investment activity, in turn, boosts
demand. However, the lower risk premium exerts a beneficial impact on technology
111 However, the 1 percentage point rise in inflation played a role in this, in addition to a 300 basis point
drop in short-term rates. According to an estimate by the Portuguese central bank in 1998, the expected
reduction in real interest rates due to the disappearance of exchange rate risk was 1–3 percentage points
[see Pereira (1999)].   
112 For a detailed description of the model, see Jakab and Kovács (2002).300 basis points 150 basis points
Permanent impact on GDP level (per cent) 1.9–2.0 0.9–1.0
Differential in growth   0.11 0.05
(for 20 years, percentage points)
Average impact on current account as a  –0.9 –0.4
percentage of GDP (percentage points)
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transfer as well, given that lower risks encourage foreigners to invest. The rise in 
foreign direct investment, in turn, is associated with higher improvements in efficiency.
On the whole, a reduction in the risk premium raises the economy's growth potential
from two sources – first, through higher capital stocks and, second, due to rising 
foreign direct investment and the resulting more efficient utilisation of production 
factors as well. Rising propensity to invest, however, also tends to have an influence
on external balance. External balance deteriorates temporarily, as increased fixed
investment activity is financed from abroad. This deterioration in the external balance
lasts as long as the economy adjusts to the changed circumstances and embarks on
a new equilibrium path accompanied by higher income. It is important to note, 
however, that at this stage the rate of economic growth is not higher than in the 
starting position.
We have analysed the effects of two risk premium shocks. In the first case, we have
assumed that, with monetary union membership, the risk premium permanently falls
by 300 basis points, and by 150 basis points in the second case. We compare our
results with a situation in which the risk premium does not fall radically in early 2006,
i.e. Hungary does not enter EMU.
Table IV–1, and Chart IV- 6 and Chart IV- 7 summarise our results. It can be seen that,
in line with those discussed above, the gain in GDP growth is associated with a 
deterioration in the external balance. Our results show that the level of GDP will be
1.9%–2.0% and 0.9%–1.0% higher respectively assuming a deeper or more modest fall
in the risk premium. This will be associated with a lasting deterioration of 0.9 
percentage points and one of 0.4 percentage points as a percentage of GDP on 
average over the period under examination. However, the rate of GDP growth will also
be permanently higher, by 0.1 percentage point and 0.05 percentage point, on the
average of a 20-year period.
Table IV–1
The effect of the decrease in the risk premiumChart IV-6
Deviation of GDP level from the baseline
Chart IV-7
Deviation of current account balance from the baseline
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4IV.4.3. Compact, calibrated exogenous growth model simulation
In this section, we measure the effect on economic growth of the probable fall in real
interest rates as a result of joining EMU, using the growth model by Barro, Mankiw
and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
113 As per-capita physical and human capital is lower in
Hungary relative to developed countries, return on capital is higher in the former.
Consequently, although Hungary's demand for fixed investment is higher than its
savings, this gap is offset by the inflow of foreign capital attracted by higher yields.
Propensity to invest is a diminishing function of real interest rates – as the returns on
real interest rates and capital move hand in hand, the two factors will be equal with
a lower capital stock in the case of a higher real interest rate. Thus, lower real interest
rates will be associated with more lively investment activity, which, in turn, boosts the
rate of capital accumulation and, through this, economic growth.
But, especially in emerging markets, the inflow of foreign capital is much more modest
than would be expected on the basis of the equalisation between the real interest rate
and return on capital. However, the model by Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin handles
just this very problem. The authors assume that a country may accumulate debt only
to the extent that its capital stock is capable of providing collateral for debt. In the
original model, the upper limit to indebtedness is the physical capital stock. However,
this hurdle can be easily defined in a narrower sense, which is necessary in the case of
Hungary, in order to enable ourselves to reproduce the empirically observable debt-to-
GDP ratio (which contains all types of foreign investments, in addition to debt).
Thus, by adapting the original model we have been able to examine two issues 
simultaneously – first, we have simulated the expansionary effect of a fall in real
interest rates on economic growth and, second, we have measured the growth surplus
resulting from the easing of the debt and current account constraints.
In the basic version, we set the parameters of the model with the requirement that it
should reproduce Hungary's debt-to-GDP ratio fluctuating around 60%, and then under
these conditions we examined the effect of a fall in interest rates. The highest, 350 basis
point fall, was associated with a 80% debt-to-GDP ratio. Creditors generally do not 
tolerate levels higher than this in the case of emerging markets.
114 In the alternative 
version, we assumed a loosening of the credit ceiling characteristic in emerging 
136
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113 Appendix F.4 includes a more detailed description of the model.
114 See, for example, Calvo and Végh (1999), pp. 1597-98.137
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markets. Then, we chose the starting parameters with the requirement that the
debt-to-GDP ratio should be 80% and it should reach 100% in the event of a 350
basis point fall in interest rates.
Table IV–2 shows the results of a simulation conducted by assuming the more
stringent debt constraint. Here, assuming a 150 basis point fall in interest rates, the
growth rate projected for 20 years increases by 0.04 percentage point and by 0.09
percentage point in the event of a 300 basis point fall in interest rates. All this
implies that, without an initial fall in interest rates, per-capita GDP rises by 78.6%
in 20 years, by 80% in case of a 150 basis point fall and by 81.5% in case of a 300
basis point fall relative to the starting position.
Table IV–2
Effect of a change in real rates on the assumption of a 
stringent debt constraint 
The columns include results pertaining to the various real interest falls (measured in basis points). The rows
show the level of per-capita GDP in five--year intervals at a given interest rate, if the level of year 0 equals 100.
The one but last row includes the average growth rates related to 20 years. The last row shows the increase
in current account deficit, expressed in percentage points, as a ratio of GDP relative to the starting scenario.
Table IV–3 includes the results of a simulation conducted by assuming the looser debt
constraint. A comparison of the two tables reveals that if the 150 basis point fall in
interest rates is accompanied by an easing of the debt constraint, then the average
growth rate, projected for 20 years, will be 0.09 percentage point higher and it will be
0.15 percentage points higher in case of a 300 basis point fall. The stimulus of a
350 bp 300 bp 250 bp 200 bp 150 bp 100 bp 50 bp 0 bp
5  119.1 118.6 118.2 117.8 117.4 117.0 116.6 116.2
10 137.7 137.2 136.7 136.2 135.8 135.4 135.0 134.6
15  158.6 158.0 157.5 157.0 156.6 156.1 155.7 155.3
20  182.1 181.5 181.0 180.4 180.0 179.5 179.0 178.6
Growth rate, per cent 3.04 3.03 3.01 3.00 2.98 2.97 2.95 2.94
Change in C/A as a  0.64 0.52 0.42 0.32 0.23 0.15 0.07 0
percentage of GDPmore moderate debt constraint to growth is reflected in the levels as well – in 20 years 
per-capita GDP rises by 81.6% assuming a 150 basis point fall, and by 83.7%
assuming a 300 basis point fall. This, compared with the situation in which the real
interest rate remains unchanged and the debt constraint does not ease off, suggests
a 3 percentage point and a 5.1 percentage point higher per-capita GDP.
Table IV–3  
Effect of a change in real rates
on the assumption of a loose debt constraint
IV.4.4.Summarising the results of the NIGEM simulation and the compact
calibrated model
As we have seen, over 20 years the growth surplus is 0.05%–0.1% of GDP in the NIGEM
model. The calibrated model outputs are broadly consistent with those produced on the
assumption of a more stringent debt constraint and are slightly higher, between
0.1–0.15 percentage points, on the assumption of a looser debt constraint. This
difference between the outputs is primarily due to NIGEM being an estimated model
based on the empirical observations of the pasts decade, and so it does not take into
account the expected changes in economic agents' behaviour due to the currency union.
Another major difference between the two models is that in the ‘looser debt constraint’
scenario of the compact calibrated model we assumed a permanently higher balance of
payments deficit than in the NIGEM model, and so surplus capital inflows related to a re-
duction in interest rates in the former model are also higher in the 20-year period 
examined, which, in turn, delivers higher growth surpluses. Explanation for this is that, in
the compact model, we attempted to model the effect that, as a member of the currency
138
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
350 bp 300 bp 250 bp 200 bp 150 bp 100 bp 50 bp 0 bp
5  120.4 119.8 119.2 118.6 118.0 117.5 117.0 116.5
10  139.3 138.6 138.0 137.3 136.7 136.2 135.6 135.1
15  160.6 159.9 159.2 158.5 157.8 157.2 156.6 156.1
20  184.5 183.7 183.0 182.3 181.6 180.9 180.3 179.7
Growth rate, per cent 3.11 3.09 3.07 3.05 3.03 3.01 2.99 2.97
Change in C/A as a 1.51 1.35 1.20 1.06 0.94 0.82 0.71 0.61
percentage of GDPunion, the country's sustainable current account deficit may be higher than in the past.
Whereas the assumptions of the compact calibrated model provide a better description
of economic conditions arising with EMU membership, the advantage of the NIGEM
model is that it takes more factors into account and that there exist central bank
experiences with simulations. Based on all these, we have calculated with the
average of the two models' results in analysing the cost-benefit analysis of EMU
membership – according to our estimate, the fall in real interest rates causes the
long-run average growth rate of GDP to rise by 0.08–0.13 percentage point.
It may be useful to compare our calculations with other, similar examinations. We
considered an analysis of Portugal, a country similar to Hungary in many respect,
as particularly relevant.
115 The authors examined a 25-year growth period, and
compared the growth path in the basic scenario (opt-out from EMU) with two alter-
native growth paths resulting on the assumption of a 100 basis point and a 300
basis point fall in real interest rates. According to their results, if the interest rate
falls 100 basis points, then the average growth rate calculated for 25 years increases
by 0.12 percentage point; if it falls 300 basis points the change is 0.41 percentage
points. It can be seen that in the Portuguese model the growth surpluses are much
higher than our model outputs. Consequently, our estimate of the growth surplus
can be considered as conservative by international standards.
The empirical method of estimating the growth surplus arising from foreign trade
expansion did not allow for identification of the sources of this growth surplus, and
therefore we relied only on the results of investigating the relationship between
openness and growth in the endogenous growth theory. In this theoretical frame-
work, foreign trade expansion mainly affects growth positively through the boost of
technology transfer to productivity and the fall in deadweight losses caused by trade
barriers. Conceivably, though, expanding foreign trade simply contributes to growth
in part through a rise in domestic fixed investment, in addition to these influences.
In this case it may happen that we have accounted twice for the same growth
surplus – first, as a benefit from foreign trade expansion and, second, as a growth
surplus arising from the fall in real interest rates. But because we cannot measure
the potential overlap and, moreover, our estimate of the growth surplus resulting
from a lower real interest rate is low both in absolute value and in international
comparison, we have omitted this factor in summarising the potential benefits.
139
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V. TIMING OF EURO AREA ENTRY
V.1. Time schedule of accession
The new wave of accession countries does not have the option of opting out of
monetary union. Therefore, Hungary has committed itself to conducting an 
economic policy aimed at fulfilling the conditions for adopting the single currency
when applying for EU membership. Timing of compliance with the convergence
requirements remains the responsibility of the Hungarian government. However,
when the convergence criteria are met, participation becomes compulsory.
116 This
implies that if Hungary should wish to postpone the introduction of the euro despite
an advanced state of convergence, it could only do so by deliberately failing to
meet one or more of the convergence criteria. This simple path has been chosen
by Sweden. Without an opt-out right, by not entering the ERM II exchange rate
mechanism, Sweden fails formally to fulfil the exchange rate criterion.
117
The earliest date when Hungary can adopt the euro as a participant in EMU
depends on a number of factors which can be more or less influenced. Monetary
union membership is, by definition, preceded by accession to the European Union
as well as meeting the convergence criteria. In principle, one can say that even if
the convergence criteria are fulfilled, the earliest possible date of joining the euro
area is two years after accession, as a minimum participation of two years is
required in ERM II. In view of the fact, however, that approval of shorter formal ERM
II participation is not without precedent, the following section will examine other
factors that may have a bearing on the date of Hungary’s monetary union entry.
116 Whether a country fulfils the convergence criteria, is officially decided by the Ecofin council, based on
convergence reports drafted separately by the European Commission and the ECB. It is unprecedented
that having met the criteria a country does not join. As Sweden has not formally met the exchange rate
criterion, the Swedish example is not a precedent case for non-entry when there is no opt-out right
involved.
117 Great Britain and Denmark have an opt-out right in respect of monetary integration.141
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Box V–1
The Maastricht convergence criteria
The first convergence criterion relates to price stability. Accordingly, for a
one-year period specified by the convergence report, the annual average
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) of a member state should not
exceed by more than 1.5 percentage point above the average of the inflation
rates of the three best performing member states in terms of price stability
calculated for the same period.
The second criterion pertains to the requirement of a sustainable general 
government position. At the time of the examination by the Ecofin Council, the
member state should not be the subject of a so-called excessive deficit procedure.
According to the Treaty of Maastricht, an excessive deficit is a consolidated
general government deficit above the reference values of 3% of GDP and gross
government debt exceeding 60% of GDP. The deficit should not be regarded as
excessive if the excess deficit and government debt have declined substantially
and continuously and reached a level that comes to the reference value, or,
alternatively, if the reference values have been exceeded only temporarily and
exceptionally and the ratios remains close to the reference value.
The third criterion measures the durability of convergence. A member state’s
annual average nominal interest rate on ten-year fixed interest government
bonds for a one-year period set by the convergence report should not exceed
by more than 2 percentage points the average of the long-term interest rates
of the three best performing member states in terms of price stability.
The fourth criterion relates to exchange rate stability. Fluctuations of each
country’s exchange rate should be within the normal range of ERM II, and there
should be no unilateral devaluation of central parities established in relation to
the other member states two years prior to the convergence report.142
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Date of joining the EU
In its Strategic Paper
118 published on 13 November 2001, the European Com-
mission confirmed the previously approved enlargement timetable (Nice,
Gothenburg), indicating that it will follow a road map.
119 Accordingly, in principle
accession talks may be closed by the latter half of 2002, and accession treaties
on joining the EU on 1 January 2004 could be signed at the year-end. This is
the earliest possible date of accession for Hungary. Due to protracted negotiations
or the ratification of accession treaties, there may be a postponement of the
early 2004 date. However, since the EU stresses the objective that the most
eligible candidates should participate as full members in the European
Parliament elections of June 2004, an alternative date of entry could be June
2004. The next possible date is 1 January 2005. The following section looks at
these three potential accession dates in relation to the timing and length of
Hungary’s participation in ERM II, and the reference period examined by the
convergence tests. 
Date of the convergence test
As a condition for entering monetary union, Hungary must meet the requirements
laid down in the Treaty. In order to assess the extent to which these conditions are
met, community regulations require that the Commission and the ECB prepare
convergence reports once every two years about non-participating member
states; the member states reviewed may also request a report in the interim
period. EU institutions, such as the Council in the composition of Economic and
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN), the European Parliament and the Council in the
118 The Strategic Paper is published simultaneously with the Commission’s country reports to assess the
state of the accession process and make proposals on its advance.
119 The road-map of Nice denotes the enlargement timetable approved by the European Council summit
held in Nice in December 2000. The road-map in effect divides negotiation chapters according to the
degree of difficulty involved. It is possible to deviate from the targets in both a negative and positive
direction, in other words, some chapters may be brought forward in time while other, difficult, ones may
be postponed.composition of heads of state and government of member states, will take a
position on the basis of these convergence reports and decide on the integration
of the new member states into monetary union. This happened in spring 1998
in respect of the member states that adopted the euro as of 1999. The only
difference from this procedure will be that in the case of Hungary the final decision
will not be made by the Council compasing of heads of state and government,
but by the ECOFIN Council (as in the case of Greece’s admission into monetary
union in 2000).
Experience to date suggests that convergence reports are drawn up in the
spring, followed a couple of weeks later by an ECOFIN Council decision on
admission. In all likelihood, the convergence test will take place sometime
between March and May in the case of Hungary too. First of all, this is the earliest
date when statistics for the previous year become available. It would not be
desirable to postpone the test to a much later date as, providing that the
decision is positive, time should be left for making the arrangements for the
adoption of the euro early the following year. Despite the fact that Hungary can
then look at the experience of the twelve euro members and that Hungarians will
presumably have a welcoming attitude to the switch from the forint to the euro,
this will be a major challenge for the economy as a whole. This will be the case
especially because, in contrast to the experience of the current euro member
countries, in Hungary the euro will be introduced – in all probability – simultaneously
as account money and cash.
Date of joining ERM II and measuring the duration of participation
Meeting the exchange rate criterion raises two timing-related issues. One uncertainty
factor is related to the question of what is the earliest possible date of Hungary’s
entry into ERM II, following accession. On the one hand, it can be indirectly
derived from the Treaty that member states should formulate their economic
policy with a view to entering monetary union. This commitment is reflected in
approving the Copenhagen criteria. The implication is that entry into the EU
also marks the start of our participation in ERM II. The uncertainty about this




Member states have to submit a request for participation in ERM II. Participation
and the conditions therefore have to be agreed on by the ECB and the parties
involved, taking into account the level of macroeconomic stability achieved
by that point.
120 Under the exchange rate mechanism, the forint exchange rate
will be pegged to the euro allowing a ±15% fluctuation range. The most crucial
issue to be decided is the central parity of the forint in relation to the euro.
Our presumption is that the request will be approved within the shortest time
technically possible.
121
Another uncertainty factor related to determining the earliest possible date of
joining the euro is how long Hungary is required to participate formally in ERM II
to meet the exchange rate criterion. While the Treaty specifies a two-year
period, there have been two precedents for decision-makers accepting a shorter
duration of ERM membership as satisfying the exchange rate criterion.
Pursuant to the Treaty, the convergence tests conducted so far have looked
back on the two years from the month preceding the month of the test when
reviewing progress in respect of the exchange rate criterion. The Test of
March 1998 looked at the reference period between March 1996 and February
1998. On the occasion of the 1998 convergence test, Italy, which re-entered
the exchange rate mechanism on 25 November, 1996, was only able to produce
a 15-month period of ERM membership for the duration of the reference
period, and the Finnish markka only 16 months. Even though their formal
membership was shorter than the required two years the ECB and the
Committee judged the currencies of these member countries as sufficiently
120 Decisions on participation, the central parity and the width of the fluctuation bands are made using
a “common procedure”, with the participation of the European Commission, the Economic and
Financial Committee. A consensus of euro member finance and economic ministers and the ECB
on the one hand and ministers and central bank governors of non-euro participants of ERM II on
the other hand is necessary. Non-ERM II participant ministers and central bank governors can take
part in the procedure without a voting right. The parties involved in the procedure, including the ECB,
may trigger a confidential procedure to review the central parity. 
121 Austria joined the exchange rate mechanism on the ninth day after its EU accession on 1 January
1995. Finland, which joined the EU in the same wave of enlargement, chose to enter the ERM
much later, on 14 October 1996. Based on its own decision, Sweden has not yet joined the
exchange rate mechanism.145
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stable for the entire length of the reference period, i.e. they satisfied the
criterion on exchange rate stability. In view of the fact that the current
Hungarian exchange rate strategy nearly fully complies with the ERM II
standard,
122 it cannot be ruled out that, with a stable forint, the reference period
will include not only the formal ERM II membership, but also the preceding
period, as needs may be.
Assuming that Hungary can participate in ERM II immediately upon its accession
into the EU and that it joins in early 2004, the mandatory two-year period of
ERM participation will expire in late 2005. Providing further that the other criteria
are satisfied in 2004, Hungary can enter monetary union on 1 January 2006 at
the earliest, if the exchange rate criterion is judged on a flexible basis. Should
the criterion be interpreted formally, the earliest date of entry would be January
2007. If the date of EU accession is postponed, the earliest possible date of
monetary union entry will also be postponed.
Timing of compliance with the fiscal criterion 
While flexibility in judging compliance with the exchange rate criterion has
a crucial bearing on the earliest prospective date of Hungary’s entry into the
euro, when all the other criteria are satisfied, the required (reference) periods
or dates relating to the rest of the convergence criteria are much more clearly
specified.
The condition for meeting the Treaty’s fiscal convergence criterion does not
specifically stipulate that the reference values defined in the Treaty’s Protocol
should be met a certain date. What is specified instead is that at the time of the
convergence review the member country reviewed should not be under an excessive
deficit procedure, as defined in Article 104 of the Treaty. In view of the fact,
however, that the Council resolution providing for the excessive deficit procedures
in detail considers the budget deficit and government debt data as a proportion
of GDP in the full calendar year preceding review date, the reference year should
122  It fails to fully comply with the ERM II because of the formal requirement that the central parity and
bandwidth within ERM II should be established jointly by the ECB and other related parties. Naturally,
the ECB does not yet undertake a commitment to intervene to protect the forint’s exchange rate.be the one preceding the review year. Accordingly, in the case of a 2007 euro-
area entry, for instance, the fiscal criteria should be satisfied in 2005 at the
latest.
Apart from this key condition, it should be kept in mind that as far as meeting the
fiscal criterion is concerned, a member state’s exemption from the excessive deficit
procedure is a much more complex process than a simple comparison of reference
values. Indeed, it is a less clear-cut and transparent process, potentially involving
political decisions. Member states’ 1998 experience
123 indicates that in assessing
the fiscal criterion the Council took a flexible approach to judging both government
gross debt and the sustainability of the achieved general government position.
However, considering the following practical implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact and the case of Greece entering subsequently, it is not likely that
Hungary would be given similar leeway in meeting the fiscal criterion. It appears
thus that it is not sufficient to meet exclusively the quantitative fiscal criterion by
the set reference date, say 2005, but already in the pre-review years fiscal policy
should be such that convincingly proves to the EU the sustainability of the value
attained by the reference year.
Timing of meeting the inflation and interest rate criteria
In contrast with the fiscal and exchange rate criteria, the Treaty clearly states
that in terms of the inflation and interest rate criteria the degree of member state
convergence shall be assessed on the basis of a twelve-month reference period.
The price stability criterion is met when a member state has achieved sustainable
146
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123 As the Council resolution on reviewing the existence of excessive deficit was not in place at the time,
the 1998 convergence report judged compliance with the criterion by taking 1997 as reference year.
For the first time, greater attention was paid to compliance with specific quantitative limits and also
dealing with prospective consolidation processes. The convergence reports on Greece and Sweden
in 2000 put greater emphasis than the previous reports on the when and how of ending the excessive
deficit procedure. The Council made Greece exempt from the excessive deficit procedure on 17
December 1999. Remarkably, at the time of ending the excessive deficit procedure, Greece had a
government debt of 104.5% of GDP, and at the time of the December resolution, there were no final
results available yet, and the Committee regarded the preliminary deficit of 1.9% as adequate.147
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price stability and an inflation rate that does not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage
points the average inflation rate of the three best performing member states in
terms of price stability over a twelve-month period prior to the examination. Just as
the inflation criterion, the convergence criterion on interest rates also refers to the
year preceding the examination. Accordingly, the member state reviewed should
have an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than
two percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing member states in
terms of price stability. In practice, the reference period is the twelve months
counted from the last month for which data are available at the time of the test. The
reference period of the March 1998 convergence test lasted from February 1997 to
end-January 1998, while the corresponding dates for the November 1996 test were
October 1995 and September 1996.
However, regardless of this twelve-month reference period, it should be remembered
that just as with each criterion, examination is not exclusively focussed on
comparing actual inflation or interest rates with reference values. Indeed, other
indicators are also looked at to check for the sustainability of inflation (or the interest
rate) attained.
Article 121 of the Treaty on interpreting ‘other criteria’
Taking into account the relationship between nominal and real convergence,
Article 121 of the Treaty also provides that the Commission and the ECB (or EMI,
its legal predecessor
124) also ‘take account of’ other indicators. Accordingly, these
institutions ‘shall also take account of the development of the ECU, the results of the
integration of markets, the situation and development of the balances of payments
on current account and an examination of the development of unit labour costs and
other price indices’. The Treaty’s words of ‘take account of’ are rather difficult to
interpret on their own as, unlike the nominal convergence criteria, the indicators
listed are not defined in specific terms, i.e. there are no quantified reference values
and, furthermore, some indicators, such as the integration of markets, cannot be
quantified.
124 European Monetary Institute.These indicators intended to support the real convergence of the economies and
the sustainability of quantified results are referred to in the Commission and
EMI/ECB’s convergence reports as ‘other’ or ‘additional’ factors. As the Treaty
does not specify how they should be implemented - there is no clearly defined
legal provision about the procedure - the examination becomes subjective, and
the question of what other factors should be included in the examination can
become much more easily subject to the existing (say political) situation.
The EMI/ECB convergence reports provide insight on the application of these
‘other criteria’ in the assessment of individual countries’ state of convergence.
Since the EMI published its first convergence report in 1995, there has been a new
one every year, dealing with the economic (and legal) convergence of the member
states. By looking at each individual criterion, the EMI examined in this report how
the Treaty’s requirements are satisfied. In the convergence reports’ methodological
description of other factors, the EMI admits that in respect of ‘other criteria’ there
is a need for uniform statistical concepts, in the absence of specific reference values,
to enable comparisons to be made between individual national data. In its reports,
the EMI (and later the ECB) assess the development of ECU and the degree of the
integration of markets in relation to general development from an Economic and
Monetary Union perspective. The remaining factors are selected relying on
definitions that produce comparable indicators across the member states. The
‘other factors’ are not treated as separate criteria but rather as means of support
for the nominal criteria, in the context of the requirement that the convergence
criteria should be met not only at a specific time (the reference period of the
examination) but also in the long term.
Of the ‘other factors’ underlying the nominal criteria the examination of the
sustainability of inflation is the most interesting from the point of view of Hungary.
The convergence reports also take account methodologically of what kind of
economic environment is required to achieve price stability. They examine price
changes on the basis of supply and demand, emphasising the factors affecting,
among other things, productivity and unit labour costs or import prices. They also
take a position on prospective trends in inflation, making use of the projections of key
international organisations, in addition to assessing the structural aspects needed




for instance, examining the performance of Greece in reducing inflation, the ECB
recognises the sustainability of the achieved results after a thorough examination
of the above criteria, in addition to checking that the reference values for the reference
period are met.
Chart V-1
Reference period for the convergence criteria,
assuming euro-area entry in 2007
The following section presents a comparison of the benefits and disadvantages of
entering monetary union at the technically earliest date in four to six years’ time,
with later entry scheduled for 2010-2012.
V.2.  Elements of the Hungarian convergence programme and
prospective costs of convergence 
Of the four Maastricht criteria, those relating to inflation and the government
deficit will require the greatest efforts in terms of economic policy. Meeting these
two criteria ‘automatically’ entails convergence of long-term interest rates. If
financial market players expect the country to join the euro area, the interest rate
2004        January  Exchange rate 
                   March-April
        
     December         Inflation  Budget
2005        January      Interest rate
                                        2 years                  By 2005
                          the latest
                       to be reduced
                   below 3% in a 
                 1 year          sustainable way
     December
2006        January
                   March-April
          May        Decision on participation in 
                  monetary union
2007        January               Start of the membership in
                   the euro areaspread measured on long-term yields will likely drop to the size of the country-
risk and liquidity premium
125, which is lower than the permitted difference of
200 basis points
126. Meeting the criterion on government debt needs no further
adjustment.
V.2.1. Fiscal adjustment
The fiscal requirement for joining the euro area is that a country is not involved in
an excessive deficit procedure. The excessive deficit procedure is launched when
the government deficit calculated in terms of the European standard (ESA 95)
exceeds 3% of GDP or government gross debt exceeds 60% of GDP. There may
be two exceptions to this rule. The first is that the above ratios are on a significant
and steady decline and have reached levels close to the reference. The second is
that the reference values are exceeded only under exceptional and transitory
circumstances and the ratios remain close to the reference values. In the course
of the examination under the excess deficit procedure the Commission qualifies
the extraordinary budget deficit as the consequence of severe economic recession
if there has previously been an at least 2% drop in GDP of the member state under
review. The Council has to take into account the comments of the member state
involved and the evidence in support of the argument that a smaller-than-2% drop
in GDP should also be viewed as extraordinary, with special regard to the
suddenness of the recession or the cumulated loss in output relative to the historical
trend.
Although the conduct of fiscal policy remains a national responsibility even after joining
the EU and becoming a member state with a derogation, and even later, as a euro
area member state, the Treaty sets forth as a fundamental regulation that member
states should avoid an excessive budget deficit. The device used to control and
ensure that excessive deficit is avoided is the excessive deficit procedure, also
referred to above in the discussion of the fiscal criterion. This aforementioned
150
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
125 The country risk and liquidity premium is approximately 50 basis points today and rose to 130 basis
points at the time of the Russian crisis.
126 The effect on nominal rates of joining the euro is discussed in Chapter IV.3.fundamental requirement of the Treaty is supplemented by other additional
requirements set forth in the Stability and Growth Pact
127 (see Box V–2).
There is no specific fiscal policy requirement for the pre-accession period.
Nevertheless, in a 2002 publication entitled ‘Public Finance in EMU’, the European
Commission suggests that, as new member states will also be liable to the 3%
government deficit criterion after accession, they should embark on fiscal adjustment
well before entry into the EU. This way they will be able to avoid high welfare losses
usually associated with delaying consolidation until the last moment.
128
Following accession to the EU, Hungary will have to adopt a medium-term convergence




Principal requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) provides that the member states, in order
to be able at any time to maintain the budget deficit within the reference
values defined in the Treaty Protocol, should aim to achieve a government
position of close to balance or in surplus. This will enable them to increase their
budgetary expenditures at the time of a cyclical slump so that the reference
value is respected. Euro area participants should adopt stability programmes
and non-participating member states should adopt convergence programmes
in an effort to achieve the above goal. The SGP outlines sanctions to be
imposed if a country does not continuously comply with the objectives laid
down in the convergence and stability programmes through a fault of its own.
While in an extreme case euro area member states may incur financial
sanctions, non-participating member states are only sanctioned via moral
suasion if there is any deviation from the provisions of the Pact.
127 Formally, the Stability and Growth Pact comprises the 17 June 1997 resolution of the European
Council and Council Regulations (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying
the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, and No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination
of economic policies. 
128 European Commission (2002) 126. o.152
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to present, among other things, our fiscal consolidation timetable for the following four
years. Experience so far
129 suggests that by the end of the first four-year convergence
programme adopted after accession, even if not seeking a balanced budget, Hungary
should aim to maintain a fiscal position offering a sufficient ‘contingency margin’ to
ensure compliance with the 3% limit in case of unforeseen fiscal developments.
Accordingly, the Maastricht criterion on fiscal policy should be fulfilled before the end
of the first convergence programme after accession if Hungary is to avoid an excessive
deficit procedure.
All in all, no fiscal considerations call for postponing monetary union entry until
after 2010, as the fiscal criterion has to be met independently of monetary union
membership. By contrast, compliance with the fiscal criterion may be of crucial
importance with regard to which year Hungary joins the euro area under the ‘rapid
accession scenario’. As noted above, depending on how the ERM II membership
requirement is interpreted, the first opportunity to join will be in the period between
2006 and 2008. Accordingly, if it aspires to join at the earliest possible date,
Hungary will have to comply with the fiscal criterion in one of the years between
2004 and 2006. However, this will call for considerable budgetary adjustment
relative to the current situation. As there is no information available on the prospective
fiscal position
130, let us give a numerical representation of a hypothetical fiscal path
followed with the intention of a 2007 entry, assuming that the required adjustment
will take place in equal portions distributed over a period of several years.
131  
The table below is based on the assumption that, in an effort to qualify for membership
in 2007, Hungary wishes to comply with the 3% deficit criterion in the fiscal year 2005.
The limit cannot be exceeded even if the business cycle is unfavourable. A 2.7% target
can provide sufficient leeway in meeting the criterion even if GDP growth is 1-1.5%
129 In the first stability and convergence programme, prepared at the end of 1998, member countries
envisaged an adjustment of 1.5% of GDP on average between 1999 and 2002. Greece, the only
country aspiring to join the euro area, set a target of a 0.2% surplus in 2002, following a deficit of
–4.6% in 1997. Austria projected the highest deficit at the end of the first convergence programme,
amounting to 1.1% of GDP.
130 Information on the prospective long-term fiscal path will be presented in the PEP programme
submitted to the Brussels Commission in August 2002. 
131 In respect of countries that joined the euro area earlier and were subject to serious fiscal tightening,
the reference year generally fell to the first half of the election cycle. However, in countries where
fiscal adjustment took several years to be implemented, such as Spain and Greece, tightening took
place during the final two years of the election cycles. below trend.
132 Under this scenario, the government-sector deficit as a proportion
of GDP, computed in terms of the ESA 95 standard, should be reduced by 3.8 per-
centage points in the period between 2002 and 2005. The primary balance computed
excluding EU funds should improve by approximately 2.3%, while the remaining
roughly 1.5% deficit reduction will arise from changes in the interest balance and net
EU funds. As assuming even-paced adjustment, this implies an annual tightening of
0.8%, the downward effect on GDP growth will be also distributed over time. 
Table V–1
Projections for government sector
133 ESA deficit 
and the primary balance as a percentage of GDP
* As the effect of prospective measures cannot be quantified as yet, the projected ESA deficit is
shown within the limits suggested by government specialists and analysts. Hence, this is not the
National Bank’s projection, all the less so because the Bank’s projection is based on changes
in the SNA primary balance, an indicator constructed using a different methodology. 
It is also clear from the table that government interest expenses will decrease at the
fastest pace in 2003, when they are still largely determined by former arrangements,
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
preliminary assumptions* hypothetical hypothetical hypothetical
path path path
1. ESA deficit (1=2+3+4) –4.1 –6.5 –5.3 –4.4 –2.7
2. Interest balance –4.2 –4.2 –3.8 –3.6 –3.5
2. ESA central bank contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4. ESA primary balance 0.1 –2.3 –1.5 –0.8 0.8
5. Net EU funds 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.1
6. Primary balance excluding –0.2 –2.6 –1.8 –1.1 –0.3
EU funds (6=4-5)
7. Change in primary balance  –2.4 0.8 0.8 0.8
excluding EU funds
132 The explanation for the apparently tight ‘reserve’ is that the cyclical sensitivity of the balance
currently amounts to merely 15%, and is not expected to exceed 20% within a few years. For more
on this, see Chapter III.2.4. 
133 The term government sector is used here because current Hungarian terminology does not include
the State Privatisation and Holding Company (ÁPV Rt.) and the Hungarian Development Bank (MFB
Rt) as constituents of general government.154
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134 As far as contributions are concerned, Hungary is assumed to meet the average EU contribution
level from the first year. In respect of agricultural support, we use an estimate for Hungary’s share
in the EU’s offer to the ten countries. In respect of structural actions, the calculations use the estimates
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which only minimally fall short of the estimates by the European
Parliament.
and debts are expected to be gradually re-priced later. Firmness in measures aimed
at complying with the fiscal criteria may further speed up interest rate convergence.
As a result of the further reduction in interest expenses, the size of the adjustment
required in the primary balance may decrease, while more favourable monetary
conditions may contribute to offsetting the negative effect on growth of fiscal
adjustment.
In contrast with the interest expenses, access to EU funds
134 cannot be expected,
even under favourable circumstances, to exert further downward pressure on the
size of the required adjustment. This is because only some payments make a
predictable effect on the deficit, with the contributions increasing it and the
agricultural subsidies decreasing it. By contrast, transfers that can be obtained in
the framework of the structural actions depend on our absorption ability, and they do
not automatically improve the deficit, as the subsidies are countered by expenditures
and there is also need for co-financing. If these combined do not exceed the
financing of the previous period for similar purposes (for instance environmental
protection), the deficit may lessen, but if they cover additional expenditures, the
deficit will remain unchanged. Inasmuch as Hungary’s absorption capacity proves
to be significantly better than projected by the Bank on the basis of estimates by
the European Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary would gain
access to more EU funds, but due to excess expenditures financed by these funds,
there would be no reduction in the government sector deficit. 
The size of the fiscal adjustment required from Hungary can be viewed as being average
relative to earlier euro-area entrants. Of the 11 countries joining the euro area in the
first wave, only two countries – Luxembourg and Ireland – complied with the 3%
deficit limit two years prior to the reference period. The first-round joiners were able
to reduce the ESA deficit from 5% to 2.6% on average in the course of the two years,
0.4% of which was accounted for by a reduction in the interest burden. Greece
implemented even more significant adjustment prior to joining the euro, as its ESA-
based financing requirement, in excess of 10% of GDP in 1995, was brought down to155
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1.6% in 1999. The effect of a drop in the interest burden accounted for 4.5% of this
improvement between 1995 and 1999. The adjustment proved to be permanent in
most cases, with only Austria and Belgium experiencing some relapse during the two
years following the reference period. 
V.2.2.  Reducing inflation
The inflation criterion requires that domestic inflation should not exceed by more
than 1.5% the average rate of the three EU member countries with the lowest inflation
in terms of the average rate in the year preceding the preparation of the convergence
report. The rate of inflation to be complied with changes constantly, with the lowest
rate since 1997 being 1.9% and the highest so far 3.3% in April 2002. In that
month, the annual rate of inflation in Hungary amounted to 6.1%, which means that
inflation has to be lowered by another 3-4% in order to meet the criterion. 
The examination of the convergence criteria will not be confined to checking
whether the prescribed values are met, but it will also examine whether the
favourable indicators achieved are sustainable. A reduced inflation rate can be
regarded as sustainable if market participants also incorporate a permanently
lower expected rate of future inflation into their expectations. As the yield curve will
reflect domestic inflation expectations less and less reliably as Hungary approaches
monetary union, nominal wage growth may become the most significant test of
inflation expectations.
A monetary policy issue of crucial significance concerns the date and costs of
meeting the disinflation target as required by the Maastricht criterion. The central
bank’s current inflation targets are 4.5%±1% at end-2002 and 3.5±1% at end-2003.
Provided that inflation follows its set path, meeting the reference value will require
another 1-2% reduction after 2003, which, in view of the speed of disinflation so
far, could be met during the reference year between 2004 and 2006. However, the
economy may be hit by unforeseen shocks and the inflationary pressure they
exerted could only be offset at the price of an excessive growth sacrifice. Therefore,
the Monetary Council may temporarily tolerate a rise in inflation. In other words,
unforeseen events bearing on the course of the economy may cause a delay in
achieving the inflation reference value.Meeting the inflation criterion may require that the inflation differential relative to
the euro area be temporarily reduced below the equilibrium inflation differential
(0.8-2.2%, see Chapter II.2). This may be a source of extra costs compared with a
strategy aiming for joining the euro at a much later date. This inflation differential
will, however, disappear only in the long term as the economy catches up. Indeed,
postponing entry into the euro area by four or five years may push up rather than
lower the costs. This is because if the disinflation process is reversed or remains
flat at a high level for a longer period of time, expectations may become rigid and
less susceptible to the announced disinflation programme. This, in turn, may push
up the costs of disinflation. From the point of view of disinflation costs, the optimum
strategy seems to be based on a steady decline in inflation, leading to a drop in the
existing inflation differential within a couple of years.
The extra costs incurred if inflation is brought below the equilibrium level could be
offset in the light of the fact that the disinflation process as a whole could probably
entail a smaller sacrifice if it is implemented in the context of the preparations for
joining the euro. The cost of disinflation in terms of a loss in economic growth
depends on several factors, such as:
– the credibility of the announced disinflation programme and its influence
on inflation expectations, 
– the fiscal and monetary policy mix leading to a lower path for inflation,
– the extent to which economic agents view desired monetary stability as 
sustainable, and finally
– the cyclical position of the economy.
In view of the above factors it seems expedient for the government and monetary-
policy decision-makers to co-operate in implementing the disinflation programme
in an effort to meet the requirements for the euro area membership. The credibility
of the disinflation programme is greatly enhanced by the fact that euro area
membership is not one of many economic policy objectives in the context of an
‘ordinary anti-inflationary programme’. Indeed, it is a matter of national interest
with a bearing on the country’s future well-being, with implications going beyond
the direct economic effects. Therefore, economic agents are likely to hold it more
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enhanced by the work of the European Commission and the ECB in monitoring
and evaluating the implementation of the convergence programme.  
Meeting the accession criteria also promotes the creation of an appropriate fiscal
and monetary policy mix. In a small open economy, interest rate moves by monetary
policy make their impact primarily via the appreciation or depreciation of the
exchange rate. Thus, a greater emphasis on fiscal policy usually helps to reduce
output costs and has a favourable influence on the sustainability and credibility of
the programme through its effect on the balance of payments. From a monetary
policy perspective, joining ERM II will enhance the credibility of a disinflation strategy
based on the exchange rate. At the same time, if the target is credible, monetary
conditions will become increasingly deterministic, and interest rates will converge
to euro rates at more and more shorter sections of the yield curve, while exchange
rate changes will be significantly influenced by the expected conversion rate.
Therefore, as the date of accession grows nearer, disinflation via fiscal policy must
be given increasingly greater emphasis. It is beneficial in this respect if Hungary
wants to meet the inflation criterion after the EU accession. This is because
complying with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact will likely
prescribe some fiscal tightening, independent of disinflation.
As shown by the experience of earlier EU entrants, in addition to fiscal and monetary




Role of wage agreements in disinflation
In the majority of EU countries, the moderation of wage demands has been of crucial
importance in meeting the inflation convergence criterion. During the years
preceding the examination of the convergence criteria, most member countries
reached wage agreements for a duration of several (two or three) years. This was
the case even in countries which had a different tradition. The success of keeping
wage inflation within institutional limits was primarily due to a country announcing
its intention to join monetary union.158
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As shown in the table below, even though nominal wage increases in most countries
exceeded the extent of the inflation compensation in the pre-convergence-report
years, real wage increases remained permanently below the rate of productivity
growth. Of the euro area member countries, only Italy and Portugal produced
higher real wage growth than productivity growth in the period before joining the
euro area as a compensation for the exceptionally low rate of wage increases in
both countries in the mid-1990s.
Table V–2
Nominal and real wage growth (annual %)
Source: Eurostat.
In the course of wage negotiations in the majority of countries not only
competitiveness/profitability considerations were recognised, but also compliance
with conditions for prospective monetary union entry. In Belgium, for example,
total wage growth, including compensation for inflation, was not allowed to
deviate from the average rate of the three main trading partners.
N No om mi in na al l   w wa ag ge e   g gr ro ow wt th h R Re ea al l   w wa ag ge e   g gr ro ow wt th h P Pr ro od du uc ct ti iv vi it ty y   g gr ro ow wt th h
1 19 99 94 4 1 19 99 95 5 1 19 99 96 6 1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 94 4 1 19 99 95 5 1 19 99 96 6 1 19 99 97 7 1 19 99 94 4 1 19 99 95 5 1 19 99 96 6 1 19 99 97 7
Austria 3.5 2.9 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 –0.2 –0.6 2.3 1.5 2.6 0.8
Belgium 4.0 2.4 1.6 2.9 2.2 0.6 0.4 1.5 3.4 1.9 0.8 2.6
Finland 3.1 3.9 2.7 1.7 1.1 –0.2 0.9 –0.3 5.2 2.2 2.6 2.9
France 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.5 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.2 2.4 1.2 1.3 1.8
Netherlands 2.8 1.9 1.4 2.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 3.6 0.8 0.5 0.7
Ireland 2.5 2.0 3.3 5.7 0.8 –1.0 0.9 1.2 2.6 4.5 4.1 6.1
Luxembourg 4.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 –1.2 1.5 0.6 –0.2 1.6 1.3 0.2 4.0
Germany 3.0 3.6 1.3 0.8 0.5 1.6 0.3 0.0 2.5 1.5 1.1 1.6
Italy 3.0 4.2 6.1 4.1 –0.4 –0.8 0.8 1.7 3.2 2.9 0.8 1.5
Portugal 5.6 7.2 4.9 3.7 –0.7 2.0 1.5 0.6 3.3 3.6 2.0 2.0
Spain 2.8 3.0 4.5 2.1 –1.2 –1.8 1.0 –0.1 2.8 0.9 1.2 0.7
Greece 10.9 12.9 8.8 13.6 –0.4 2.8 1.4 6.3 0.1 1.2 2.8 3.9
Denmark 1.5 3.8 4.1 3.5 –0.3 2.0 1.6 1.8 4.0 2.3 1.9 2.1
UK 3.4 2.6 1.8 4.4 1.9 0.1 –1.4 1.4 3.6 1.2 –0.1 1.4
Sweden 4.8 2.8 6.8 3.0 2.4 –0.7 5.3 1.8 4.9 2.3 1.6 2.6
EU15 3.1 3.3 2.8 2.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 2.9 1.7 1.0 1.6159
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The fact that wage negotiations in Italy were based on the average EU-level inflation
rate implies that they used prospective average European wage growth as a
standard. Less  developed member states, such as Greece and Portugal, for
instance, also sought to gradually narrow the real wage differential relative to the
developed countries. In determining the rate of wage increases, these countries
also took account of a certain percentage of productivity growth in addition to
the inflation compensation. Only in two less developed member countries,
(Ireland and Greece) wage bargainers also took into account explicitly compli-
ance with the convergence criteria and the altered economic policy conditions
following euro-area entry. As far as Portugal and Spain are concerned, there
was no evidence of any change in the factors that were taken into account in the
course of wage negotiations in an effort to attain monetary union membership.
The cases of Finland, Ireland and Italy are of special interest from a Hungarian
point of view. Traditionally corporatist Finland, for instance, could only make the
dampening of wage demands acceptable by setting up a special budgetary fund
to be used for compensation in the event of asymmetric shocks. Another objective
was to preserve their centralised wage negotiation system, which was expected
to facilitate adjustment to lower inflation.
However, the centralised wage negotiation system is not typical in the majority of
the member countries. In Ireland and Italy, for instance, there were national wage
agreements valid for several years in the 1990s, despite the fact that the organisation
of trade union and employers representations is the least developed in these two
countries within the euro area.
135 Ireland did not have a tradition of central
agreements, and the increase in the 1990s in the role of national wage agreements
in Italy paradoxically coincided with palpable institutional decentralisation of wage
bargaining. It should be stressed, however, that the purpose of wage agreements at
the national level is not to reinstate the institutional centralisation of negotiations,
but to reach a social pact. In Ireland and Italy, trilateral social pacts, also including
the government, enabled national guidelines for nominal wage growth to be defined.
These guidelines were formulated as recommendations for private sector agents,
and deviation from the agreement entailed no sanctions.
135 The organisation level of interest representation within the EU is reviewed, among other authors, by
Scheremet (2000).The government can directly influence wage growth only in the public sector, but
the benchmark range for wage increases established at a trilateral wage policy
co-ordination forum with the participation of the private sector may also affect
inflation expectations formed by market participants.
It is also conducive to sustainability if Hungary can join the euro area as a result
of disinflation, since membership in the single currency would mean irrevocable
commitment to adopting the monetary policy of the euro area. Joining the euro
will also indirectly enhance the sustainability of disinflation, and as successful
convergence will also change the significance of the balance of payments




In Ireland, the social pact was necessitated primarily by the limited adjustment
opportunities due to the special ERM framework, while in Italy the foundation of
the social pact was the need to comply with the convergence criteria. In order to
reduce high unemployment in the late 1980s, Ireland needed to dampen real
wage growth, which was only possible within the ERM by moderating nominal
wage demands. The Irish social pact in essence meant that in exchange for lower
nominal wage demands, the government promised tax cuts. The nearly decade-old
success of the pact owes somewhat to Ireland’s liberal immigration policy, which
lessened the likelihood of labour market bottlenecks. By contrast, the success of
the social pact in Italy was due not to government concessions but literally a
common social endeavour. It became clear by late 1996 that short of major
restrictions, Italy would be the only country besides Greece to be left outside the
first wave of euro members against its wishes. Having recognised the danger of
being left outside Europe, Italians came to fully accept fiscal and income policy
restrictions, so much so that of all EU countries Italy showed the highest support
for the single currency in 1999. Thus, the Italian social pact was brought about
primarily by raising awareness about the political and emotional, rather than the
economic, costs of postponing the entry to the euro area.
136 Of the less developed EU members, only Portugal exhibited a significantly worsening current
account deficit (1997: -5.7%, 1998: -7%, as a percentage of GDP) prior to entering to the euro area.
However, due to the credibility of convergence, neither the exchange rate nor the interest rates
showed signs of depreciation pressure. In sum, it will be beneficial from the point of view of the costs of disinflation if
disinflation policy can be linked to compliance with the criteria for monetary union
participation. Co-ordinated fiscal and monetary policies will enhance credibility of
the disinflation programme, having a favourable impact on inflation expectations
and ultimately reducing the costs of curbing inflation. Co-ordination of fiscal and
monetary policies can be accomplished in the context of a credible government
commitment to euro area entry, announced well in advance. Therefore, the Bank
believes that economic policy makers should publish their timetable for joining the
euro area and the schedule and steps of the required adjustment as soon as
possible. 
V.2.3. Prospective costs of convergence in the light of international experience
In each EU member state, consumer price inflation declined at a steady pace in
the 1990s. However, the output costs of disinflation varied considerably across
countries and periods. The cumulated output cost for a particular disinflation period
indicates the size of cumulated loss in growth, relative to trend growth, a country has
to accommodate in exchange for permanently reducing its rate of inflation by one
percentage point.
137 In the four less developed EU member states of greatest
relevance to Hungary, output costs caused by disinflation vary both across
countries  and over time. Our calculations suggest that forced disinflation in
Greece in the 1990s entailed the highest costs (GDP fell by 1.34 percentage
points in exchange for a one-percentage-point drop in inflation). Spain also
incurred similar costs due to disinflation in the period between 1977 and 1985
(GDP fell by 1.08 percentage point for every one percentage point drop in inflation).
Ireland also paid an output price for stabilisation (between 1981 and 1987, 0.61
% point of GDP for 1% point disinflation). By contrast, curbing inflation did not
entail any, or only negligible, output cost in Greece in the 1980s or Portugal and
Spain in the 1990s.
The variation in disinflation costs can be explained by the composition of the
stabilisation packages, their comprehensive nature and, ultimately, the credibility
of the programmes. Disinflation was only successful in periods when economic
161
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137 For the methodology used here to calculate cumulated output costs, see Ball (1993).162
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policy tools also supported the restrictive monetary policy. In contrast to Ireland,
Portugal and Spain, for example, where the exchange rate proved to be an
effective nominal anchor from the very beginning of disinflation, Greece was
unable to adopt a credible exchange rate policy until a few years after announcing
an exchange rate target in the second half of the 1990s. Another major difference
was that, unlike in the other countries, nearly the full burden of disinflation in Spain
fell initially to monetary policy. Monetary and fiscal policies did not become
co-ordinated until the mid-1990s. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
prospect of monetary union participation significantly enhanced the credibility and
social acceptability of fiscal adjustment. Apparently, the output cost of restrictions
in Europe was considerably lower in the run-up to EMU than in the 1970s and
1980s.
In the assessment of the prospective costs of disinflation, Hungary can rely on
the experience of the euro area member states which implemented simultaneous
fiscal adjustment and disinflation immediately before the period of testing the
criteria. Nearly all the current monetary union participants needed some degree
of fiscal adjustment, but only Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece had to reduce
inflation in order to meet the criteria, and only Greece was required to make a
major adjustment. The expected costs of disinflation can be estimated relying
on the experience of this group of countries. Chart V-2
Monetary conditions in Spain* in the disinflation period
Source: IFS database. 
* Three-month interbank rate, twelve-month CPI increase, 1991=1 nominal exchange rate, with
higher values indicating a more depreciated exchange rate.
Chart V-3
Monetary conditions in Greece* in the disinflation period
Source: IFS database.
* Central bank key rate, twelve-month CPI increase, 1991=1 nominal exchange rate, with higher
values indicating a more depreciated exchange rate.
163
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Short-term interest rate (left-hand scale)
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Monetary conditions in Italy* in the disinflation period 
Source: IFS database.
* Three-month interbank rate, twelve-month CPI increase, 1991=1 nominal exchange rate, with 
higher values indicating a more depreciated exchange rate.
Chart V-5
Monetary conditions in Portugal* in the disinflation period 
Source: IFS database.
* Three-month interbank rate, twelve-month CPI increase, 1991=1 nominal exchange rate, with
higher values indicating a more depreciated exchange rate.165
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When looking at the experience of countries forced to implement disinflation in
order to comply with the monetary union participation criteria, it should be
emphasised that none of the countries had to tighten monetary conditions in
order to eliminate the inflation differential. In the reference year and the preceding
two years, nominal exchange rates had weakened in general, and key rates
declined faster than inflation. The monetary developments were primarily the
result of conversion speculation, as the level of nominal interest rates had been
higher than the EU average in the countries under review and the exchange rate
was more appreciated than the pegged central parity, expected to correspond
to the prospective conversion rate.
138 By contrast, fiscal policy was tight in every
country, except Portugal. This economic policy mix facilitated disinflation in a
way that did not lead to a decline in GDP growth, with the exception of Italy, the
country forced to undertake the most significant fiscal correction. Economic
activity in these countries did not slow down significantly relative to the previous
years, as the effect of fiscal tightening was offset by stronger private sector
demand.
In countries with a similar inflation history to Hungary, the growth sacrifice
required for reducing inflation to the level required by the Maastricht criteria was
low. In the period from 1995 to 1997, Spain and Italy had below-potential GDP
growth only in 1996 (by 0.5 and 0.6%, respectively), while GDP grew above
potential in Portugal and Greece in the reference year and the preceding two
years. It should be noted for the sake of completeness that due to the ERM crisis,
these countries had grown below potential previously, with the widest output
gaps recorded in 1994 and 1995 in most countries. Thus, it is possible that
disinflation hampered economic recovery and the closing of the output gap.
This buoyant growth was due to several factors, including the global economic
boom in the case of Portugal and Spain. After 1996, the European Union
experienced an export-led economic boom, due to robust growth in the US
and world-wide. External activity was not conducive to growth in the case of
Greece in the reference period. Another crucial factor was the credibility
138 Speculation on devaluation enabled the central banks to maintain high nominal rates at least at
the short end of the yield curve. In order to dampen speculation, Greece and Ireland revalued the
central parity by 3%.166
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effect. Fiscal adjustment demonstrated to market participants their governments’
commitment and determination to joining the euro. The entry became
increasingly more credible, as is reflected in the convergence of long-term
yields at end-1996 and 1997. The drop in interest rates has a stimulating
effect on demand. Furthermore, convergence credibility also had an at least
as important effect on households’ income prospects, with consumer spending
picking up pace and the level of household indebtedness increasing over the
period.
Chart V-6
GDP growth and its components in the period 
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GDP growth and its components in the period 
of disinflation in Greece 
Source: OECD database.
Chart V-8
GDP growth and its components in the period 
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GDP growth and its components in the period 
of disinflation in Portugal
Source: OECD database.
Chart V-10
Spread between selected countries’ government 
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VI.1.  Effects of negative external demand shocks on Hungarian
gross domestic product
As was mentioned earlier, devaluation of the exchange rate may be chosen as one
of the tools of an optimal economic policy aimed at improving competitiveness in the
event of the economy being hit by an asymmetric negative external demand shock.
As the Hungarian and the European economies are deeply integrated with each
other, the probability of a shock exclusively affecting one of the two regions is low.
If, however, the importance of the sector affected by the impact is higher in one
economy than in the other, then the shock may well grow in size to trigger
asymmetric effects.
A decline in demand for goods in the member states of the Economic and
Monetary Union produced by a given sector may not only have a negative
effect on producers of the euro area but on Hungarian firms selling their out-
put to the region as well. The drop in foreign demand
139 has a direct, medium-
term impact on firms producing for exports and on the output of firms,
normally selling both in the domestic market and abroad, directed to the
external markets. But lower demand encourages foreign companies to
stretch out their market presence beyond national borders. Consequently,
competition in the domestic market intensifies. This is further aggravated by
a part of the volume of goods sold until recently abroad now adding to supply
in the domestic market. All this mars the competitive positions of Hungarian
market participants previously selling their output domestically. At the same
time, sub-contractors, treated as producers for the domestic market in
statistical terms and selling their output to firms producing for exports, also
may experience a decline in their existing orders. Thus, over the long term,
a specific negative demand shock affecting the world or at least the euro
139 Here, and in the following, the categories of decline and growth are not only satisfied by change in
the absolute sense but by a change in the dynamics of change as well, provided that it is not
indicated otherwise.171
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area may retard output growth and thus the production of value added as
well, passing through the entire Hungarian vertical chain of a given sector.
Through other linkages (for example, the fall in hours worked reduces
household income, which, in turn, may curtail household consumption; or
falling revenues of the central budget may cut state demand due to the drop
in tax receipts, etc.), this process may spread across other sectors as well. On
the whole, a decline in external demand may weaken the performance of an
entire economy, through an extended and sophisticated system of interlinked
factors.
Earlier, we defined those specified sectors which, due to their importance
in the Hungarian economy being significantly higher than the EMU average,
might be exposed to asymmetric shocks.
140 The real economic costs of a
monetary policy forced into a passive role by accession to the euro area
may be defined as the fall in value added of specified industries induced by
a potential negative external demand shock. In the following, we attempt to
estimate the size of this cost.
A decline in export demand may weaken the performance of the total economy
over the long term. We attempt to estimate the spill-over effect on the basis
of the negative external demand shock which took place in 1998–99.
141 The
decline in external demand in the second half of 1998 did not only affect
the CEECs – there was also a disruption in growth in manufacturing output
of the European Union in the period (see Chart VI-1).  Therefore, when
analysing the influence of this demand shock on the Hungarian economy,
we cannot confine ourselves exclusively to examining a single region, the
so-called ‘Eastern markets’.
140  These are the following: manufacture of computers, manufacture of lighting equipment, manufacture
of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles n.e.c., manufacture of electronic components,
manufacture of television, radio receivers, sound or video recording, manufacture of road vehicles,
manufacture of engines for motor vehicles and parts and accessories for such.
141 It would be legitimate to include the global recession starting in 2001 in the scope of observations.
However, the extent of recession cannot be quantified yet and, therefore, conclusion cannot be
drawn from such.




Manufacturing output of the European Union, 1995–2002
Seasonally adjusted data; December 1994=100
Source: Eurostat.
In terms of year-on-year percentage changes, Hungarian manufacturing exports
were some 6% lower than the potential at end-1998 and in the first half of 1999.
143  
The slowdown in the rate of export growth also forced actual Hungarian GDP
below the potential level. Slower economic growth resulted in a loss of nearly
2% of GDP, measured on the basis of year-on-year percentage changes. This
rough calculation helps us to draw the general conclusion that a 1% fall in







































145 Here and elsewhere in the analysis, by potential we mean the time series as produced using the
Hodrick-Prescott approach. Much longer time series would be required to applying the method reliably,
therefore, we consider these calculations as experimental.173
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Chart VI-2
Hungarian manufacturing export sales, 1997–2002
Seasonally adjusted data; 1992=100
Sources: CSO; NBH calculations.
It is important to point out that the slowdown in export demand in 1998–99 did not
or only slightly affect machinery and equipment comprising the majority of the
specified industries (see Chart F–3).
144 The degrees to which the various sectors are
integrated into the whole economy are different and, moreover, vary constantly over
time. Therefore, caution is required when applying the multiplier effect, stemming
from the empirical investigations presented above, to the various sectors, particularly
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144 Whereas machinery and equipment, which contributes some half of total industrial output, was not
perceptibly affected by the recession in 1998–99, the sector was not left unaffected by last year's
decline in demand for exports. 174
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145 We assumed a linear relationship between the decline in exports and the fall in gross value added in
the case of each sector. 
Chart VI-3
Comparison of economic growth in the European Union and
export sales of Hungarian machinery and equipment
Time series of EU growth on year-on-year basis; time series of machinery and
equipment adjusted for seasonal and working-day effects; 1992=100)
Source: Eurostat, CSO.
As discussed in detail earlier, provided that a certain sector of the Hungarian economy
exposed to an asymmetric shock is hit by a specific negative external demand shock,
then the given sector's exports as well as its value added from exports will fall over the
short term.
145 As a consequence of the decline in demand, deterioration in domestic
market positions caused by intensifying competition in the domestic market and the
fall in contractors' existing orders may lead to a reduction in the entire sector's output,
irrespective of the direction of sales. The slowdown in the sector's performance may
sooner or later feed through to other sectors as well, so total Hungarian gross domestic
product may experience a larger drop than the decline in value added of the sector
affected by the shock. Table F–1 presents these observations translated into numbers,
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Effect on GDP of a fall in exports by specified industries
146
Notes: * Using the value deriving from the empirical observation of the multiplier effect.
** Data released by CSO differ because of the different database.
Source: APEH's database of corporate tax returns for 2000.
For example, when exports of road vehicle manufacturers suffer a decline of 10%, and
the cyclical position of the European Union remains unchanged, Hungarian GDP may
fall by some 0.7% over the long term relative to its earlier path. Assuming that
exchange rate policy were able to handle such an export demand shock effectively,
then, following Hungary's joining the euro area, the decline in GDP caused by the
negative external shocks hitting the industries exposed to asymmetric and specific
shocks would be accounted for as the real economic costs of giving up the
independent monetary policy. But even this, the largest economic sector, only
contributes 2.3% to total GDP; and adjustment of the exchange rate would also boost
demand for goods produced by the competitive sector left unaffected by the
asymmetric shock. For this reason, we maintain that an independent exchange rate
policy is an inappropriate tool to handle negative external demand shocks hitting the
specified industries.
Industries Gross value added  Gross value added  Per cent fall in GDP as 
per exports as a per  of the entire sector  an effect of a 10% fall in
cent of GDP as per cent of GDP exports*
Manufacture of road vehicles 2.1 2.3 0.68
Manufacture of computers 0.4 0.5 0.14
Manufacture of lighting equipment 0.4 0.5 0.14
Manufacture of electronic components 0.3 0.4 0.13
Manufacture of electrical  0.3 0.3 0.08
equipment for engines and vehicles
Television, radio receivers etc. 0.2 0.3 0.09
Manufacturing firms, total 9.1 18.3**
146 It deserves special mention that, within the specified industries, the proportion of firms producing in
customs-free areas is very large. These firms are characterised by salient foreign trade volumes relative
to gross value added. According to a 1999 survey, total GDP produced by firms located in customs-
free zones was HUF 411 billion, while their exports exceeded HUF 2,400 billion, compared with imports
amounting to HUF 2,070 billion.VI.2. Identifying supply and demand shock using structural VAR
estimates
The effect of a supply shock hitting an economy can be identified in two steps.
After choosing the appropriate time series, mostly a real and a related nominal
variable, the systematic relationship between the two must be estimated in the
first step. Assuming first order integrated variables, this produces the estimation
of the vector autoregression model as follows:
where y and p denote the natural logarithm of the real quantity and the price relating
to it, and e
y and e
p are the two random shocks affecting the two variables which
may correlate with each other. Ai,…,Aq are the estimated coefficient matrixes.
In the second step, we decompose the random terms by imposing structural
restrictions, and the shocks calculated this way can now be readily interpreted in
economic terms. In our assumption, the actual data generating process is as
follows:
where L is the lag operator, ε
d and ε
s are shocks affecting demand and
supply respectively, and matrixes Bi represent the corresponding impulse
response functions for output and the price level.
In case the stationarity assumptions are met, the estimated VAR model can be written
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The relationship between the residues of the estimated model and the structural
shocks can be written as e=Cε . In addition to the orthonormality of the structural
shocks, another condition is required for the exact identification of C. As our purpose
is to segregate demand and supply shocks, it is the most straightforward and most
frequently used restriction in such cases that demand shocks do not alter the level
of output over the long term.
147
We performed the estimate using GDP and consumer price data in a quarterly
breakdown, taking into account that GDP data for the accession countries examined
are only available from 1992–93. Although the GDP deflator would be more suitable
as a price variable, we chose the consumer prices, due to the better reliability of
data.
The GDP time series used for the purposes of the estimate are at constant
prices, as provided by OECD. The sources of consumer prices are the IFS
database of IMF and the CSO in the case of Hungary. We seasonally
adjusted all time series using the model-based approach of the TRAMO-
SEATS software. There was a shift in German GDP in 1991 Q1 due to
reunification, which we corrected by averaging the first difference between
the logarithms of seasonally adjusted 1990 Q4 and 1991 Q2 for 1991 Q1.
We used the logarithmic differences of the seasonally adjusted and corrected
levels in the estimate. As a first step, we estimated two-variable VAR models for
the sample covering the period 1980 Q1–2000 Q4 for developed countries. In
defining the number of lags, we relied on the Akaike Information Criterion. In the case
of a few countries, the impulse response functions proved to be counterintuitive;
therefore, we reduced the number of lags according to the Schwarz Criterion in the
∆ ∑ = ∆
147  In respect of the coefficient matrixes of the structural equation this means that               , i.e. the




case of these countries. Then, all impulse responses had the expected sign over
the long term. The number of lags was 1–2 for each country, with the exceptions
of Portugal and Luxembourg (6–6), Spain (4) and Ireland (3).
Chart VI-4
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* For the sake of better comparability, we normalised the shocks in order for the effect on consumer
price levels to be 1 per cent on the 20-quarter horizon.179
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Chart VI-5
Hungarian impulse response functions (supply shock*)
Chart VI-6



























* For the sake of better comparability, we normalised the shocks in order for the effect on consumer
price levels to be 1 per cent on the 20-quarter horizon.180
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Chart VI-7
Impulse response functions (supply shock,* EMU members)
* For the sake of better comparability, we normalised the shocks in order for the effect on consumer
price levels to be 1 per cent on the 20-quarter horizon.
We derived the time series for supply and demand shocks which we called
‘European’ from the individual demand and supply shocks, using their first principal
component. As a next step, we estimated the structural VAR models for the accession
countries using the strategy described above, for the period 1992–2000, and related
the demand an supply shocks obtained this way to the European. It is important
to note that we did not use the shocks to accession countries in order to define the





















Variance explained by the first principal component (per cent)
We would like to place the emphasis on two factors in respect of the interpretation
and interpretability of our results. First, due to the short time series for the accession
countries, we used quarterly data in the calculations, and the correlation coefficients
obtained only measure quarterly simultaneous co-movements. Averaging the
demand and supply shocks for longer periods, the results may change significantly.
For example, Hungary's supply correlation with the European component is 0.25
between 1996–2000, provided that the quarterly shocks are considered. This
value, however, rises above 0.6 in the same period, if four-quarter moving averages
are used, given that there is a high cross-correlation between the time series lagged
by 1–2 periods.
Demand Supply Demand Supply
Austria 18 2 Luxembourg 29 13
Belgium 44 40 Great Britannia 18 3
Denmark 7 20 Germany 39 20
Finland 12 26 Norway 7 0
France 15 45 Italy 16 30
Greece 3 13 Portugal 2 17
Netherlands 26 17 Spain 16 4
Ireland 26 0 Switzerland 42 5
Iceland 1 7 Sweden 5 32182
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Chart VI-8
Inflation in the accession countries
Quarterly growth rates, seasonally adjusted
The reliability of our results and those obtained by other authors using similar time
series is considerably limited by the clearly observable trends in inflation of the
accession countries, and particularly in that of Hungary and Poland (see Chart VI-8).
However, the method outlined above builds on the stationarity of the first differences.
Unit root and stationarity tests show a mixed picture, i.e. the presence of a unit root
can neither be confirmed nor rejected at high significance level.
































































































































1VI.3. The model used to estimate foreign trade expansion
In the section of our cost-benefit analysis, dealing with trade expansion, we used
the gravity model derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2000) (hereinafter: AW)
to obtain the required estimate. The main features of the model are full specialisation
(i.e. one country produces a single product) and the CES-type utility function,
which AW employ to derive a simple equation for the volume of trade (xij) between
countries i and j, as follows:
where yi is the nominal GDP of country i-th, y
W is the world's total nominal output,
σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods of the countries, tij is the mark-up
reflected in prices due to trade barriers and Pi is the price index of country i, which
positively correlates with the sum of bilateral trade barriers between i and all of its
trading partners. The domestic price index Pi, therefore, can be expressed as the
function of bilateral trade barriers tij. 
Thus, the volume of trade between a pair of countries in the model depends on the
size of the bilateral trade barrier relative to the average of barriers to trade with all
trading partners. 
Currency union between a pair of countries reduces the bilateral trade barrier.
However, the effect of this on trade between the two countries depends on the
extent of this reduction relative to the reduction in barriers to trade with all trading
partners. In other words, if a country forms a currency union with another which
has previously had a large importance in its foreign trade, then the expansion of
trade within the new union will be relatively slight, given the not too large fall in
bilateral barrier relative to that in the average multilateral trade barrier. This may
be true even if the entry into currency union otherwise significantly reduces bilateral
trade barriers within the union. It should be noted that this same situation applies
to the case of Hungary's joining EMU, given that, even before entry into the




(1)However slim the expansion of bilateral trade may be, the reduction in trade barriers as
a result of entry into the currency union has a positive effect on welfare, as less
resources are wasted on account of barriers. This will be reflected in the fall in the
domestic price index Pi. Demonstrably, in the case of the CES utility function the
welfare gain is commensurate with (1/Pi)
2. The more member states trade with each
other prior to establishing the currency union, the higher the gain in welfare will be after
entry into the currency union. The welfare gain, therefore, will be the highest in currency
unions where the expansion of trade is the slightest. 
The model developed by AW has proved to be an excellent tool in the empirical
examination of the effects of currency unions on trade and welfare. This examination
can be performed in three steps. The first step is to estimate the size of bilateral trade
barriers (tij). In practice, this is carried out with a large panel regression, where the
observed trade barrier is regressed on factors which are presumably the determinants
of trade barrier tij. Such variables are, for example, the distance between the two
countries, their GDP, dummy variables for a shared border, common language,
common colonial past, existence of a free-trade agreement, etc. The dummy variable
relating to the existence of currency union is also among these explanatory variables.
The estimation conducted this way is essentially little different from the estimate
performed using a standard ‘gravity’ model.
The next step is to express price levels Pi  from bilateral trade barriers tij.
Calculation of these for all countries is carried out simultaneously, and it requires
a complex numerical optimisation involving numerous computations.
The third step is to calculate price levels Pi simultaneously again, but this time we
simulate the effects of a hypothesised currency union. Accordingly, trade barriers
tij  among members of the currency union will be lower, corresponding to the
parameter of the currency union dummy variable obtained in the first step, i.e. in
estimating the ‘gravity’ model.
Then, the effect of the currency union on trade and welfare can simply be calculated
by substituting price levels Pi, obtained in steps one and two, into equation (1) and
expression (1/Pi)
2, and by comparing them.
In order to estimate the effect of Hungary's joining EMU, we used the GAUSS code
referred to in the article by Rose and van Wincoop (2000) and developed by the
authors themselves, which functions using the three-step approach described
184
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148 We modified the programme to enable ourselves to not only calculate the
effects of the currency union on trade and welfare for the average of the members,
but for the individual countries as well. The reason for this approach is that it has
a crucial economic policy importance for the newly acceding countries. The
programme allows us to examine the effects of a hypothetical currency union of
any composition. Thus, we were able to examine a number of highly important
scenarios which were not discussed by the article by Rose and van Wincoop. In our
cost-benefit analysis, the scenario ‘Hungary joins EMU’ played the central role. In
addition to this, we also calculated, and published in the paper, the results of the
scenario ‘the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary join EMU’ as well.
VI.4. Description of the calibrated growth model
We attempted to measure the effect of a reduction in real interest rates and the release
of current account and debt constraint by adapting the BMS model by Barro,
Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995). The key problem of the model is that convergence
of small open economies is a slower process, and capital inflow is more moderate,
than one would expect based on the equalisation of returns. One of the possible
explanations for this is the adjustment cost of investment. However, the BMS model
attempts to explain this phenomenon in a different manner, by postulating that
there exists an upper limit to capital flows, accompanied by another one to the
accumulation of debt by a country. From this it follows that returns only equalise
over the longer term and amid slower capital flows relative to an ideal world.
The BMS model assumes that a country may accumulate debt only to the extent
of its physical capital stock, as foreign creditors require a collateral for their debts,
but they do not accept human capital, but rather physical capital, as a collateral.
In the case of the parameters used by BMS, i.e. when the share parameter of physical
capital is α =0.3, the model would produce a more than 200% debt-to-GDP ratio,
which cannot be seen in emerging markets and not even in developed countries.
Therefore, we need to find a more stringent constraint than the amount of physical
capital in order to enable ourselves to adapt the model to Hungary. In our view, it
185
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is not necessary to give a concrete interpretation of the issue of what kinds of
capital goods could provide a collateral for debt. Simply we assume that there
exists such a group of capital goods, and we define the share parameter a with the
goal of enabling ourselves to reproduce the debt-to-GDP ratio observable empirically
in the case of Hungary. Furthermore, we assume that the share parameter β
represents all other physical and human capital goods, i.e. α+β is the share of the
country's total capital stock.
The solution of the BMS model can be characterised basically by three indicators.
One is λ , which measures the speed of economic convergence, i.e.
log(yt+1)–log(yt)= λ [log(y*)–log(yt)], 
where yt is per-capita GDP normalised by the level of technological development.
This same indicator is denoted by y* in developed countries (y* is constant, which
means that in developed countries per-capita GDP is on a balanced growth path
determined by exogenous technological progress). As the model implies that
countries with lower per-capita GDP converge to developed countries, i.e. yt
converges to y*, therefore λ is positive. λ measures the extent of the reduction in
the percentage difference between y* and yt over the next period. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) also demonstrate on page 37 of their textbook that ln(2)/λ
measures the so-called half-life of convergence. It shows how many years it takes
for the actual difference between y* and yt to reduce to a half.
149.
In the BMS model, the parameter λ is a function of the following parameters: α and
β denote capital share parameters, n denotes the rate of growth of population, g
denotes the measure of technological progress, δ denotes the rate of depreciation,
ρ denotes the subjective discount factor of the representative consumer and θ
denotes the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.
Let us notice that the real interest rate does not play a role in defining λ . The
real rate of interest is important from the perspective of the two other significant
coefficients characterising the solution of the model. Let us denote capital goods
available as a collateral for foreign debt by kt and the rest by ht. In equilibrium, the
149 From this it clearly follows that in case of a constant half-life of convergence the distance reduces
to one fourth in two periods and to one eighth in three periods. 
(1)foreign debt-to-GDP ratio is equal to the kt/yt ratio. This is determined by the
formula as follows:
where r is the real interest rate. With a given real interest rate, depreciation rate and
debt-to-GDP ratio, the size of α can be determined from this formula. In the model,
the connection between y and h is determined by the equation as follows:
where ε is the function of the capital share parameters, and 
For the purposes of our calculation, we set most of the model parameters as in
international literature and in BMS – α+β =0.8, g=0.02, δ =0.05, θ =2, ρ =0.02. We
chose the rate of growth of the population to be n=0, conforming with the
Hungarian circumstances. We calculated the size of parameter a from the debt-to-
GDP ratio according to the method as described in the previous paragraph. We
considered two versions in the model. In the first, the fall in real interest rates is
associated with a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio, i.e. the present value (this is debt taken
in the broad sense, i.e. it not only includes debts but all claims as well); and we
also considered a case in which the debt constraint eases, and the initial debt-to-
GDP ratio is 80%. In the first version, α =0.087 and α =0.116 in the second version.
Furthermore, we assumed that, in the initial position, Hungarian per-capita GDP is
half of that in developed countries, i.e. y0=y*/2. This corresponds to the empirical
values calculated on a purchasing power parity basis.
In the model, we captured the change in real interest rates using the approach as
follows. The starting position is t=0, and the economy features a higher real interest





(4)basis of formula (4), B increases and, as a result, y1 also increases relative to y0,
based on formula (3). Thereafter, B remains constant, and the evolution of y can be
written using equation (1). Although from t=1 the growth rate of variables is determined
by λ on the basis of equation (1), which does not depend on the real interest rate,
this does not mean that the reduction in the real interest rate does not influence the
average growth rate during the period examined. Explanation for this is that the effect
of the reduction in the real interest rate can be captured in the period between t=0
and t=1. Consequently, the real interest rate influences the growth rate over the entire
period between t=0 and T. The one-off jump between t=0 and t=1 can be explained
by the fact that investment related to kt is not associated with adjustment cost in the
model. 
As mentioned earlier, the reduction in the debt constraint can be captured by
choosing α =0.116 instead of α =0.087 as a share parameter. An increase in the
parameter raises λ in equation (1) and B in equation (4); consequently, the growth





Copenhagen criteria The conditions for membership in the European Union were
defined by the Copenhagen European Council. Accordingly,
candidates have to meet certain political, economic and legal
criteria.
ECB European Central Bank. The central institution of the
Eurosystem and the ESCB. Its governing bodies also function
as the decision-making bodies of the Eurosystem.
Ecofin Council of Ministers for Economic and Financial Affairs. The
supreme decision-making body of the European Union, in
which the governments of the Member States are represented
at the ministerial level. Its composition varies according to
the agenda – ministers of the Member States responsible for
the matters under consideration attend the Council meetings.
Normally, the economic policy issues relevant to Economic
and Monetary Union are discussed by Ecofin.
EMU Economic and Monetary Union. An important stage of
European monetary integration, as a result of which countries
that meet the Maastricht criteria introduce a common currency
and give up their independent exchange rate and monetary
policies.
ERM II Exchange Rate Mechanism II. A not compulsory exchange
rate arrangement for currencies of EU Member States not
participating in the euro area.
ESA 95 The statistical system of the Eurosystem which provides a
description of the national economies of the Member States.
It is consistent with the principles of the SNA, the inter-
nationally used  accounting methodology. The ESA 95190
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provides a very detailed methodology of calculating general
government sector deficit. One of the Maastricht criteria
refers to this category as defined by ESA 95.
ESCB European System of Central Banks. It consists of the
European Central Bank and the national central banks
(NCBs) of all Member States of the European Union. The
ESCB provides a framework for monetary and exchange rate
policy cooperation between the Eurosystem and the NCBs of
the Member States which have not yet adopted the euro.
European The independent administrative body of the European Union. 
Commission, EC It is responsible for the implementation of Community policies
(e.g. common agricultural policy), administration of the
Community budget and the arrangement for Community
programmes. It is also a crucial part of the European
legislation process – it submits proposals to the European
Parliament and the Council, on which they have to make
decisions.
Eurostat The statistical office of the European Union.
Eurosystem The central bank of the euro area. It is responsible for
developing and implementing the common monetary policy.
The central institution of the Eurosystem is the European
Central Bank and its branches are the national central banks
of euro area Member States.
Governing Council The supreme decision-making body of the European Central
Bank and the Eurosystem. The Governing Council defines the
monetary policy guidelines for the euro area and the method of
implementing them. It comprises the governors of the national
central banks of the Member States that have adopted the euro
and all the members of the Executive Board of the ECB.191
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HICP Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices. The purposes of
examining of the inflation convergence criterion and assessing
price stability have necessitated to construct national price
indices on a comparable basis and harmonise the differences
national definitions.
Maastricht criteria The requirements of membership in Economic and
Monetary Union were defined by the Maastricht Treaty. The
convergence criteria refer to price stability, long-term interest
rate convergence, sustainable budgetary position and
exchange rate stability.
NIGEM model The macroeconomic model developed by the London-based
NIESR research institute. Its main areas of use are  analyses
of various world economic effects, real economic forecasts at
regular intervals and economic policy simulations.
OCA Optimum Currency Area. The OCA theory provides the theo-
retical conditions of exchange rate pegging between countries.
Opt-out The right to stay out. An option either to participate in the
stages of monetary integration (e.g. ERM II and EMU) or stay
out. The Maastricht Treaty provided Great Britain and
Denmark with an exclusive right to opt out. However, the EU
ruled out this option in the case of new members. 
SNA A statistical system developed jointly by the UNO, the
European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and
the OECD and used world-wide. There are differences between
this and the definition of ‘SNA-based’ general government
deficit in the publications of the National Bank of Hungary. In
many respects, this category of deficit is common with the
genuine accounting method of the SNA, but actually it is an
analytical-economic indicator.The Pact clarifies the excessive deficit procedure defined in
the Maastricht Treaty. Accordingly, (i) it requires that the
government deficit must be kept below the reference value of
3% of GDP in periods of normal cyclical fluctuations, (ii) it
defines the nature of sanctions that may be imposed in the
event of a breach of the reference value, (iii) it establishes
stringent deadlines for implementing the various steps of the
excessive deficit procedure and (iv) it requires preparing
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